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We were sitting around the table after dinner, the red wine bottles not yet 
quite empty. The light-hearted banter turned to national stereotypes and 
the jokes people in each country told about each other. There were, I think, 
about six of us sharing the comfortable house, three train stations outside 
downtown Oslo. Most around the table were from Nordic countries. As a 
visiting researcher at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), I was one of 
the two non-Nordics that evening. The other was a recent household arrival, 
a Turkish activist asylum-seeker, who now occupied the sofa in the front 
room. The laughter grew boisterous as people chimed in with examples from 
Finnish and Norwegian television shows and with witty, though not mean, 
regional jokes learned in schoolyards.
I was fascinated. Until then, I had lumped the countries of the Nordic 
region together. I probably even mistakenly labelled all five ‘Scandinavian’.
This would have been October 1978.
Now, here we are in 2020. Over these last four decades, I have learned to 
say ‘Nordic’ when referring to the five northern countries. Over the same 
decades, Icelandic voters have chosen the world’s first woman elected head 
of state; Norway’s members of parliament have voted to conscript young 
women as well as young men in the country’s military; a Swedish foreign 
minister has declared her commitment to a feminist foreign policy; the 
governments of Demark and Finland, each headed by women prime minis-
ters, have received high marks for their public responses to the coronavirus 
 pandemic – and, we learn from this fascinating book, ‘Nordic’ has been 
turned into a brand.
As I’ve been reading these engaging chapters, I’ve been pushed (I like being 
intellectually pushed!) to think carefully about the interplay of four central 
themes that take centre stage here. First, there are the politics of branding. 
I’ve wondered about gendered branding ever since I started exploring Chiq-
uita’s corporate campaign to brand a generic fruit, the banana. But taking 
deliberate steps to brand an entire geographic region – that is new to me. 
Second, there is the centrality of gender equality – as a reality and a civic 
commitment – to this deliberately constructed Nordic brand. Third, the 




reality: despite Nordic branding efforts, the five countries have remained 
quite distinct, even in their allegedly shared gender- equality successes (for 
example, only Sweden uses ‘feminist’ in its official self- description). The five 
aren’t quite the stereotypes that made my Oslo friends laugh out loud all 
those years ago, but they certainly are not carbon copies of each other. And, 
fourth, the authors reveal, there are both advantages and disadvantages to 
positive regional branding. A downside, it turns out, is that presenting one-
self as ahead of everyone else can be quite off-putting for one’s potential 
allies and partners.
These attentive contributors reveal, moreover, that the four dynamics are 
neither stable over time nor simply moving along on parallel tracks.
There is a good reason why this book is more valuable analytically for 
being written by gender specialists. Since the 1970s, each of the five Nor-
dic countries has been pushed by its local women’s movements to face up 
to, and address politically, the masculinizing processes that shaped each 
of their structures and cultures of business, family, politics and culture. 
Those five women’s movements have not moved in lock step; their activists, 
I’ve learned, don’t share a common regional language, and thus often can 
only talk to each other in English. Iceland’s 1975 historic Women’s Strike 
has not been repeated in the other four countries. The pressures to absorb 
new immigrants and address local racism and ethnocentrism have not been 
uniformly felt by feminists in all five societies. Notwithstanding these dif-
ferences among women’s movements, there have been shared activist experi-
ences and conscious collaborations, as well as, as we see here, joint research 
enterprises. The contributors to this volume show us how those myriad 
sharings have worked their ways into a notable regional branding effort, an 
effort enacted not just by women activists, but by people who have come to 
see gender equality – or at least the veneer of gender equality – as useful for 
pursuing their own ends.
And all this has made me realize how much gender investigating we all 
still need to do. Thanks to the focused and rigorous investigations offered 
here, the editors and scholars involved in this work have made me more 
curious about the micro-workings of masculinities and femininities – and 
thus of patriarchy in all its guises. I’m greedy. Having now finished these 
eye-opening chapters, I want full gender analyses of every one of the Nordic 
ministries of foreign affairs. Furthermore, the gender workings of the full 
process of designing, approving and revising national websites have now 
caught my attention. I am also looking forward to someone conducting a 
feminist gender analysis of the Norwegian Tourism Board – maybe a team 
to compare the genderings of all five countries’ tourism boards. I’ve become 
more curious, too, to see the findings of researchers who dig into the gender 
dynamics shaping the day-to-day relationships between business lobbyists 
and the Danish and Finnish ministries of foreign affairs.
Foreword xv
Yes, I know. It does seem ungrateful of me to write a foreword that asks 
for more. But, really, that is the sign of an analytically valuable book, isn’t 





Gender equality is an inevitable part of the Nordic imaginary – and partly 
for unmistakable reasons: The Nordic states enfranchised women ahead of 
most countries and regions in the world. And since the social transforma-
tions of the 1970s, the Nordics have all introduced generous welfare pro-
grammes and policies to overcome inequalities deriving from longstanding 
structures and cultures of gender difference. At the same time, there is rea-
son to ask what role this predominantly progressive gender image currently 
plays in the political communication of the Nordic states abroad. Particu-
larly in a time when branding has become a ‘necessary marker of identifi-
cation, a language for all nations on a global scale’ (Aronczyk, 2018: 233), 
we need to investigate more critically the strategic use of gender equality 
in the Nordic region for the purposes of nation-branding and reputation 
management.
The Nordic countries top the rankings of all global indexes on gender 
equality. Their global reputation is underlined by the United Nations’ de-
scription of Norway as a ‘haven of gender equality’ (UN CEDAW, 2003), 
while others have proclaimed them ‘gender superpowers’ (Vandapuye, 2016).1 
The circulating force of these simplistic representations seems evident in a 
time when the political interaction within and between states increasingly 
takes place on Twitter, social media and the internet. Yet to portray the Nor-
dic countries as forerunners or superpowers of gender equality is never an 
objective or neutral act, but the result of agency: of states, parliamentarians, 
politicians, civil society, NGOs or other interest groups, in addition to me-
dia and communication professionals. It is therefore important to ask not 
only what role the Nordic gender imaginary currently plays in the external 
communication of the Nordic region, but by whom the Nordic gender image 
is mobilized, for what purpose, and how the strategic use of gender equality 
has affected the brands of the region’s five countries: Denmark, Sweden, 
Norway, Finland and Iceland. Further, if the Nordic brand has been suc-
cessfully gendered, how does the individual Nordic country manage to dif-
ferentiate itself from its fellow Nordic comrades by representing itself as a 
gender-equal nation? This is the core focus of this book on gender equality 
and nation branding in the Nordic region.
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Moving beyond Nordic gender exceptionalism
This book, put together by scholars from various fields of specialization, is 
motivated by an urge to move beyond conventional images and discourses 
of Nordic gender- and women-friendliness. At a time when nation-branding 
is regarded as vital for the global recognition of states, it seems even more 
important to shed a critical light on how and to what extent the Nordic 
countries draw on the Nordic gender image to enhance their own visibility 
in the world. Current attempts to brand the nation – also called nation- 
branding – involve efforts to create new or reinforce already existing asso-
ciations and identities of the nation as a geographical, historical, cultural, 
political, economic and social entity. This is usually done by triggering or 
nourishing its positive values and associations to distinguish it from other 
countries on the global scene (Vuignier, 2016: 9). Nation-branding is thus 
also an unescapable part of globalization, which is a market-oriented pro-
cess dominated by the West and predicated on the creation of winners and 
losers. Hence, efforts to strengthen the national brand or reputation of in-
dividual Nordic countries with the aid of gender equality as a political and 
symbolic value inevitably help to reinforce already established global hier-
archies of the Nordics as moral superpowers.
When Nordic ministers or academic observers proclaim that the Nordics 
are ‘gender superpowers’,2 the images of gender equality are usually closely 
related to Nordic achievements and experiences within the welfare state, 
including stay-at-home dads and parental leaves. This indicates that gender 
equality also has become essential to the self-understandings of the Nordic 
countries, serving as a source of pride and national identity, and defined as 
a key element of economic prosperity and a well-functioning society. Nor-
dic uniqueness on gender therefore tends to inflect and legitimate other as-
pects of the Nordic models, such as the Nordic model of welfare and social 
democracy.
This book addresses some of these intricate and sometimes complicated 
interactions between domestic self-identification and foreign promotion and 
projection of the Nordic models, regions and countries. Consequently, it 
leans more on the fast-growing scholarship of nation-branding and reputa-
tion management than on the literature on nation-building, although it does 
acknowledge the importance of national identities for nation-branding pur-
poses. Few, if any, states brand themselves in stark opposition to how they 
see themselves domestically. But where nation-building has some room for 
idiosyncrasies and complexities, the market language of branding calls for 
simplicity to the level of distortion. It feels somehow important to state that 
we, as editors and authors of this book, do not necessarily identify with the 
processes discussed and analysed in its pages. For us, branding – including 
nation-branding – has foremost been an analytical tool to unlock the appar-
ent ones of our own time, that is, concerns of how states present themselves 
to the outside world and the decoupling that often follows between what 
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takes place at home, politically speaking, and what is promoted abroad. 
The danger of turning gender equality into a political symbol or brand is, of 
course, that this might lead to a sense that there is no need for improvement. 
The political force of gender equality as a normative value and vigour in 
society runs, in this way, the danger of ebbing out. The contribution of this 
book is more about the empirical richness of its ten chapters than its critique 
of nation-branding as theory and practice. The book shows how gender 
equality has been and is currently being used in the political communica-
tions of the Nordic countries. We draw upon empirical studies of Nordic 
domestic self-images within different areas, as well as external imaginings 
and uptakes of the Nordic gender imaginary within various policy fields.
In recent decades, the image of the Nordic countries as gender champions 
has circulated in and out of the Nordic region thanks to the global index 
industry, the media, and social science researchers like ourselves publishing 
internationally on various gender-related themes. In this book, however, we 
focus on three key actors – national governments, business organizations 
and civil society – without losing sight of the vast international literature on 
the Nordic model(s), on the one hand, and nation-branding, on the other. The 
process of imagining the Nordics as gender-progressive, as already stated, is 
closely related to the discourse of Nordic exceptionalism built on the notion 
of the ‘Nordic models’ (Browning, 2007; Clerc et al., 2015; Marklund, 2017). 
This scholarly literature and discourse focuses predominantly on social 
welfare, labour relations, penal culture and law, development aid, Nordic 
cuisine and aesthetics, the ‘Nordic ways of doing things’, and the general 
stickiness of the Nordic reputation (Marklund and Petersen, 2013; Skil-
brei and Holmström, 2013; Ridderheim, 2014; Jónsson, 2014; Elgström and 
Delputte, 2016; Leer, 2016; Scharff Smith and Ugelvik, 2016; Solum, 2016; 
Stougaard-Nielsen, 2016). Few systematic efforts, however, have been made 
to bring gender into the expanding critical literature on nation-branding in 
the Nordic area (for exceptions, see Towns, 2002; Loftsdóttir, 2015; Jezierska 
and Towns, 2018; Einarsdóttir, 2020).
In their contribution to the emerging literature on public diplomacy and 
nation-branding in the Nordic region, Clerc and Glover (2015: 6) distinguish 
between domestic imaginings of the nation and the external imaging of it. 
In doing so, they optimize the delicate but ever so mutually dependent rela-
tionship between nation-building and nation-branding. In his seminal work 
Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, 
Benedict Anderson (1983) saw nations as imagined communities; commu-
nities that were made possible as print capitalism in the sixteenth century 
created new ways of communicating identity and belonging among citizens. 
Nation-building and nation-branding can thus be said to have the imaginary 
aspect in common, yet as historical phenomena they must be kept apart. It 
was during the neoliberal turn of the late 1970s and early 1980s that business 
principles and communication strategies entered state management in the 
form of nation-branding, including in the realm of public policy-making. 
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Nation-building, on the other hand, goes back to the nineteenth century 
and the rise of new nation-states, including in the Nordic region, defined by 
their distinct languages, cultures and pasts. In this sense, nations were de 
facto brands long before more systematic efforts began to cultivate certain 
of the nation’s associations for nation-branding or reputation-management 
purposes, whether the aim of such activity is to attract foreign investment, 
to secure a chair at the table of powerful organizations or to increase the 
visibility of a country in the international arena.
Our book builds on Clerc and Glover’s distinction between, on the one 
hand, domestic imagining of the Nordic countries related to ongoing pro-
cesses of nation-building and, on the other, foreign or external imaging of 
the areas in question. The external pictures made of the Nordic region and 
countries are more detached from the national identity politics of the Nor-
dic countries. At the same time, we recognize the danger of operating on 
the assumption that a watertight separation can be maintained between the 
two sides of the distinction. Activities of imagining and imaging the Nordics 
take place both inside and outside the region, and it is our task to capture 
some of the dynamics at play between various branding agents at the same 
time as we allow the actors studied to define and name their own activities. 
Thus, in this book, we deliberately recognize the multi-faceted nature of 
nation-branding, even when studying periods before the neoliberal turn of 
the 1980s and 1990s. That said, we are fully aware that nation-branding is a 
contemporary phenomenon and that most would read this book with that 
sense in mind, not necessarily viewing it as an analytical lens, as we have 
made use of it.
Nation-branding versus nation brands
There is considerable variation in the definitions of nation-branding, and 
many related concepts – such as public diplomacy, framing and reputation 
management, and status-seeking – are linked to the phenomenon it cap-
tures. The authors of this book have been given room to situate themselves 
and their topics in the broader scope of nation-branding and related con-
ceptualizations, as we believe these different terms speak to the imagining 
of the Nordic in relation to gender equality. Again, this makes branding 
first and foremost an analytical device for grasping contemporary and past 
representations of the Nordics in relation to gender equality (Langford and 
Larsen, 2017; Viktorin et al., 2018: 11–20). We also relate to nation-branding 
as a contemporary phenomenon and characteristic of the neoliberal state 
(Varga, 2013). The practice of branding, however, is much older, first used 
in the Bronze Age to mark ownership, particularly of cattle. Etymologi-
cally speaking, the word brand originates from the Old Norse branðr, which 
simply means to burn with something hot – such as charred wood or iron. 
In the nineteenth century, branding turned into a business practice used to 
appeal to the consumer and to help sell increasingly similar products. The 
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rise of department stores from the 1830s onwards represented a revolution 
in retailing, offering a large range of goods for fixed prices, which made it 
increasingly important to provide each product with a unique image and 
personality. Yet it was the explosion of mass consumption during the 1950s 
and 1960s that helped branding become a tool of modern marketing, stra-
tegically used both for products and for cities and countries to attract buy-
ers and tourists. The goal of branding, however, is to create a brand that, 
if it proves successful, provides strong associations with the product itself, 
such as Apple for computers, McDonalds for hamburgers, Nike for running 
shoes, etc. The breakthrough for nation-branding, however, came in the late 
1980s and 1990s.
British politicians, in particular, in cooperation with communication 
and marketing experts, were early to use branding techniques in their ef-
forts to remake the image of Britain. The Labour Party’s success in the 
1997 election was partly due to the use of such an approach. Tony Blair’s 
New Labour corresponded to a large extent with a new image of Britain 
that not only gave voters new confidence (Leonard, 1997; Dinnie, 2016; 
 Viktorin et al., 2018: 7–8). This also helped modernize the image of the 
UK in a way that, according to Dinnie (2016: 16), replaced ‘Rule Britan-
nia’ with the media-made ‘Cool Britannia’ – the ‘Old Britain’ with a ‘New 
Britain’. However, it was Margaret Thatcher that first introduced public 
diplomacy measures as a strategy of political communication in the UK. 
According to Cull (2013), this soon paved the way for using branding as a 
tool in promoting and communicating the nation. Later, Simon Anholt, an 
independent nation- branding consultant, came up with the idea of develop-
ing nation brands not only as a way of measuring the global reputations of 
nation-states but also to help countries improve their reputations by flash-
ing specific favourable characteristics above others. In this way, corporate 
branding techniques were applied to countries, claims Mordhorst (2018: 
245), who describes how such an approach was presented to governments 
and foreign ministries. Still, the Nation Brands Index launched by Anholt 
in 2005 as part of his own nation-branding consultancy was never able to 
provide evidence for any correlation between nation-branding campaigns 
and changes in a nation’s image (Anholt, 2010: 2). The reason for this, of 
course, is that nation brands are complex constructions that cannot be pro-
pelled backwards or explained through reference to a specific programme 
or ambition of nation-branding. According to Keith Dinnie, a branding 
consultant who played a key role in the neoliberal globalization discourse 
around 2000, a nation brand is ‘the unique, multidimensional blend of ele-
ments that provide the nation with culturally grounded differentiation and 
relevance for all of its target audiences’ (Dinnie, 2016: 5; see also Mordhorst, 
2018: 246). However, as branding consultants are hardly lords over nation 
brands, we as researchers need to do our part to keep nation- branding as 
a deliberate activity and the nation brand as the image or reputation of the 
nation separate.
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The elements used to make nations recognizable on the global scene, 
however, are not always unique in themselves: it is the blend of the various 
ingredients that, according to the logic of the market, provides a nation with 
a competitive advantage through its ability to simply stand out. According 
to Svein Ivar Angell and Mads Mordhorst (2015), the Nordic countries have 
only to various degrees made use of professional branding consultants and 
programmes to improve their reputations as nations internationally. An-
gell and Mordhorst’s research shows that the Danish government decided 
to make use of international branding gurus such as Simon Anholt, among 
others, after the cartoon crises of the early 2000s. In Norway, on the other 
hand, there has been no official branding programme, but policies were im-
plemented around the same time to charter the country’s international rep-
utation (Angell and Mordhorst, 2015). Jezierska and Towns’ chapter in this 
book goes further into the differences and similarities between the various 
branding programmes, policies and infrastructure of the Nordic countries. 
Suffice is to say that, today, in addition to their governmental and tourism 
websites, Iceland, Denmark, Finland and Sweden all have official country 
webpages and are more directly involved in programmes of nation-branding 
than Norway, which does not have an official country webpage (see Chapter 
2 in this book for more on the online branding of the Nordic countries). Yet, 
despite these differences within the Nordic region, the logic and language of 
the market has contributed, albeit in different ways and to different degrees, 
to how the Nordic countries present their historical legacy as gender-equal 
nations – that is, as forerunners of gender equality.
Different policy areas, competing Nordic images
In this book, we have chosen to focus on how various policy fields enable, 
or drive, different and sometimes competing images and imaginings of the 
Nordics through the aid of gender equality and women’s rights. To achieve 
this, we pay particular attention to foreign policy and diplomacy, peace and 
security, and legislative policies related to gender, rape, political rights and 
citizenship, as well as business and corporate boards, in addition to the in-
ternational index industry. The various thematic approaches employed by 
the contributors include quantitative and qualitative methods, fieldwork 
and interviews, and historical, archival and literature studies. What are 
particularly valuable and innovative in our book are the ways in which pro-
cesses of branding regions and nations are seen through gendered optics. 
Gender equality as branding has so far has gained little scholarly attention 
but much public and media interest. The book uses the concept of gender 
with care, not only analysing how notions of masculinity and femininity are 
coupled with, or decoupled from, the Nordic region or individual countries, 
but also pointing to contestations over the constructions of gender equal-
ity and ‘Nordicity’ historically, geographically, and in different policy fields 
and industries.
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The book consists of ten chapters and, as already noted, spans various 
disciplines and fields of research. Despite targeted attempts none of the 
chapters were written by Finnish or Danish contributors, though Finland 
and Denmark are included in analysis covered in various chapters of the 
book. In Chapter 1, Eirinn Larsen emphasizes the importance of history in 
Nordic gender branding. The strong and persistent external image of the 
Nordics as gender champions, she argues, has made history an increasingly 
important resource for individual Nordic countries seeking to distinguish 
themselves from other countries within the Nordic region and legitimate 
themselves as national promoters of gender equality in the world. However, 
the pasts being evoked when imagining the gender-equal Nordic nations dif-
fer considerably among the Nordic countries, although a particular struc-
ture is followed that aims to produce the impression that each country is 
best due to its seminal role in implementing modern standards of women’s 
and gender rights. But, as Larsen asks, what was the importance of the role 
played by external actors in branding the Nordic countries as gender pio-
neers? She seeks to answer this question by tracing how the Nordic gender 
image or ‘brand’ first emerged around a 100 years ago within a context of 
rising nationalism and (trans)national women’s suffragist activism. Her an-
swer provides perspective and a background for the subsequent chapters, all 
of which are more contemporary in their focus.
Chapter 2, by Katarzyna Jezierska and Ann Towns, examines the dif-
ferent operational modes for nation-branding in contemporary Denmark, 
Sweden, Norway, Finland and Iceland, and how their respective uses of 
gender equality in their nation-branding efforts serve to position the coun-
tries quite differently. Through an examination of the official country web-
sites that are set up to brand the individual Nordic nations, the chapter 
explores an important example of the deliberate branding in which the 
five Nordic countries are engaged. Through this material, Jezierska and 
Towns are able to identify differences and similarities between the five 
Nordic countries that provide an interesting backdrop for later chapters. 
They find that the degree to which and ways in which gender equality is 
highlighted differ quite drastically, with Sweden being the most assiduous 
user of gender equality for nation-branding purposes and Denmark the 
least, while Iceland, Finland and Norway lie somewhere in the middle of 
this spectrum.
Then follows Chapter 3 by Sigrun Marie Moss who discusses how gender 
equality has become part of diplomatic practice in the foreign services of the 
different Nordic countries, and how diplomats talk about the Nordic brand 
in relation to gender equality. When is the Nordic gender brand applied, and 
when is it avoided? Here, the Scandinavian diplomats interviewed express 
caution when talking about the Nordic brand, emphasizing that it can carry 
with it an air of moral superiority that can undermine the various ministries 
of foreign affairs’ work on gender equality. Simultaneously, the strength of 
the Nordic region is emphasized, as the Nordic brand is also perceived as 
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being useful when the countries come together to lobby or show in practice 
that women-friendly approaches can be economically viable.
Chapter 4, by May-Len Skilbrei, discusses how Sweden often presents it-
self, and is presented by others, as a role model in terms of gender equality. 
The steep increase in the number of rapes in the country that are reported 
to the police is therefore a concern: As Swedish NGOs and governmental in-
stitutions have invested considerably over several decades in promoting the 
idea that rape exists because of gender inequality, the seemingly high level 
of rape in Sweden makes it difficult to uphold a position as a gender- equality 
role model. In 2018, Sweden changed its legislation on rape to define the 
latter as non-voluntary sexual activity rather than coerced sex. The chapter 
explores how the revision of the rape law was debated and represented in 
the Swedish parliament and the media, with a particular focus on how the 
desired role as a norm entrepreneur was addressed.
Chapter 5, by Irma Erlingsdóttir, discusses how gender-equality images 
have been used in Icelandic national identity projections abroad. After an 
‘era of masculinities’, which coincided with a neoliberal turn in the early 
2000s, she shows that the 2008 financial crisis reopened a space for women 
in terms of political representation and participation, which led to a fun-
damental change in the gendered branding of Iceland internationally. This 
rebranding was largely made possible by feminist activists who put forward 
a societal critique that paved the way for the adoption of concrete gender- 
equality policies as a crisis-response mechanism. Erlingsdóttir offers in-
sights into the feminist struggles in Iceland, whose trajectories differ from 
those of the other Nordic countries, and shows how gender equality has, in 
the last decade, become a central part of Iceland’s foreign policy.
In Chapter 6, Inger Skjelsbæk and Torunn Tryggestad discuss what the 
promotion of gender equality entails for Norwegian peace mediation ef-
forts, and what branding challenges and opportunities emerge from Nor-
way’s involvement in peace processes. In addition, the authors ask how the 
Norwegian engagement in such processes affects the gender branding of 
Norway as a peace nation. These questions are analysed in the light of the 
establishment and practice of the Nordic Women Mediators network and 
a set of Nordic national action plans to follow up on UN Security Council 
Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security. The analysis concludes that 
Norway’s ambitions in the area of peace and reconciliation take precedence 
over gender equality in the country’s nation-branding efforts. In order to be 
an attractive peace facilitator in a competitive market, Norway must down-
play its commitments to gender equality and leave the articulation of femi-
nist foreign policy ambitions to the Swedes.
Chapter 7, by Stéphanie Ginalski, discusses the debate on gender quotas 
for businesses in Switzerland in the early 2000s, and how Nordic experiences 
with quotas were drawn on in public debates about the introduction of sim-
ilar systems in Switzerland. Her findings indicate that the Nordic countries 
were important and useful points of reference in the parliamentary debates, 
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although the imaging of the experiences of the Nordic region varied ac-
cording to the speaker’s position within the Swiss political landscape. The 
more to the political left, the more attractive were the Nordic countries as 
an example to emulate; the more to the right – that is, the more conservative 
the speaker was – the less attractive the experiences of these countries. Dif-
ferences between the Nordic countries also affected which model Swiss par-
liamentarians chose to promote in the debate. While the left saw Norway as 
the most preferable of the Nordic countries, the right favoured the example 
of Sweden. The debates analysed by Ginalski thus provide an external view 
on the process of imagining and imaging the Nordic countries, which gives 
further insight into the contextual nature of the evaluation of the gender- 
progressiveness of the latter.
In Chapter 8, Cathrine Holst and Mari Teigen investigate how the national 
branding of Norway takes form through the voicing and silencing of various 
features of Norwegian gender-equality policies. Gender-equality policy is a 
hybrid policy field. In Norway, it consists of different areas, with equality 
legislation, the work–life balance, gender mainstreaming and gender bal-
ance in decision-making being the four most important. However, the focal 
point for Holst and Teigen’s analysis is the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs’ action plan on gender equality and selected speeches by the minis-
ter of foreign affairs and the minister of children and equality. These doc-
uments are core sites of communication about Norwegian gender-equality 
policies to foreign audiences, and the authors ask how their main messaging 
relates to existing knowledge about the features, merits and shortcomings 
of such policies.
Chapter 9, by Anne Hellum, focuses on the Convention on the Elimina-
tion of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and its ex-
amination of the periodic state reports of four Nordic countries – Sweden, 
Denmark, Finland and Norway – with an in-depth look at Norway. With 
a focus on contestations regarding the relationship between CEDAW and 
these countries’ gender-equality and anti-discrimination laws, Hellum’s 
chapter discusses how the international equality and anti-discrimination 
standards that these countries support at the international level are resisted 
at the national level. A comparative study reveals that Norway to a much 
larger degree than the other three Nordic countries has modified its equality 
and anti-discrimination laws in response to the CEDAW Committee’s crit-
icisms. An examination of public debates in Norway regarding CEDAW’s 
status in Norwegian law suggests that bringing the country’s equality and 
anti-discrimination laws into line with the brand as a superpower on gender 
equality matters.
Chapter 10, by Tori Loven Kirkebø, Malcolm Langford and Haldor Byrkje-
flot, asks how global indexes have helped build and shape the idea of Nordic 
gender exceptionalism. After tracing the rise of ranked indicators and the 
literature on their limitations and constructive power, the chapter examines 
78 global and eight gender-specific indexes in which the Nordics perform 
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strongly. It discusses which features of gender equality are (and are not) 
captured by the indicators and what the rankings communicate symbol-
ically about the idea of and progress on gender equality. This is followed 
by an analysis of the presence of indicators in media discourse on the Nor-
dics. Here, the authors make two principal arguments: that global indexes 
have powerfully and rather peculiarly shaped the discourse on Nordic gen-
der exceptionalism, and that their constructive limitations and constituent 
power are often underplayed in policy discussions. Global gender rankings 
have, perhaps more than any other area, helped take the Nordics from ‘mid-
dle way countries’ of the Cold War to the ‘top of the world’ in the era of 
globalization.
Finally, the Foreword written by Cynthia Enloe frames the book by re-
flecting on what she sees as the central themes of the book and how they 
challenge us. The Afterword, written by Halvard Leira, sheds a more critical 
light on the book. He asks why, beyond profit or affection, states want to be 
seen and recognized, and through this pushes the reader to think beyond 
the insight presented in the various chapters.
With this book, we demonstrate that gender equality has become a highly 
strategic tool for the communication of the Nordic countries in an attempt 
to position themselves as ‘best at being good’. We hope this insight will fur-
ther discussions and research on the centrality of gender equality in the dis-
course of Nordic exceptionalism. Gender equality has become more than 
politics and experiences, it is a currency in a market place of values. Our 
book suggests that this currency should be handled with care.
Notes
 1 During the 28th Session of the CEDAW, on 13–31 January 2003, the chair-
man noted that Norway was seen as a haven for gender equality and that the 
country’s equality policy had provided positive examples for other countries; 
see https://www.un.org/press/en/2003/wom1377.doc.htm (accessible with a pass-
word only). The image of a ‘gender superpower’ was used by Norwegian Foreign 
Minister Børge Brende in 2016 to denote Norway to a Norwegian audience; see 
Vandapuye (2016).
 2 See note 1.
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The Nordic countries have worked together for over four decades to improve 
gender equality in all aspects of society. Gender equality between the sexes 
is a condition for the success of the Nordic Model and a pillar of the modern 
Nordic welfare states.
(Nordic Co-operation, n.d.)
History is an important resource in the current attempt to brand the Nor-
dics as pioneers of gender equality. The Nordic Council of Ministers, for 
instance, explains the success of the ‘Nordic Model’ and the ‘Nordic welfare 
states’ as the result of enduring Nordic collaboration on gender equality 
over decades. Yet evoking history to make the region shine in this way, as 
champions of gender equality and progressive social models, is not simply 
a reflection of historical developments but also involves contemporary con-
structions of the past. In fact, the geographical area known as Norden has 
no common historical meaning to those who inhabit it today. Since the nine-
teenth century, five distinct nations have belonged to the Nordic area. Each 
has its own national language, culture and historical identity, its own set of 
myths and heroes, stars of independence and national events to commemo-
rate. Surely this makes it difficult to claim pan-Nordic ownership of a value 
such as gender equality in the way that the Nordic Council of Ministers 
does, on this occasion to enhance the reputation of the region as a knowl-
edge hub.
Besides, for individual Nordic countries, the historical experience of be-
ing Nordic is not necessarily a unified memory.1 Until the mid-twentieth 
century, the Nordics were more rivals than friends. While Sweden and Den-
mark were the monarchs, Finland, Norway and Iceland were the underdogs. 
This historical asymmetry also affects how history is used today to brand 
the Nordic nations as gender-equal. Rather than showcasing the historical 
legacy of the region as women-friendly, Nordic countries flash their own 
individual historical breakthroughs as gender-progressive states and soci-
eties. A very telling example in this respect is Finland, which, according to 
the governmental webpage, is a pioneer of gender equality on account of its 
1 ‘The gender-progressive 
Nordics’




early enfranchisement of women (Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, 
Finland, n.d. a). Under the headline ‘Finland Is a Gender Pioneer’, it is 
declared that ‘Finland is one of the world’s leading countries in fostering 
gender equality. It was the first county to grant women full political rights’ 
(Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, Finland, n.d. b). Yet Finland’s deci-
sion to flaunt its early enfranchisement of women is far from coincidental. 
Women’s right to vote has been a standard of appropriate behaviour among 
states, and thus a symbol for the fulfilment of democratic rights in general, 
since the end of World War I (Towns, 2010: 119–120). This means that the 
nation-branding of individual Nordic states is not just situated within a 
 historical context in which certain laws and reforms were made to better 
the gender rights of women and men. The national imagining of individual 
Nordic countries as gender pioneers is also done by evoking a past that aims 
to favour them globally in the present. Thus, the key question is what his-
torical times and roles individual Nordic countries currently construct for 
themselves when branding themselves as gender-equal nations. And, how 
do the current historical imaginings of the ‘gender-pioneering Nordic na-
tions’ relate to the foreign images made of the Nordic region – and individ-
ual Nordic  countries – a hundred years ago? The Nordic gender image is not 
entirely new, yet it remains somehow unclear how it developed and what role 
external actors played in the process.
To answer these questions, I draw upon literature that understands his-
tory and the use of history as a contemporary process of commemoration 
and nation-building. Pierre Nora, for example, speaks of lieux de mémoire – 
that is, sites of commemoration – and argues that this process makes history 
stand still in accordance with the political aims and needs (of the nation) of 
the present (Nora and Kritzman, 1996). In this chapter, I investigate the gen-
der progressiveness of the Nordic countries both as a contemporary histori-
cal imagining of the Nordic nations and as a foreign image first made when 
women’s demands for political rights intensified at the turn of the nineteenth 
century (Clerc and Glover, 2015: 6). The sources used are predominantly 
official and governmental webpages from the five major Nordic countries. 
In addition, historical sources and material from the international suffrage 
movement, represented by the International Council of Women (ICW), the 
International Woman Suffrage Alliance (IWSA) and the Norwegian Na-
tional Suffrage Association (NNSA), have been consulted.
Best at being first!
The consistent external representation of the Nordics as gender-equal is key 
to understanding why individual Nordic countries now turn to history in 
their gender-branding discourse. We know that international interest in the 
small Nordic countries intensifies when the annual global indexes on gender 
equality are released – most often with similar results: The Nordics take it 
all, year after year, when it comes to gender equality. So, what can be learned 
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from them, the American weekly Forbes asked in 2018 as journalist Shelley 
Zalis (2018) wrote up ‘Lessons from the World’s Most Gender-Equal Coun-
tries’. Evidently, this strong and stable external image of the Nordic region 
makes it more than a challenge for its five different states to be recognized 
as individual stakeholders of gender equality. This has made history an im-
portant source of differentiation, a key element in all forms of branding.
Although the historical imagining of the gender-progressive Nordics has 
a foot in the real, it is predominantly a contemporary construct made to 
distinguish the individual Nordic state from other states. Wordings of dif-
ferentiation are therefore frequently used when the Nordic countries present 
themselves to foreign audiences as gender pioneers today. This most often 
takes the form of self-assertive comparative statements, wherein the world 
or other continents hold the role of the laggard. Such statements follow a 
specific pattern that provides the imaginary of a historical frontrunner of 
gender rights: for example, ‘X was the first in the world to do Y’, ‘X are or 
were the first to Y’, or, more modestly, ‘X did Y in time’. The webpage Guide 
to Iceland, for instance, presents Iceland as ‘the first country in the world to 
grant equal inheritance rights to both men and women [in 1856]’, as well as 
the country that ‘had the world’s first democratically elected head of state’ 
(Chapman, n.d.). On the country’s official webpage, the message is similar, 
although the role of Iceland as a historical gender pioneer is not linked to 
women’s rights but to men’s rights as fathers. It states: ‘Iceland celebrated 
the millennium by introducing the first exclusive paternity leave in the 
world’ (Iceland.is, n.d.). Yet, on the official governmental page, none of these 
examples are mentioned. Here, the image cherished is simply that Iceland 
remains at the top of most global rankings of gender equality. For instance, 
on 18 December 2019, the story created and published by the Prime Minis-
ter’s Office was ‘Iceland Remains the Top Country on the World Economic 
Forum’s Gender Gap Index’ (Government of Iceland, 2019).
The second way in which history is used to enhance the credibility of the 
Nordics as nations with a long tradition of gender equality is by providing 
explanations as to why they became so gender-equal in the first place. Such 
use seeks to connect the countries’ historical gender progressiveness to their 
societal, geographical, commercial or even climatic qualities. For instance, 
the site Guide to Iceland turns to Iceland’s role as a seafaring nation to ex-
plain why women in old Iceland had the reputation of being strong and in-
dependent, a notion that is also supported by two of the Icelandic sagas. It 
elaborates:
women in Norse society could be granted a greater level of respect and 
freedom than their European counterparts. Women managed the fi-
nances of the household, ran the farmstead in their husband’s absence 
and could become wealthy landowners in widowhood. They were also 
protected by law from unwanted attention or violence.
(Chapman, n.d.)
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However, larger historical explanations of why the Nordic countries are 
gender- equal do not fit well within the tight format of nation-branding. The 
language of branding is more about declaring and exemplifying a product’s 
qualities, not explaining why it possesses them. Accordingly, few of the Nor-
dic states turn to history to explain the current situation in the way Iceland 
can be seen to do above. Denmark’s official webpage provides a good il-
lustration. This page simply affirms that Denmark is a gender pioneer by 
stating that such a role is old news to them: ‘Women’s influence in Danish 
politics is nothing new. In 1924, Nina Bang became the world’s first female 
minister in a country with parliamentary democracy’ (Denmark.dk, n.d.).
The third use of history on Nordic country webpages addressing gender 
equality relates to the imagining of time and progress itself. Whereas gender- 
equality discourses formerly focused mostly on women and sometimes men, 
this is no longer the case. Today, gender has become something far more 
diverse and fluid than it was previously. Consequently, measuring gender 
equality means taking into account a range of different issues, such as the 
rights of fathers and previously marginalized sexual groups, most often re-
ferred to under the umbrella term ‘LGBTQ’. Historical landmarks are men-
tioned, however. For example, on the Norwegian governmental webpage, 
for instance, it is stated that in Norway a ‘Common Marriage Act entered 
into force on 1 January 2009. This Act gives all lesbian and gay persons the 
right to enter into marriage irrespective of sexual orientation’ (Government.
no, 2019). In this way, the achievement of gender equality is not presented as a 
linear development, running from zero to advanced according to one dimen-
sion only, but a multi-dimensional undertaking. This supports the image that 
Norway, in this case, remains on top of all things related to gender.
The gender binary man–woman still dominates in Nordic gender-branding 
discourse. This is an aspect that will be elaborated on further in several chap-
ters of this book, including in relation to the disparity between Nordic images 
made for foreign audiences and those produced for domestic political pur-
poses (Danielsen and Larsen, 2015). Regardless of this, a very striking feature 
of the ways in which history helps to brand the Nordic states as gender-equal, 
however, is the degree of conformity seen in this area. All five Nordic coun-
tries highlight their historical legacy as gender-equal nations by flashing that 
they were the first to commit to the new political value of gender equality in 
areas that range from politics and welfare to equalized economic rights for 
women and civil rights for gays and lesbians, etc. As a result, the main slogan 
within Nordic gender-branding discourse would appear to be that the Nor-
dics are best at gender equality because they were the first to adopt current 
standards of gender equality. To maintain this image, however, the Nordic 
countries have had to mobilize or evoke remarkably different pasts.
Different pasts evoked
History helps countries to distinguish themselves from others, at the same 
time as its use for purposes such as nation-branding closely relates to the 
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nation as an imagined community. This means that the pasts adduced 
when the Nordic countries communicate their gender-friendliness are never 
random but are instead used in various processes of nation-building and 
nation-branding. We have already mentioned Finland, which on its govern-
mental webpage brands itself as the first country in the world to introduce 
equal political rights for men and women. This historical imagining of the 
Finnish nation-state is related to a 1906 amendment that was made possible 
because Russia, to whose empire Finland then belonged, was going through 
a time of revolution. Finland’s role or self-imagining as a pioneer of female 
suffrage is thus closely related to the Finnish struggle for national independ-
ence from Russian control: universal suffrage was introduced in the same 
year that the country gained home rule. Yet the current use of history does 
not stop there. On the same webpage, Finland is presented as a country in 
which the struggle for gender equality began even prior to the birth of the 
new Finnish nation-state. The webpage states: ‘A move towards the equality 
of women and men was taken in Finland long before the country became 
independent. In the 1850s, Finnish women activists read John Stuart Mill 
and spoke about the importance of education for girls’ (Ministry of Social 
Affairs and Health, Finland, n.d. b). This historical representation of Fin-
land is interesting for several reasons. First, it illustrates that the struggles 
for national independence and women’s rights coincided in Finland (Hage-
mann, 2009; Blom, 2012: 611; Sulkunen, 2015: 94–96). The emancipation of 
women thus became a more integrated part of the Finnish national mem-
ory simply because it overlapped with the country’s liberation from Russian 
power. Second, the image produced of Finland as an early mover on wom-
en’s issues overrules the historical facts referred to in the actual branding 
text. One major anachronism is that Mill’s book The Subjection of Women 
was first published in 1869, not in the 1850s. Of course, Mill published his 
On Liberty in 1854, which later was referred to both by supporters and op-
ponents of women’s liberation. However, this book did not explicitly address 
the issue of women’s liberation in the way that his later book did, which 
sparked the first explosion of the women’s movement in many countries. 
Hence, to argue that Finnish women were reading Mill and discussing the 
importance of educating girls in the 1850s is probably not historically cor-
rect. In nation-branding discourses, however, the specific serves the general, 
not the other way around, and the historically accurate gives way to how 
the nation is being imagined now. In fact, it is the delicate combination of 
being sufficiently specific to be trustworthy and general enough to get the 
quality of the nation across that characterizes the use of history in Nordic 
gender-branding discourses.
The Norwegian example is illuminating in this respect. According to 
the webpage of the Norwegian government, Norway’s pioneering role as 
a gender-equal country can be communicated simply by declaration. The 
webpage states: ‘Norway has a long tradition of working for women’s rights 
and gender equality’ (Government.no, 2020a). What this tradition consists 
of, however, is more unclear. Notably, when former Norwegian foreign 
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minister Børge Brende launched an international plan for women’s rights in 
front of a national audience in 2016, he also justified this without explaining 
how Norway had become a historical pioneer of gender equality. Brende 
simply stated that ‘Norway is a forerunner of gender equality and this le-
gitimacy gives us the opportunity to take a lead, globally…. Norway is a 
gender superpower’ (Vandapuye, 2016: 2). However, in contrast to Iceland 
or Finland, when emphasizing the nation’s historical landmarks in terms 
of gender equality, Norway is predominantly branding its role in the inter-
national arena. The Norwegian webpage tailored for foreign readers, for 
instance, focuses predominantly on the country’s commitment to interna-
tional laws and standards concerning women’s rights and gender equality. 
According to these representations, Norway is a pioneer in the ratification 
of international anti-discrimination conventions. The country’s legitimacy 
as a pioneer of gender equality is thus built on its own historical legacy and 
imagining as an internationally oriented (peace) nation:
The UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimina-
tion against Women (CEDAW) was adopted by the UN General As-
sembly on 18 December 1979, entered into force on 3 September 1981 
and has been ratified by 189 states. Norway ratified the convention on 
21 May 1981.
(Government.no, 2020b)
The impression created in the above quotation from the official webpage of 
the Norwegian government, which has been a conservative coalition gov-
ernment since 2013, is that Norway has always taken its international hu-
manitarian obligations seriously and continues to do so today. However, 
as a rule, the historical period in focus when Norway presents itself to the 
world as a gender-equal nation is the post-1970s. This differentiates Nor-
way from Finland, as well as from Iceland and Demark, which are all more 
 backward-looking. Or, put the other way around, within the international 
arena Norway brands itself as an experienced and reliable international 
partner. Still, what is striking about the way in which Norway represents it-
self to the world is its apparent reluctance to mention the fact that the coun-
try was the first to ratify this particular international convention. Norway’s 
use of history is thus more discreet and subtle than that of the other Nordic 
states. The national imagining is that to be first simply comes naturally for 
Norway. Such an approach stands in contrast to the role of history in the 
official Swedish gender-branding discourse, to which I now turn.
Sweden has long pursued a women-friendly policy, although none of the 
relevant historical milestones are included in the government’s presentation 
of the country on its webpages today. Instead, the picture painted by the 
centre–left coalition government of 2020 is that Sweden has taken the fem-
inist issue to another level through the 2014 launch of what had never been 
seen before: a feminist government with a specific feminist foreign policy. 
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On the governmental webpage, it is stated that ‘Sweden has the first fem-
inist government…. A feminist government ensures that a gender equality 
perspective is brought into policy-making on a broad front, both nationally 
and internationally’ (Government Offices of Sweden, n.d.). Sweden is thus 
imagined as a country that continues to be a gender pioneer. In other words, 
it does not rely on history but makes it continuously in new ways. Instead of 
showcasing its past achievements, the Swedish government flashes its con-
temporary innovation regarding feminist politics.
This identity as ‘progressive now’ fits extremely well the role and func-
tion of Sweden as a utopia in foreign political discourses (Andersson and 
Hilson, 2009: 220). As Jenny Andersson and others have argued, the Swed-
ish self-imaging as avant-garde relates to the rise of foreign perceptions of 
Sweden from the interwar period onwards, particularly in the USA, which 
later were appropriated by the Swedish authorities (Andersson and Hilson, 
2009; Marklund, 2009, 2017). Within the frame of this imaginary, Sweden 
was an advocate of progressive values and social rights in general, and its 
population was held as being the most modern of all people. As a result, 
when branding itself as a pioneer of gender equality, Sweden is capitaliz-
ing on political and cultural images of the country that are well established 
both globally and domestically. Strikingly, this makes Sweden less con-
cerned about the past when imagining itself as a gender pioneer, whereas the 
other Nordic countries all itemize their progress in this area, legitimizing 
their claims through reference to a handful of national advancements and 
reforms.
Clearly, this picture of Sweden as the most progressive and pioneering 
of all countries also needs to be seen in relation to the country’s historical 
status and identity as a Nordic superpower within the Nordic region. In 
the 1600s, the country was one of Europe’s most powerful military states. 
And during the Napoleonic Wars, Sweden was on the winning team against 
France that forced the Danish king to cede Norway to the Swedish king 
in 1814 as part of the war settlement. Swedish national identity thus seems 
less bound to the national awakening of the nineteenth century, at least in 
comparison with its neighbours to the east and west. The situation with 
Finland, Norway and Iceland, however, is different. At the turn of the last 
century, they were all claiming independence from foreign rule and began 
constructing histories of their own, which helped them to define themselves 
in opposition to their neighbouring oppressors, that is, Russia, Sweden and 
Denmark. Norway, gaining home rule in 1814 after 400 years under Danish 
rule, was until 1905 in a personal union with Sweden. Finland, on the other 
hand, had home rule from 1906 but remained a grand duchy in the Russian 
Empire until late 1917. Iceland, declared a sovereign state in 1918, was for its 
part in a personal union with the Danish crown until 1944. History served 
as a major justification and raison d’être et faire of the nation in all these 
processes of nation-building. In the early 1900s, this also helped the Nordic 
gender image to develop within the confines of the international suffragist 
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movement, an image that depicted them as frontrunners in the campaign 
for women’s political rights. Within the frame of this imaginary, however, 
Sweden, the old monarch of Scandinavia, and Denmark, the second best, 
held no prominent roles.
The history of the Nordic gender image
Until female enfranchisement became the new normal of international so-
ciety by the end of World War I, the old and so-called civilized nations were 
characterized by keeping women out of politics (Paxton et al., 2006; Towns, 
2009). Only barbaric countries allowed women to rule, the argument went, 
which made the nineteenth-century state in most countries a true gentle-
men’s club (Towns, 2014; Florin, 2018: 29). However, this situation began 
to change around 1900 as a growing number of countries met women’s de-
mands for political citizenship, though a common characteristic of the first 
frontrunners of the female vote was that they all belonged to the growing 
class of newborn nation-states as opposed to the great powers represented 
by Great Britain, France and Germany. These latter were the leading coun-
tries of the world until the USA announced its interest in joining their ranks 
towards the end of the nineteenth century. With this, women’s issues also en-
tered the international scene, but not necessarily because the federal Amer-
ican state pushed the female issue in the same way that the country’s women 
did. The first to make women political subjects were nations belonging to 
the periphery of civilization, including the countries of the Nordic region – 
or Scandinavia, as it was generally referred to at the time.2
Before the outbreak of World War I, New Zealand (1893), Australia (1902), 
Finland (1906) and Norway (1907/1913) all granted women the right to vote.3 
For all but New Zealand, suffrage also meant the right to stand for election 
and represent the state. Evidently, this enabled the aspiring nation-states 
mentioned above to symbolize new sets of values on the international scene, 
including cultural and moral values stemming from their ability to take the 
female question seriously. For some countries, the female vote thus became 
a strategizing matter of relevance to more than domestic and party pol-
itics. Feminist claims were also included in diplomatic manoeuvring and 
the rising global competition for ‘modernity prestige’. In Werron’s (2014: 
71) words, this was because new forms of public communication helped in 
the creation of universalized ‘third parties’. Consisting of international or-
ganizations and journalists, among others, and creating new and imagined 
global audiences, these parties were to challenge the hegemonic status of 
the old monarchs of international society. As a result, the idea of women’s 
suffrage as a sign of the progressive, civilized nation began to circulate more 
freely and help distinguishing states accordingly.
In June 1890, Norwegian politician John Teodor Lund from the Liberal 
Party argued in the Norwegian parliament that Norway could ‘increase 
its international reputation and place in the civilized world by introducing 
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the female vote’ (Kolstad, 1963: 35). At the time, Norway was character-
ized by rising nationalism and independence fever. Since 1814, the country 
had shared its king, foreign policy and diplomatic service with the Swedes. 
Lund’s statement is thus an indication that the political opposition was 
advocating for a more independent role for Norway within the Swedish–
Norwegian union. Interestingly, the term likestilling, which in modern Nor-
wegian usage is strongly associated with gender equality, was in 1886 used to 
call for full equality between Norway and its union partner, Sweden (Dan-
ielsen et al., 2015: 13). While the demand, which was mostly about numbers 
of representatives in the ministry council of Sweden–Norway, responsible 
for foreign affairs, was not followed up, Lund’s proposal appears to have 
been a strategy to enable Norway to be regarded as a de facto state with 
its own foreign policy – or, more precisely, a consular service to take care 
of the country’s economic interests. Interestingly, this suggestion, to make 
the female vote a foreign policy tool, was made more than a decade before 
historian and peace activist Halvdan Koht would argue, in 1902, that Nor-
way should commit to the development of international law and peace as an 
independent nation-state. In the words of Halvard Leira (2015: 22), an inter-
national relations scholar who specializes in Norway’s role and identity as a 
‘peace nation’, smallness was from early on seen as ‘necessitating a focus on 
acting in a way that could enhance [Norway’s] status’.
By the early 1900s, the female vote went from being a sign of uncivilized 
nations to a positive feature of the modern and progressive state. This trans-
formation was partly the work of a rising international society of feminist 
organizations, but it was also closely related to small and geographically pe-
ripheral nations’ drive for status and independence (Oldfield, 1992: 215; Mc-
Donald, 2009: 25–31; Towns, 2009, 2010). Women, the argument went, were 
as important as men for the well-being of the national home. Nordic suffra-
gists also adopted or contributed to this discourse of nationalism (Blom, 
2012). At the 1911 international suffrage conference in Stockholm, Swedish 
writer Selma Lagerlöf (1911) argued in her speech ‘Home and State’ that 
women had done their lot for life and civilization, as well as for ‘the good 
of the race’, by creating homes and bringing human beings into the world. 
Consequently, they deserved the vote as much as men, since no state could 
exist without the traces that women had left on earth. Above all, however, 
the feminist nationalist discourse was a question of strategy. In the early 
1900s, there was a rising need to fight down anti-suffragist sentiments and to 
make male parliamentarians see that it would be to the nation’s advantage 
to take women on board. In the Nordic region, Finland was first out, in a 
process that, according to Irma Sulkunen (2009: 84), went ‘surprisingly rap-
idly and almost unnoticed’. During the revolutionary fervour of 1906, the 
Russian tsar granted a number of Finnish political demands that included 
calls for the female vote and eligibility for parliament. Since 1892, universal 
suffrage had been a major issue for the Finnish Women’s Rights Federa-
tion. And seven years later, in 1899, the Finnish Labour Party decided to 
22 Eirinn Larsen
advocate for equal suffrage for men and women, which in hindsight has 
lent credibility to the country’s claims today to be a gender-equality pioneer 
(Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, Finland, n.d. a). However, when the 
international suffragists began organizing to give force to their demands for 
equal political rights for women, it was Norway, not Finland, that drew the 
longest straw. As we will see below, racial discourses prevalent at the time 
were an important element in, if not a prerequisite for, the development of 
a Nordic gender image by an American-dominated international suffrage 
movement.
Looking for new success stories
For a long time, American suffragists had advocated for the need to in-
clude women in parliament by providing women with equal political rights. 
To achieve this goal, Elisabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony, two 
of the most influential nineteenth-century feminists and initially members 
of the abolition movement, had begun to play on anti-abolition sentiments 
and ethnic and racialized stereotypes (Dubois, 1997: 179; Finnegan, 1999: 5). 
Truly, the worst case for many American feminists, originating in the white, 
Anglo-Saxon and protestant middle-class, was to see the free African- 
American man enter parliament before themselves. During the progres-
sive era, these WASP women organized and campaigned for social reform 
within most social fields, from temperance and peace to welfare, civil and 
political rights. Still, American women lacked suffrage. Thus, in 1888 the 
International Council of Women (ICW) was launched as a new avenue in 
which WASP women might seek to advance and enhance their reputation in 
the eyes of men in power. However, as the German secretary Alice Salomon 
later described it, it was an organization built on air, as at that point in time 
there were no national councils that might join it (Rupp, 1997: 15).
At first, the International Council of Women was nothing more than a 
North American organization, with limited foundation and support beyond 
the USA. The women of the Nordic region were all slow to set up national 
councils. Sweden and Denmark did so in 1898 and 1899, respectively. Nor-
way followed in 1904, a year before its union with Sweden was dissolved. 
Upon the dissolution of the union, the leader of the Norwegian National 
Council of Women, Gina Krog, made a small handout on Norwegian his-
tory and politics for circulation. Addressed to the ICW, the publication con-
tained various facts to help members to differentiate between the two former 
partners of the Swedish–Norwegian union. Strikingly, the handout, which 
was written in English, put Norway in a positive light by representing Swe-
den as the conservative and anti-progressive ‘other’ to the new nation-state 
Norway: ‘In Norway there is a democracy (only half-realized, however, as 
women had not yet obtained political suffrage) and a thorough parliamen-
tary system. Sweden is far more politically conservative, and her suffrage is 
still very limited’ (Norwegian National Council of Women, 1905: 16).
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In 1911, Finland and Iceland were the last of the Nordic countries to join 
the growing international family of women’s councils (Rupp, 1997: 16). Yet, 
even before then, the ICW had already faced problems. The national aux-
iliaries of the organization were for a long time few and weak. More im-
portantly, the ICW’s members soon stopped agreeing on its over-reaching 
cause – that is, female enfranchisement. With the inclusion of anti-suffragist 
women at the London conference in 1899, the ICW was no longer really 
a suffragist organization. To fill the gap created by this development, two 
radical-minded Germans initiated an alternative meeting. The idea of form-
ing an independent international organization, however, came from Carrie 
Chapman Catt, a rising star within the American suffragist movement. In 
1900, Chapman Catt succeeded Cady Stanton as president of the National 
American Woman Suffrage Association (NAWSA), and for 28 years, from 
1904 to 1932, she was the front figure of the International Woman Suffrage 
Alliance (IWSA), which had female suffrage as its ultimate goal (Somervill, 
2003: 60–61).
For the emerging discourse on the gender-progressive Nordics, this strate-
gic and generational shift within the organized international feminist move-
ment would prove decisive. Although the Nordic countries never became a 
model for other states to follow, new images of them soon began to spread. 
Sissel Rosland (2017: 201) has argued that to understand the significance of 
foreign examples within the feminist movement at the time, ‘it is necessary 
to consider the hegemonic frames the campaigners were challenging’. Those 
opposing the female vote were well organized. They arranged meetings, 
wrote petitions and took to the streets to advocate against giving women 
the vote. In this context, the experiences of those countries that in fact were 
making progress were very valuable for those campaigning for women’s en-
franchisement. Accordingly, the IWSA began to tell the world that the Nor-
dic region contained the most gender-progressive countries in the world. Or, 
in Chapman Catt’s words, extracted from a speech at the 1908 international 
suffrage conference in Amsterdam: ‘in actual gains the Scandinavians are 
in the lead. All honor to that noble race! Once it was the pioneer upon the 
great unknown waters of the world; now it is the leader upon the high seas 
of human progress’ (IWSA, 1908).
That the president of the IWSA would in 1908 portray the Nordic coun-
tries as the world’s pioneers in the field of gender equality, however, was 
not something that could be taken for granted at the time. Also on the 
other side of the world, down under, progress was being made. However, 
the physical appearance of the Nordic people was well fitted for the racial-
ized hierarchies the international societies and suffrage communities were 
producing. According to Towns (2010: 92), Chapman Catt promoted the 
view that women were not only more civilized than men but also more civi-
lized than ‘uncivilized’ women of ‘lesser races’. This rhetoric also mirrored 
the actual power relations within the international suffragist movement 
led by Northern Americans and Europeans. For delegates from Southern 
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Europe, this would lead to frustration. The French suffragists who had at 
first hoped to maintain a symbolic lead within the international movement 
were soon to understand that the axis of the organizational monument was 
shifting. Karen Offen (2000: 154) writes that the torch was carried by the 
Anglo-American world, and that protestant representatives also took the 
lead on moral issues. For the leadership and discourse of the international 
suffragist movement, it was the Nordics that became the tool for forging a 
specific subject position as civilized women. At the 1909 IWSA conference 
in London, an Italian representative would describe the event as uniting the 
Anglo-Saxon race (Vangen, 2020). Later, French Germaine Malterre-Sellier 
would describe the IWSA’s offices as a place where ‘very often the Latin and 
oriental elements felt isolated and estranged… where a spirit predominates 
that I will call Nordic, for lack of another name’ (Rupp, 1997: 70).
Not only was the IWSA created and run by American suffragists, but 
it also developed out from American needs. Additionally, it initially trum-
peted the idea that the USA was the most advanced country in terms of 
women’s rights. At its very first convention in 1902, held in Washington, DC, 
where all the participants were invited to the White House to meet US Pres-
ident Theodore Roosevelt, the divide between the Old and the New Worlds 
was presented as a gain for American women especially. In her address to 
the participants, Chapman Catt declared:
It is well known that the new countries are far more free from the man-
dates of custom and conventionality than the old ones; and that dissent-
ers from established usage are far more willing to adopt new ideas and 
extend liberties, than those bound by traditionary beliefs…. That lib-
erty has continued to grow until unquestionably American women are 
less bound by legal and social restrictions than the women of any other 
country, unless we except progressive Australia and New Zealand.
(IWSA, 1902: 39)
As the above quote shows, the USA was initially imagined as the frontrun-
ner of the international suffragist movement. The new countries ‘down un-
der’ were also advancing but, as indicated by the speech of Chapman Catt, 
who in 1904 succeeded Susan B. Anthony as president of the IWSA, New 
Zealand and Australia were in their eyes never worthy of the status of pio-
neers of women’s rights. Such a view corresponded well with how things were 
seen also in the Nordic countries. From the formation of the first national 
women’s rights associations in the 1880s, American women had represented 
an example for Nordic feminists. Gina Krog, the Norwegian suffragist and 
leader of the Norwegian National Women’s Council, wrote in her telegram 
to the 1902 suffragist convention in Washington that
no other country in the world has received the inspiration in our work 
which we have received from the Unites States; to no women in the 
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world are we so indebted as to the women of your country – those great 
and noble pioneers.
(Krog, 1902; see also Vangen, 2020: 43)
But, with the gradual advancement of women in the Nordic countries in 
terms of suffrage, little by little the picture of the USA as the symbolic 
leader of the suffragist cause began to change.
Challenging the USA as symbolic leader
In 1901, Norwegian women received the right to vote in local elections, 
which the country’s suffragists had campaigned for, among other things, by 
making reference to the American states as frontrunners. The vote was not 
fully won, however: the requirements were linked to economic capacity and 
age. However, despite these rules, which favoured women of the bourgeoisie, 
100 women were elected to seats in local governments from 1901 (Larsen 
and Øksendal, 2013). In 1906, similar developments took place in Finland, 
as we know, but at the national level, which soon became front-page news 
in the Nordic countries and possibly beyond. The Norwegian newspaper 
Aftenposten could at least inform its readers on 15 June 1906 that 19 of the 
new representatives of the Finnish national parliament were women, a fact 
that was illustrated by a picture showing 13 of them (Larsen, 2013: 196). 
Contrary to what Sulkunen has suggested, then, the event did not pass un-
noticed in other countries. Within the international suffrage movement, the 
Finnish victory, as it was presented, would also change the discourse on the 
Nordics in ways that would have an impact well beyond the movement itself.
When the IWSA was formally launched, in 1904, during the second con-
ference held in Berlin, it managed to attract media attention. Newspapers 
were increasingly interested in covering the well-off and sometimes quite 
eccentric suffragettes and their fight for political enfranchisement. The con-
ference, which was closely prepared by Chapman Catt and her board, was 
covered by several newspapers and was clearly popular with journalists and 
readers. The organization had also developed a media strategy: All national 
delegates had to prepare their addresses carefully beforehand and to ar-
rive at the conference with multiple printed copies of their speeches in their 
handbags. Free copies could in this way easily be distributed to journalists 
and members of the audience, and the movement gained what it had worked 
for – increased public attention and support for its cause. At this stage, how-
ever, only Denmark and Sweden were formal members of the IWSA, al-
though Norway would join two years later for the upcoming conference in 
Copenhagen. It took a further two years for Finland to join, and Iceland un-
til 1911. Yet, compared to the previous conferences, the event in the Danish 
capital was a mammoth undertaking. The numbers of participants grew, as 
did the rules, and three different languages were used simultaneously, which 
says a lot about the social background of the women involved. The choice 
26 Eirinn Larsen
of location for IWSA conferences was always strategic, the idea being that 
the conferences would increase public interest in and support for the female 
vote in the countries in which they were held. The president of the Danish 
Women’s Suffrage Society, Marie Sørine Louise Nørlund, wrote in 1906 in 
Jus Suffragii, the international magazine of the IWSA, that the 1906 con-
ference in Copenhagen had been of great benefit for the suffragists’ work in 
Denmark. Clearly, it had contributed to a change in public opinion, which 
‘now is on our side’ (Jus Suffragii, 1906: 7). However, when Finland took the 
first step in the Nordic region to enfranchise women at the national level, 
this attracted the president’s attention. In Carrie Chapman Catt’s words, 
however, the Finnish victory had come as a total surprise:
Yet suddenly, almost without warning, we see upon a summit another 
army. How come it there? It has neither descended from heaven, not 
climbed the long hard journey. Yet there above us, all the women of 
Finland stand today. Each wears the royal crown of the sovereignty of 
the self-governing citizen. Two years ago, these women would not be 
permitted by the law to organize a woman suffrage association. A year 
later, they did organize a woman suffrage committee, and before it is yet 
a year old, its work is done.
(Luno, 1906: 49)
Clearly downplaying the victory and effort of the Finnish women, Chapman 
Catt continued her narrative by presenting American women as the sym-
bolic and practical leaders of the international suffrage movement. Finnish 
women, it seems, were not as qualified to be an example for others as the 
women of the USA, New Zealand and Australia. It was the opponents of 
female enfranchisement, she continued, who so persistently had refused to 
accept these gains of the female vote and see them as important:
They declared these States and Nations had no history and gave no as-
surance of a stable future; they said they were too new, their population 
too small, their people too impulsive and irresponsible for their acts to 
be taken seriously.
(Luno, 1906: 50).
This indicates that the fact that a country lacked an established history or 
a long stable past as a nation and state was a common argument among 
anti-suffragists for not taking feminist victories in new countries seriously, 
a point that would be taken on board by the IWSA in its propagandist dis-
course. In addition, the president argued that in order to be worthy of the 
role of inspiring others, a state had to be sovereign, or at least be in a sta-
ble environment that ensured that any success stories would continue to be 
successes. The fear was that feminist victories might be belittled by their 
opponents and that this would damage the entire suffragist movement. Her 
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choice of country to inspire suffragettes fell on Norway, a country that few 
in fact knew much about.
Trusting Norway over revolutionary Finland
By the time the IWSA organized its fourth reunion in 1908, Norway had 
introduced census-based national suffrage. Strikingly, the significance of 
this change to Norwegian law, whose terms were far less generous than the 
bill already passed in Finland, was emphasized in Jus Suffragii. The front 
cover of its July 1907 edition declared ‘HURRAY FOR NORWAY!!!!’ And 
when the national representatives met in Amsterdam the following year, it 
was Norway – and not Finland – that was presented as the country to look 
to for inspiration. The reason for this, the president declared, was that ‘the 
Norwegian Act lent a new dignity and significance to all the victories which 
had preceded’. It was not just that Norway had granted ‘full suffrage rights 
and eligibility to women upon exceedingly generous terms’. In terms of ‘the 
attitude of nations towards our cause’, the act of the Norwegian parliament 
meant far more than an isolated victory, declared Chapman Catt in her 
general address in Amsterdam on 15 June 1908. The strategic importance 
of the Norwegian victory was thus made out to be far larger than that of 
Finland. Again, the decisive element was the hegemonic status of the anti- 
suffragists. The tendency to ridicule the progress of the suffragists’ cause, 
by belittling any achievements and minimizing the movement’s influence, 
was widespread. It was therefore important to go for the safe option, the 
example that would not be ruined by the anti-suffragists.
‘It is true’, they say ‘Finland is old enough and has creditable history, 
but its people are in a state of revolution; what the Czar has given, he 
might take away. We shall wait’. It was at this point in the world’s con-
troversy that the Norwegian victory came. Norway was a country with 
an honorable history, a stable and independent government. It was ev-
ident that the enfranchisement of women had been accomplished after 
calm deliberation, by a people acknowledge to intelligent, honest and 
conscientious. For the first time the opponents were compelled to admit 
that a genuine victory for women suffrage had scored.
(Luno, 1906: 50)
The president of the IWSA was quick to construct new and more favourable 
images of the Nordic region as the Nordic countries increasingly met wom-
en’s demands for political citizenship. But it seems that she also knew how to 
differentiate between them in order to achieve the overall goal of her move-
ment. The method used followed the terms set in the nationalist discourse 
at the time, according to which a country without a past and a well-defined 
history did not merit significant attention. Both Finland and Norway ful-
filled the required criteria according to the American suffragist, who played 
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loosely with the facts to present them as old and noble, when in fact the old 
monarchies of the Nordic region were Sweden and Denmark. Furthermore, 
the latter countries were also on the way to allowing women to vote: ‘Both 
countries are intelligent and progressive’, which enabled Chapman Catt to 
feel confident that the way in which the question of women’s suffrage was 
to be solved in the two countries would provide important lessons for those 
working for this cause throughout the world. Still, the Norwegian victory 
hung the highest: ‘I venture the prediction, that, when the final chapter of 
the history of suffrage shall be written, it will record that the enfranchise-
ment of the Norwegian women marked a turning point in the struggle’ 
(Luno, 1906: 49–50).
The private correspondence of Fredrikke Marie Qvam, for years the 
leading figure in the Norwegian National Woman Suffragist Association, 
further illustrates how Chapman Catt made Norway – and not Finland – 
the symbolic frontrunner for the international suffragist movement. Dur-
ing the planning for the 1908 conference, the president wrote multiple times 
to Qvam at her home in Gjævran, north of Trondheim, to make sure she 
would be attending the upcoming meeting. In a letter dated 19 May 1908, 
the IWSA president wrote: ‘I have not published the list of the delegates you 
sent me…. I notice that you put? after your name. My Dear Fru Qvam, we 
really could not have an international meeting without you’.4 On 30 May, 
she wrote again to Qvam to make sure that she would not be let down by the 
Norwegian delegation to the conference in the Netherlands: ‘I most sincerely 
hope and pray’, wrote Chapman Catt, ‘that nothing will happen to keep our 
dear Fru Qvam from coming. You are the chief heroine for this meeting, and 
we do not like to have our play going on and our heroine away.’5
Although few of the Norwegian suffragettes had the money to travel long 
distances and stay for weeks in hotels abroad, events turned out as the IWSA 
president had hoped. The leader of the Norwegian National Suffragist As-
sociation arrived in Amsterdam in time for the meeting. She also played 
the heroine role given to her by Chapman Catt: ‘Since we met in Copenha-
gen, taxpaying women in Norway have obtained political suffrage’, declared 
Qvam; ‘about three hundred thousand women have entitled the vote, but 
200,000 still lack it’ (Report from Norway IWSA, 1908; see also Høyem, 
2013: 90). At the subsequent conference in London in 1909, however, she 
spoke more optimistically and with greater confidence as the official rep-
resentative of Norway. The attitude towards the female vote had changed 
considerably worldwide, she said, and ‘nothing can better show the position, 
which women now occupy in Norway, than the fact that the government 
sends an official Representative over to this International Conference for 
Women’s Rights’ (IWSA, 1909; see also Høyem, 2013: 99).
The first request to the Norwegian parliament to make Qvam a formal 
representative at the IWSA conference had been made by Chapman Catt. 
Gunnar Knudsen, representing the Liberal Party, had himself made sure 
a royal resolution was prepared to authorize the 63-year-old Norwegian 
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suffragette for the task. The financial resources she needed to travel were 
granted by the government, while the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued the 
passport for the voyage, granting Qvam diplomatic status.6 The conclusion 
of her speech ensured that the Norwegian government would not regret its 
decision to make her an official envoy. As the wife of a former prime minis-
ter, Fredrikke Marie Qvam spoke like any statesperson tasked with ensur-
ing that her country be both seen and recognized. She concluded:
We ought to remember, that Norway is the first sovereign state, that has 
given the political suffrage. And now Norway says to the other Sover-
eign countries; Follow our example! Make the women of your countries 
free Citizens.7
A new arena for Nordic foreign policy
As the American suffragist movement turned international in the early 
1900s, a new arena had opened for Nordic feminists seeking to promote the 
cause of the female vote to their governments. The reason was that foreign 
examples were, as we have seen, used to urge country after country to en-
franchise women. However, the Nordic countries themselves never became 
models for others, but the image created of them and the Nordic region by 
international suffragettes, since the USA could no longer play the symbolic 
role of frontrunner, helped the Nordic states to redefine themselves inter-
nationally. For small status-seeking countries such as Norway, feminism 
and women’s rights even became a matter of foreign policy, something that 
parliamentarian Lund had first suggested in 1890. To understand this, we 
have to take Norway’s smallness into account.
In line with Leira, smallness was the reason why Norway turned into an 
obsessive status-seeker towards the end of the nineteenth century, along 
with the recent character of the Norwegian state. Denmark and Sweden, on 
the other hand, both slower than Norway to make women equal citizens to 
men, were far more concerned about their ranking among other states and 
about maintaining their position – or climbing – within the international 
hierarchy (Leira, 2015: 22, 24). Around the turn of the century, however, 
the Norwegian discourse began to change. Where previously the country’s 
primary concern was with its status as one state among others, its status- 
related talk became increasingly focused on what Norway could and should 
do in the world, its specific characteristics as a nation, and the qualities that 
defined the Norwegian people and state (Leira, 2015: 31). As in the booklet 
produced in 1904 by the Norwegian National Council of Women on the 
subject of Norway’s history and politics, the imagining of Norway and Nor-
wegians was systematically contrasted with what it meant to be Swedish.
The new international role carved out for Norway after the dissolution of 
the Swedish–Norwegian union was related to international law and peace, 
not women’s rights in particular. At least, this is what researchers before 
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me have stressed (Gram-Skjoldager and Tønnesson, 2008; Berg, 2016). Yet, 
from 1909 to 1913, Norway was officially represented at the annual confer-
ences held by the IWSA. In addition, Chapman Catt visited Norway in 1911 
on her way from Copenhagen to Stockholm, where the sixth congress of 
the IWSA was to take place. In the Danish capital, she was met by cabinet 
members and foreign legations. In the Norwegian capital, however, her wel-
come, according to the February 1911 report in Jus Suffragii, was as grand 
‘as if she had been a reigning queen’. She and her travelling partner were 
distinguished guests at a luncheon in which they were seated next to Gun-
nar Knudsen, who was now the leader of the Liberal Party. She also held a 
lecture in the Aula, the university hall located just opposite the Norwegian 
parliament, and, most importantly, was received by King Haakon VII of 
Norway.
As Rosland (2017) has pointed out, the IWSA president used images of 
Nordic royalty in strategic ways to support her movement. During a speech 
in London, for example, Chapman Catt announced that the queen of Nor-
way, who was the sister of the British monarch, King George V, was sup-
portive of the female vote. Another story she told of the Nordic royals, first 
published in the Belfast Weekly News, concerned the attitude of the young 
Norwegian Prince Olav, who, according to Chapman Catt, at the age of 
seven had asked his mother during a visit to England ‘why uncle George 
did not give the vote to women of England as we have done in Norway’ and 
‘saved all this trouble’ (Rosland, 2017: 203–204, with references to Belfast 
Weekly News, 11 July 1911). On her visit to Norway, however, the media- 
conscious suffragette met not just the king but the entire Norwegian cabinet 
at the reception held for her at Oslo’s Grand Hotel. Wollert Konow, who was 
then serving as prime minster for the new conservative government, used 
the opportunity to entertain the guest by suggesting that the closeness of 
the relationship between Norway and the USA was due to the large number 
of Norwegian emigrants to the latter country. However, during his speech 
for the evening, Norway’s official policy somehow slipped out as he partly 
took credit for the progress of women’s political rights in the world. In this 
way, the domestic imagining of Norway was to match once again the foreign 
image made of the country within the international suffrage movement. The 
Norwegian prime minister stated:
We Norwegians consider it as an honor to have been in the front of 
the movement of giving political franchise to women…. If you ask me: 
What is your experience?… I am glad to answer: Within all parties and 
all fractions with us there is an overwhelming consensus of opinion that 
we have been right, that we have moved in the right direction.
(Nylænde, 1911: 158)
In the years to come, it was not just suffragist organizations such as the 
IWSA that were favoured by the Norwegian government. In 1909, Norway 
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would send Gina Krog as official envoy to the Toronto conference of the 
International Council of Women, an organization that had previously been 
forced to abandon the question of female suffrage owing to internal dis-
agreements. And in 1914, the Norwegian authorities planned to co-host a 
larger international gathering on women’s rights in the Norwegian capital, 
which was, however, postponed following the outbreak of World War I (Van-
gen, 2020). When the conference was finally held, in 1920, women’s struggle 
for political rights had waned to some extent, however, or was increasingly 
blending in with women’s growing engagement for peace, a development 
that is discussed further in Chapter 6 of this book by Inger Skjelsbæk and 
Torunn Tryggestad. They argue that peace and security have long been de-
fined as constituting Norway’s primary international role, and this influ-
ences how Norwegian foreign policy makes use of gender equality and how 
the past is evoked in current attempts to brand Norway as a ‘peace nation’. 
Still, prior to World War I, it seems that the political rights of women were 
as important as peace and security for this small country concerned with its 
international role and status. Consequently, the gender-progressive image of 
the Nordic countries was at first very much based on the use of Norway as 
an example both by suffragist activists, on the one hand, and by the Norwe-
gian government, on the other. Indeed, the decision to welcome Chapman 
Catt to Norway in 1911 was close to a stroke of genius for this brand-new 
state with scarce resources to impress on the international scene. Support-
ing the feminists’ cause, if not free, was at least manageable. In the general 
address that Chapman Catt held in Stockholm a few months after her visit 
to the Norwegian capital, there were no limits to her praise:
I wish every doubting Thomas could see what I saw in Norway. More 
than all else, I wish the Parliaments of all nations could pay the country 
a visit…. Norway presents an ideal example of Women suffrage in prac-




Historically speaking, the Nordic countries were early to adjust to what 
later became the new norm of international society, including measures on 
women’s and gender rights. However, New Zealand and Australia were the 
first countries in the world to introduce female suffrage at a national level. 
This tells us that it was the strategic meaning and role ascribed to the Nor-
dics within the feminist movement that caused the Nordic gender image to 
emerge as part of women’s fight for political rights. The current trend of 
declaring that the Nordic countries were the first in the world to do favour-
able things for the progression of women thus builds on much older notions 
or images of the gender-equal Nordics. In this process, external feminist 
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actors, such as Chapman Catt, were central. Thus, the first lesson to be 
drawn from this chapter is that historical imaginings of the Nordic gender 
nation are a result of external images created and reframed over a longer pe-
riod of time, which lately have been appropriated and used to the advantage 
of individual Nordic nation-states. Of course, authorities within the Nordic 
countries, including the Nordic Council of Ministers, have done their bit 
to put gender issues on the political agenda since the late 1960s (Larsen, 
2020). However, the concern for gender equality as a Nordic image – or a 
Swedish, Norwegian, Icelandic, Danish or Finnish image – has increased 
tremendously over the last two decades. As Christopher Browning (2015: 
283) has suggested, this is closely related to two connected developments: 
the introduction of new technologies that have helped to foster the democ-
ratization and proliferation of information and images worldwide, and the 
rise of nation-branding or reputation management programmes that have 
helped states to exert greater control over how they are seen and represented 
at home and abroad. In addition, global measurements within the ‘index 
industry’ have increased the circulation of the Nordic gender image. This 
makes it increasingly difficult to differentiate between fact and fiction in 
relation to the gender progressiveness of the Nordic region and countries. 
This situation is not helped by the fact that the Nordic states are themselves 
blurring the boundaries by using history to brand the nation-state in a fash-
ion that is very selective historically speaking. The historical discourse of 
Nordic gender-branding has an unmistakable structure: We are best at gen-
der equality because we were first!
The use of history in the contemporary efforts to brand individual 
Nordic countries as gender-equal also relates, often in intricate ways, to 
 nation-building. A number of researchers have argued that the nation was 
de facto a brand already before the current trend of nation-branding began 
in the late 1990s (Mordhorst, 2018: 244–245). This is true, at the same time 
as nation-branding is about cultivating certain associations for political or 
commercial purposes, whether the aim of this activity is to attract foreign 
investment or to secure a chair at the table of powerful organizations. How 
this current trend relates to the building of the nation over time has not been 
explicitly addressed here, but the chapter does show how history was crucial 
for the development of the Nordic gender image. The suffragists of the early 
twentieth century made explicit references to the history of the Nordic coun-
tries, their stable traditions and old monarchies, to gain support for their 
cause and combat anti-suffragist sentiments. Interestingly, this resembles 
how history is being used in current Nordic gender-branding discourses, 
although we should be cautious about using the notion of branding avant la 
lettre to refer to such activities (Aronczyk, 2018: 232–233).
The Nordic gender image emerged long before nation-branding occurred 
as a historical phenomenon, and for this reason the concept should not be 
used retrospectively. In fact, none of the foreign images made of the Nordic 
countries a hundred years ago match the historical pasts and roles evoked 
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by individual Nordic countries today. Accordingly, we might conclude that 
there is an interesting mismatch between the current historical imagining of 
the Nordic nations as gender-progressive and the foreign images made of the 
Nordic countries as frontrunners of women’s rights within the context of in-
ternational feminist activism and renewed nation-building a hundred years 
ago. The pasts evoked in current Nordic gender-branding are, besides, strik-
ingly heterogeneous. Finland and Iceland flash the old past, the nineteenth 
century and beyond. Denmark is more focused on the twentieth century, 
albeit in a way that always remains very general. Norway, however, takes its 
reputation as a gender-equal frontrunner more for granted and concentrates 
on showing the world that it has always taken its international obligations 
on gender equality seriously. This indicates that the imagining of Norway 
as a peace nation trumps the type of feminist commitment that Sweden, for 
instance, is currently vigorously advocating.
Thus, the notion of the Nordic countries as historical frontrunners of gen-
der equality cannot be seen only in relation to the historical achievements 
of the Nordic countries as gender-equal societies. As important as those 
achievements, it has been argued here, are the creation and circulation of 
domestic imaginings and foreign images that portray those countries as 
historical gender pioneers. Most of the time, this is done by stating that 
the countries were the first in the world to do beneficial things for the pro-
gression of women, fathers, gays and lesbians, or gender rights in general, 
accompanying this information with exact times and dates. At other times, 
the message is communicated without saying directly that they were gender 
frontrunners. This showcases the importance not only of history but also of 
context in Nordic gender-branding. When Norway, and not Finland, was en-
visioned as the ultimate number one in terms of the women’s vote a hundred 
years ago, it was because it was thought to favour the feminist movement 
in charge of constructing this image and because the Norwegian authori-
ties saw this image as beneficial for Norway’s international standing. Today, 
Finland is the only Nordic country to make use of its historical achieve-
ments in this area in its efforts to gain legitimacy as an old gender- equal 
nation. This again shows that history is more than fixed time but works as a 
reservoir of different (national) imaginaries to be mobilized and commem-
orated for various purposes in the present. The Nordics were truly among 
the first in the world to recognize women’s political rights, but the Nordic 
brand derived from how external feminist actors made the Nordic countries, 
and particularly Norway, into examples for other countries to follow. Or, in 
the words of Carrie Chapman Catt, speaking at the 1911 IWSA conference 
in Stockholm and discussing the argument of a Swedish professor who had 
declared that women’s suffrage was a fad:
The Scandinavian people represent a race which does not forget its an-
cestors were Vikings, who sailed the seas without chart and compass. 
There are modern Vikings in all these lands as fearlessly ready to solve 
34 Eirinn Larsen
the modern problems as were those of old. It is unlikely that all the 
people were bold and courageous in those ancient times. There were 
undoubtedly pessimistic croakers who declared the ships would never 
return, that the men would be lost at sea, and that the enterprises were 
foolhardy and silly. It is the antitype of this class which we find the uni-
versity professor [opposing the female vote] but we recall that it is the 
Vikings who are remembered today.
(Chapman Catt, 1911)
Notes
 1 Greenland, the Faroe Islands and Åland are also part of the geographical and 
political space called Norden. This chapter, however, focuses on the five main 
countries. 
 2 ‘Scandinavia’ now refers to Norway, Sweden and Demark only. 
 3 Norway enacted census-based national suffrage for women in 1907 and univer-
sal female suffrage in 1913. However, the economic requirements were main-
tained also after this. In 1919, receivers of poor relief were included in the polity, 
regardless of gender. Local suffrage followed the same pattern: In 1901, women 
with income above a certain threshold – or with a husband earning the same 
amount annually – could vote and stand for local election. In 1910, this right was 
made universal for all self-sustained women above 25 years of age.
 4 Archive after Fredrikke Marie Qvam, Private Archive No. 5, The University 
 Library of NTNU, Special Collection, Trondheim, Norway, Box 22: Corre-
spondence 1908.
 5 See note 4 above.
 6 Archive after Fredrikke Marie Qvam, Private Archive No. 5, The University 
 Library of NTNU, Special Collection, Trondheim, Norway, Box 23: Corre-
spondence 1909.
 7 Archive after Fredrikke Marie Qvam, Private Archive No. 5, The University 
Library of NTNU, Special Collection, Trondheim, Norway, Box 56: The Inter-
national Woman’s Suffrage Alliance, Report from Norway read by Fru F. M. 
Qvam on the International Woman Suffrage Alliance London Conference.
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Differentiation is at the core of nation-branding. As branding scholar and 
consultant Keith Dinnie (2008: 139) has argued, ‘governments around the 
world are turning to branding techniques to differentiate their nations on 
the global stage and also to give themselves a competitive edge over rival 
countries with which they must compete in both international and domestic 
markets’. This urge to differentiate presents a challenge for Nordic states, 
perhaps particularly when it comes to gender equality. On the one hand, 
there is now an effort to launch a ‘Nordic’ brand as a single and unified con-
cept that includes all the Nordic countries. The Nordic Council of Ministers 
presented a branding strategy for the Nordic region in 2015, the aim being 
to ‘promote what we have in common – our Nordic perspective, our values, 
and a culture that has grown out of a common history’ (Nordic Council of 
Ministers, 2015: 5). Gender equality is featured as a central pillar in this 
common branding effort as a set of values, policies and practices that unifies 
the Nordic region and sets it apart from the rest of the world. On the other 
hand, each Nordic state still engages in its own nation-branding, and gender 
equality is a potential feature for each of these states. Nation-branding gen-
erally requires that each state presents itself as distinctive and even unique. 
Rather than a uniform narrative about Nordic gender equality across the in-
dividual brands, there is thus an incentive for each state to highlight its own 
unique traits. The question is what qualities the Nordic countries emphasize 
in their efforts to brand their respective nations gender equal?
The aim of this chapter is to examine and compare the gender equality 
components of the branding efforts of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Nor-
way and Sweden. The approach adopted is primarily descriptive, the in-
tention being to provide a comparative examination of the Nordic brands 
that can provide a wider context for the other chapters in this volume. Do 
the countries brand themselves in similar ways in terms of gender equality, 
as the Nordic Council of Ministers has recommended? Or do they attempt 
to carve their own niches in the international distinction game, as Larsen 
(see Chapter 1 in this volume) suggests? Do their branding efforts differ in 
terms of how and to what extent gender equality is emphasized? If so, in 
what ways does each country claim and feature gender equality as a national 
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trait? While our theoretical point of departure is critical – the function of 
our analysis is neither to legitimize branding as a practice nor to help im-
prove Nordic branding – the description of the various countries’ brand-
ing efforts is merely a first step necessary for a future critical analysis that 
would unpack the underlying assumptions and power dynamics inherent in 
these branding practices. The comparison of the brands makes it possible 
to consider opportunities that may have been missed in particular brands, 
ways in which gender equality could have been incorporated but was not. 
Identifying missed opportunities, however, does not mean making sugges-
tions about what branding should have included. Again, our aim is to high-
light differences and similarities rather than to advance particular visions 
of Nordic brands.
The analysis relies on three kinds of data: (1) secondary sources, to piece 
together a brief history of the nation-branding efforts of each country; (2) 
brand platform documents, if they exist and are publicly available, as part 
of each country’s nation-branding history; and (3), most importantly for 
the analysis of gender equality in each brand, national websites.1 Nation- 
branding is obviously much more than the texts and images presented on 
official websites. Nonetheless, these websites are deliberately and carefully 
crafted to convey the simple and distinctive messages about national traits 
that form the core of each national brand. While not comprehensive, we thus 
approach these sites as a shortcut to the brand each state seeks to promote 
and project. Since Norway does not use its official country website Norway.
no as a general branding platform (it serves as a portal to the embassies and 
missions of the Norwegian Foreign Service), our analysis of Norway is pri-
marily focused on the tourism promotion and travel guide Visitnorway.no. 
The branding of Norway is thus not entirely comparable to the other Nordic 
countries, but we have opted to include Norway in the analysis nonetheless, 
bearing this difference in mind.
The methodology used is a standard discourse analysis of the texts of the 
Nordic country websites. On each website, we began with a general orien-
tation, looking at the organization of the website and the main branding 
message. Discerning the main branding message is not rocket science – the 
whole point of these sites is to present clear and obvious narratives about 
the nation. We then used the search engines provided at these sites to find 
gender-related articles, using the search terms ‘gender’, ‘women’, ‘women’s 
rights’, ‘gay rights’, ‘LGBTQ’ and ‘masculinity’. We read all articles contain-
ing any of these terms carefully, to discern in what ways gender is presented 
as part of a particular country’s brand. The data collection was carried out 
in 2018 – the websites may have changed since then.
The concern with the nation’s image abroad is not a new one: Nordic states 
have consciously managed their reputations abroad for at least a century. 
For instance, the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA) founded its 
Press Department in 1909 explicitly to ‘remind the world about Sweden’, 
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and it also deployed journalists in Paris, London and Berlin to feed news 
stories about Sweden to foreign news outlets (Pamment, 2013: 100).
The boom in nation-branding campaigns seems to have occurred in the early 
to mid-2000s (Teslik, 2007), which is also the period in which the Nordic states 
first launched ‘national brands’. The five states have nonetheless approached 
nation-branding quite differently, with Finland, Sweden and to some extent Ice-
land having developed much more coherent, distinctive and institutionalized 
brands than Denmark and Norway. As we will show below, branding efforts 
in Denmark and Iceland were triggered and speeded up by sudden events – the 
2006 Muhammad cartoon crisis in the case of Denmark, the 2008 economic cri-
ses and the 2010 eruptions of volcanic ash in that of Iceland – whereas branding 
initiatives in the remaining three countries developed as a result of more general 
and less urgent concerns with the global standing of the respective ‘national 
brands’. As we will demonstrate in the following sections, the roads and ap-
proaches to nation-branding vary significantly among the five countries, as does 
the position of gender equality therein.
In sum, the comparison conducted in this chapter shows that the five 
Nordic brands rest on similar foundations. They all emphasize egalitar-
ian and progressive values, laws and institutions; and they all highlight the 
natural environments of their respective countries. In this normative set-
ting, all five brands furthermore include narratives about gender equality 
and LGBTQ rights. However, they do so to remarkably different degrees. 
Whereas Sweden centrally features gender equality in virtually all its brand-
ing efforts, neither Denmark nor Norway places much emphasis on gender 
equality at all. Finland and Iceland emphasize gender equality less consist-
ently than Sweden, but when they do emphasize it, they do so forcefully, 
setting the countries up as gender-equality leaders. Visually and in text, men 
and women are generally presented in non-stereotypical roles: the nurtur-
ing side of men as fathers and caretakers is highlighted, and the innovative 
and physically forceful side of women is stressed. None of the brands are 
starkly heteronormative. Other than on the tourism sites, there are few im-
ages of heterosexual families and couples, for example, and most images are 
‘sexuality- neutral’. However, Denmark and Iceland hardly feature LGBTQ 
rights at all, whereas Finland, Norway and Sweden do so more extensively.
The rest of this chapter is made up of five sections in which we compare 
the Nordic countries in terms of the extent to which and how gender equality 
features on their nation-branding websites. We will begin with a discussion 
of Denmark and Norway, which do the least to incorporate gender equality 
into the national brand, before moving on to Sweden, the gender-equality 
branding champion. Once we have looked at these three, Finland and Ice-
land are discussed. We have labelled each brand in an attempt to synthesize 
the main message of each national platform, and we use these labels as titles 
for each individual section. The chapter concludes with a more extensive 
discussion that summarizes our analysis.
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Trusting Denmark
In 2007, Denmark launched its first explicit ‘nation-branding’ initiative, 
entitled the ‘Action Plan for the Global Marketing of Denmark’, to guide 
nation-branding until 2012. At this time, Denmark was reeling from the Mu-
hammad cartoon crisis that had erupted in early 2006 and involved global 
protests and boycotts of Danish products as a result of the 2005 publication 
of cartoon caricatures of the prophet Muhammad in the major Danish daily 
paper Jyllands-Posten. Facing demands from the Danish business sector 
that diplomacy and other tools of political dialogue be used to mitigate the 
crisis, the government established a nation-branding programme to rebuild 
Denmark’s image (Angell and Mordhorst, 2015: 190). The Ministry of Eco-
nomics and Business Affairs was assigned leadership of the programme, 
with four additional ministries participating in the taskforce: the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs; the Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation; the 
Ministry of Education; and the Ministry of Culture. The business sector, 
however, never became centrally involved in the actual planning and execu-
tion of the brand (Angell and Mordhorst, 2015: 191).
Marketing consultants from Red Associates were hired by the Ministry of 
Economic and Business Affairs to develop a brand platform, resulting in the 
report Perceptional Analysis and Recommendations for an Aggressive Global 
Marketing of Denmark (Red Associates, 2006). The development of this 
brand platform was subjected to political negotiations (Mordhorst, 2015: 
252). As a result, rather than one core message and a single brand vision, 
Red Associates proposed a platform centred on four themes: ‘Responsible 
and Balanced’, ‘High Quality’, ‘Experimental and Proactive’ and ‘Environ-
mental Awareness, Simplicity and Efficiency’. This was a fragmented and 
internally contradictory platform that was difficult to implement as a coher-
ent narrative (Mordhorst, 2015: 252). The programme was evaluated in 2010, 
and it was concluded that, despite major efforts, the international visibility 
and strength of the Danish brand had not improved to any significant degree 
(Csaba and Stöber, 2011). The nation-branding initiative was subsequently 
terminated in 2012 (Merkelsen and Rasmussen, 2015: 192).
There is no contemporary national brand document coordinating the 
presentation of the country image of Denmark.2 Branding efforts are coor-
dinated by the Department of Public Diplomacy, Press and Communication 
of the Danish MFA in collaboration with Danish diplomatic representa-
tions worldwide (Merkelsen and Rasmussen, 2015: 192). This department 
also maintains the official website, Denmark.dk, which is designed to ‘tell 
you the story about Denmark’.3 Denmark’s national brand is much less es-
tablished than those of Sweden or Finland, and international surveys indi-
cate a lack of familiarity with Danish corporate brands and with Denmark 
more generally (Cremer, 2016) – or, as summarized by two analysts, ‘Copen-
hagen is hot, Denmark is not’ (Csaba and Stöber, 2011). Not surprisingly, 
there have been calls from the Danish business sector for a new, concerted 
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national branding strategy. As a representative from the Confederation of 
Danish Industry has argued, ‘we have to treat Denmark as if it were a busi-
ness: draw up a plan, invest in it, follow up on it, adjust it and measure our 
results’ (Csaba and Stöber, 2011).
On Denmark.dk, the brand message is one that emphasizes the welfare 
state and social trust in a national community. Trust, community and wel-
fare hang together, we are told, and Danish society functions so well because 
they are so tightly interwoven within it. In explaining universal healthcare, 
education and other benefits of the welfare state, the text elaborates that
the idea is that everyone must contribute to the community and in re-
turn, the community will help care for all. These values of trust and 
community are deeply embedded in Danish culture and society and 
have their roots in Danish history.
(Denmark.dk, n.d. a)
Why is Denmark a great place to live? Because of trust, community and the 
welfare state (Denmark.dk, n.d. a). ‘Why are Danish people so happy?’ Be-
cause of trust, community and the welfare state (Denmark.dk, n.d. b). Why 
is Denmark such ‘a great place to do business’? Because of trust, community 
and the welfare state.
An article entitled ‘Trust: A Cornerstone of Danish Culture’ asks the 
(perhaps rhetorical) question, ‘Why are the Danes so trusting?’ The reader 
is provided with a tautological claim: that Danes are trusting because there 
is a Danish culture of trust – trust is a ‘culturally-determined phenomenon 
built over time. Trust is learned during childhood from parents, teachers, 
and coaches, lasts for a lifetime and is passed on from generation to gener-
ation’ (Denmark.dk, n.d. c). Indeed, the text on Denmark.dk is infused both 
with implicit assumptions and overt claims about the existence and impor-
tance of a cohesive and distinctive Danish national community. Not surpris-
ingly, and in stark contrast with Swedish branding efforts, the Danish site 
makes not one mention of multiculturalism. The monocultural nature of the 
Danish nation is reinforced visually, with images representing Denmark as 
a white community with very few people of colour. To be sure, there is one 
article on religion in Denmark that makes mention of Muslims and Jews 
and features a photo of three little girls, and the one in the middle is wearing 
a headscarf (Denmark.dk, n.d. d). But this brief discussion follows a much 
longer one describing Denmark as a Christian country.
So how is gender equality fitted into the Danish national narrative about 
trust, community and the welfare state? Visually, the Danish site looks 
similar to the other Nordic ones. There are both men and women depicted 
throughout, and they are often depicted in non-stereotypical ways. For in-
stance, the majority of the images of a parent and a child feature fathers 
rather than mothers. However, interestingly, gender equality or the status 
of women is hardly featured at all textually. In fact, on Denmark.dk, there 
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is only one article – on the broader theme of equality – that devotes a few 
short paragraphs explicitly to ‘Gender Equality in Denmark’ as well as a 
few on ‘LGBT Rights in Denmark’ (Denmark.dk, n.d. e). There is one ad-
ditional paragraph describing women’s higher rates of paid employment in 
Denmark, in an article on work–life balance (Denmark.dk, n.d. f), and a few 
scattered sentences on women here and there. Overall, gender equality has a 
miniscule presence within the Danish online brand.
In the article on equality, we learn that equality is a central feature of 
Danish culture, with low income inequality and low poverty rates being 
characteristic traits of Danish society. Gender equality and LGBTQ rights 
are discussed as dimensions of this general cultural trait. In contrast with 
Sweden and Finland, as we will show below, the claims about gender equal-
ity in Denmark are furthermore modest, presented as brief, matter-of-fact 
statements. For instance, the reader is told that ‘Denmark scores well on 
the World Economic Forum’s gender equality index’ and that ‘women are 
well represented in Denmark’s government’. Claims about LGBTQ rights 
are equally downplayed and modest. Statements about equality of same-
sex partners before the law and of Copenhagen being one of the most gay-
friendly cities in the world are made, but the overall message that ‘being gay 
in Denmark is no big deal’ is made by hardly featuring LGBTQ issues or 
gay life at all.
That said, Denmark – like the other Nordic states – is presented in 
terms of a few gender-equality ‘firsts’: Nina Bang becoming ‘the world’s 
first female minister in a country with parliamentary democracy’ in 1924 
(Denmark.dk, n.d. e); Asta Nielsen being Europe’s first female movie star 
(Denmark.dk, n.d. g); and Christine Jorgensen receiving ‘one of the first 
 internationally-discussed gender reassignment surgeries in 1951’ (Denmark.
dk, n.d. e). Overall, however, it is remarkable how little emphasis is placed 
on showcasing gender equality and how many opportunities for doing so are 
overlooked. For instance, in the discussion of Denmark as a Christian coun-
try, one brief sentence states that ‘more than 55% of the priests in the state 
church are women’ (Denmark.dk, n.d. d). Given the lack of women priests in 
most other Christian denominations, this could have been an opportunity 
to emphasize Danish progressiveness on gender. Likewise, the discussion 
of Danish foreign policy and aid says virtually nothing about the integra-
tion of gender equality into Danish foreign aid (Denmark.dk, n.d. h). There 
is nothing on women or gender in the section on government and politics. 
Clearly, and in stark contrast with the Swedish brand, as we will show be-
low, gender equality is briefly mentioned but not featured in the branding 
narrative about Denmark.
Natural Norway
Norway seems to have started working towards a national brand earlier than 
neighbouring states, and yet these efforts never resulted in a coordinated 
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brand platform or an institution charged with managing a Norwegian 
‘brand’. The MFA took a leading role in starting the process, preparing 
three reports on Norway’s image abroad between 1999 and 2006 (Lending, 
2000; Omdømmeutvalget, 2006). These reports called for a coherent brand-
ing of Norway executed through coordinated national reputation manage-
ment. Two consecutive bodies were established to meet these expectations: 
the Norwegian Public Diplomacy Commission (mdømmeutvalget) that 
functioned during 2004–2006 and the Norwegian Public Diplomacy Forum 
(mdømmeforumet) that was in operation from 2007 to 2010. Both were led by 
the foreign minister and included a broad spectrum of representatives from 
the private sector, the cultural sector, academia and various NGOs. Angell 
and Mordhorst (2015: 192) argue that ‘national reputation efforts in the Nor-
wegian setting were an integrated part of the foreign policy realm and have 
not caused significant controversies’.
Ultimately, despite the early initiatives towards a branding platform, 
Norway did not end up with an explicit and coherent brand that is officially 
promoted. As the Foreign Ministry explains, ‘we are not seeking to convey 
a fixed message, like a slogan, but rather to stake out a certain direction in 
our continued efforts to promote Norway’. According to the Foreign Min-
istry, that general message is that Norway should be seen as an ‘attractive, 
strong and committed partner’ and that the world should know more about 
Norwegian culture and ‘our relationship with nature’ (Government.no, 2013). 
The official country website of Norway, Norway.no, is used as a portal to 
Norway’s diplomatic missions abroad rather than as an information site and 
country-branding tool. This sets Norway apart from all of its Nordic neigh-
bours. In the absence of a single online focal point, the online management 
of Norway’s reputation abroad is spread over many official websites, in-
cluding the official government website,4 diplomatic mission websites,5 the 
official tourism website,6 the official site for studying in Norway7 and Inno-
vation Norway, a site for promoting business in Norway.8 The other Nordic 
states of course also maintain these kinds of websites, and they also engage 
in some nation-branding in them, too. But they centre their branding efforts 
on their official country websites in a way that Norway does not. Like the 
other Nordic states, Norway also has a resource base for public diplomacy 
developed for ‘missions abroad and other relevant actors when they need 
to tell others about Norway’, which allegedly includes images, a story bank 
and presentations (Government.no, 2015). However, the Norwegian resource 
base is not publicly available. Below, we will focus our analysis primarily on 
the tourism site Visitnorway.com, using the other, less-developed websites at 
times for additional illustrations.
It is difficult to get a coherent sense from all of these websites of any core 
messages about Norway. That said, a 2009 report recommended that Nor-
way be branded as ‘a resourceful, committed and reliable partner’ (Synovate, 
2009). This is still the main message that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
claims to want to use in Norwegian public diplomacy: ‘We would like our 
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contacts to perceive us as: a resourceful, engaged and reliable partner.’ The 
Norwegian MFA still wants official communication efforts to pivot around 
two main dimensions: ‘Norwegian culture and our relationship with nature’. 
Norwegian nature is presented as both ‘magnificent and accessible’ and as 
a great resource for wealth generation and technological development. Nor-
wegian culture, on the other hand, is coupled with the welfare state, quality 
of life and egalitarianism (Government.no, 2013).
Gender equality is not mentioned explicitly by the MFA as part of the 
core public diplomacy message. And gender equality does not seem to fea-
ture centrally on any of the official sites (other than the government site, of 
course, which discusses gender-related public policy along with other pol-
icy). To be sure, as in Denmark, gender equality is mentioned here and there 
in more general discussions of Norwegian egalitarianism. For instance, in 
an article on Norwegian society on the Study in Norway site, readers are 
told that
Openness, equality and equal rights in general – such as economic, so-
cial and gender equality – are important values to most Norwegians…. 
Homosexual relations, for instance, have been legal since 1972, and 
same sex couples have been able to adopt children and get married since 
2009.
As on the other Nordic sites, the caretaking role of fathers is highlighted. 
Under an image with the title ‘Dad hugging his baby’, we learn that
Systematic efforts are made to ensure that women and men are equal 
when it comes to education and wages. This has certainly changed the 
Norwegian male’s role as a father. Norway has a paternity leave quota 
[… it’s easier] to combine careers and family. Nevertheless, the goal of 
total equality remains.
(Study in Norway, n.d.)
Visitnorway.com, Norway’s official travel guide, is clearly tourist-oriented, 
comprising mostly information about how to get there, where to stay and 
what to eat. However, there is also some messaging about the country. The 
slogan ‘Norway powered by nature’ is used in the logo, in line with the core 
brand message. Throughout, the website is full of beautiful visual rep-
resentations of nature, which is to be expected from a travel site. There is 
frequent use of videos narrating personalized stories about Norway through 
food, nature, etc. (e.g. ‘Find inspiration in our stories from Norway. Meet 
the locals and get tips from experts and insiders’; see Visitnorway.com, n.d. 
a). Both men and women are featured in these films; however, in videos fea-
turing single individuals, men dominate as protagonists by a ratio of 4:1. 
Nature and different tourist attractions are presented through the ‘eyes’ of 
young, heterosexual couples. Avoiding representations of nature as empty 
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swaths of land seems to directly follow the advice from a 2003 external re-
port on Norwegian public diplomacy:
In portraying peace and nature, Norway should abjure the static land-
scape, the romanticized anti-modern images of spaces empty but for the 
occasional troll, and the depictions of an innocuous faraway place. The 
expression should focus on the dynamic – active people, hardheaded-
ness and modernity.
(Leonard and Small, 2003).
In this way, the land shots avoid the male-explorer gaze. The texts accom-
panying the videos, however, frequently use words such as ‘explore’, ‘experi-
ence’, ‘discover’, all alluding to lust and pleasure.
There are no explicit discussions of gender equality on Visitnorway.com. 
One article entitled ‘Women’s Museum’ presents a museum dedicated to the 
history of women up to the present time (Visitnorway.com, n.d. b). There 
is no mention of what specific feminist struggles are highlighted or what 
achievements are celebrated in this museum. If ‘gender’ is mentioned at all 
on the website, it is simply listed as one of various ascriptive criteria, as an 
expression of the non-discriminatory character of Norwegian society. For 
example, we read that among the guests at Park Café there are people of 
‘all ages, genders, nationalities, titles and types’, that ‘age and gender set no 
limits’ for the adventurous trips promoted on the website, or, alternatively 
that ‘disc golf is a recreational sports for everyone, regardless of age, gender, 
or ability’.
In contrast, some effort is made to present Norway as an LGBTQ-friendly 
travel destination, as summarized in the slogan ‘Open landscapes, open 
minds’. The article ‘LGBTQ+ Travel’ features the story of two couples who 
came to Oslo for the Pride festival. We learn that
like its Nordic neighbours, most Norwegians have a liberal attitude to-
wards LGBTQ people, and the country was among the first to enact anti- 
discrimination laws against gays and lesbians. In fact, Norway ranks as 
third best in the ILGA-Europe 2018 rating of 49 European countries.
(Visitnorway.com, n.d. c)
A queer person interviewed in the article assures us that ‘in many ways, we 
live in a dreamland’, even though there is an admission that ‘parts of Nor-
way are still very far behind’.
There are themes on the website in which one could expect more explicit 
discussion of gender equality. For instance, an article labelled ‘The Happi-
est Country on Earth’ boasts about the fact that in 2017 Norway jumped to 
the first place in the ranking of the world’s happiest countries in the United 
Nations’ World Happiness Report (Visitnorway.com, n.d. d). Since the arti-
cle elaborates on several reasons behind this high result, we might expect 
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gender equality to be included as an important aspect explaining the ‘hap-
piness’ of Norwegians. However, among the many factors listed, such as a 
well-functioning welfare and healthcare system or the fact that ‘our society 
is rather safe and harmonious’, gender equality is not mentioned. It only 
appears in passing when we learn that in the aftermath of the 2011 terror-
ist attacks in Norway, the daily paper Aftenposten invited its readers to list 
things they appreciate about Norwegian society. Among the most popular 
contributions, fifth (out of 12) was ‘that everyone has the same opportunity 
to succeed, get an education and become what they want, without regard to 
gender, economy and background’ (Visitnorway.com, n.d. d). Yet again, gen-
der is presented as one among several other characteristics that showcase 
Norwegian openness.
It should not be forgotten that while the absence of any other official 
country website makes Visitnorway.com function as the deputy gateway to 
Norway, it is nevertheless a travel site, and Sweden’s official tourist website, 
Visitsweden.com, also has virtually no references to gender equality. Like its 
Norwegian counterpart, too, the latter has a specific section entitled ‘LGBT+ 
Sweden’ (Visitsweden.com, n.d. a), though Sweden’s efforts to attract this spe-
cific category of tourists go even further than the Norwegian site – the sec-
tion takes us to a separate website specifically designed as an ‘inspiration for 
gay and lesbian travellers to Sweden’ (Visitsweden.com, n.d. b).
Progressive Sweden
Sweden has one of the most integrated and well-developed national brands 
of the Nordic countries, and its ongoing platform has a relatively long his-
tory (Clerc et al., 2015; Marklund, 2017). In 1995, the Swedish government 
created a task group – the Council for the Promotion of Sweden (bring-
ing together actors from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the Ministry 
of Enterprise and Innovation, and Business Sweden) – to effectively pro-
mote Sweden in a coordinated, long-term manner. The emergence of self- 
conscious ‘nation-branding’ – in corporate language that draws parallels 
between the nation and a corporation with a ‘brand’ to manage – can be 
traced back to a 2003 study called Sweden’s Image Abroad, commissioned 
by the Council for the Promotion of Sweden (NSU). Apart from the Coun-
cil, the Swedish Institute, a body led by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that 
coordinates public diplomacy promotional resources in trade, investment, 
export and tourism, has overall responsibility for Swedish public diplomacy. 
The aim of the Swedish Institute (n.d.) is to ‘promote Sweden and Swedish 
issues globally’ and to work ‘with Sweden’s image abroad’. A broad con-
sultation process starting in 2005, which involved many stakeholders and 
promotional bodies, resulted in the 2007 launching of a common brand 
platform – a simplified and coherent set of concepts that are to serve as the 
foundation in communication about Sweden. The Council launched the new 
brand platform with great fanfare, with Swedish public TV broadcasting a 
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four-hour VIP event over the internet (Pamment, 2013: 100). According to 
Pamment (2013: 99), ‘Brand Sweden represents an ambitious government led 
consensus that few other democratic states would be able to hold together’. 
Despite the ambition to forge a broad consensus behind the brand, some 
dissenting voices were heard from academics and cultural commentators 
who found the bombastic claims about national distinctiveness and corpo-
rate imagery laughable (Pamment, 2013: 101). Since 2007, both the Swedish 
Institute (2007, 2008) and the NSU (2009, 2014a, 2014b, 2017) have issued a 
number of reports upgrading and refining Brand Sweden.
The brand platform permeates the country website Sweden.se. The core 
concept to be associated with Sweden, we learn from the Swedish brand 
platform, is ‘progressive’ (Swedish Institute, 2007). There are four compo-
nents of the brand platform: Sweden as an ‘innovative’, ‘open’, ‘caring’ and 
‘authentic’ country (Swedish Institute, 2007). These are clearly streamlined 
on the site. The brand rests on a seductive mix of progressive values and 
trendy magazine aesthetics, seamlessly weaving messages about innovation, 
inclusiveness, equality and the environment into a coherent story about a 
country at the forefront of the move towards a better future. Multicultural-
ism and openness to the world are central to the visual presentation. Around 
a fourth of the people portrayed are people of colour, which roughly corre-
sponds with the national average in Sweden. Of the Nordic visual presenta-
tions on the country webpages, this is the most diverse national brand.
Gender equality and, to a lesser degree, LGBTQ rights are central pil-
lars in this progressive story, which resonates with the feminist foreign 
policy adopted by the Swedish government in 2014. In the work leading up 
to the present branding strategy, gender equality was identified as one of 
the themes most closely associated with Sweden in populations around the 
world (Swedish Institute, 2007). This is clearly reflected on the country web-
site. As a whole, the site imagery by and large tells a story that up-ends gen-
der stereotypes, one of economically active women and caring fathers, with 
a few non-binary and gender-fluid inserts. The images of sports, science 
and innovation often feature women, whereas tabs and imagery with small 
children almost exclusively feature fathers. ‘Swedish dads’ are depicted as 
being on parental leave and generally involved in the care of their children, 
whereas the reality of Swedish men on average only taking 28% of the pa-
rental leave that couples are entitled to is not portrayed (Försäkringskassan, 
2018). The parental involvement of Swedish men plays an important part in 
the branding efforts. The focus is dual: on women in the workforce, politics 
or science, on the one hand, and on men as diaper-changing, vomit-wiping 
and sometimes stay-at-home caretakers, on the other.
Gender equality is one of the explicit tags on the website, and there 
are also tags for information about Sweden as a family-friendly country 
(‘Family- Friendly Life the Swedish Way’) and ‘Children in Sweden’. The ar-
ticle ‘Gender Equality in Sweden’ highlights important issues crucial for 
achieving gender equality: power and influence, economic equality, work 
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and family, and men’s violence against women. For the most part, Sweden 
is presented as highly advanced in relation to these issues. Like Finland, as 
we will see below, Sweden is also represented as an international role model 
on gender equality: ‘An extensive welfare system that promotes a healthy 
work–life balance has been an important factor in making Sweden a gender- 
egalitarian leader,’ the reader learns (Sweden.se, n.d. a). Although the site in 
essence presents Sweden as a gender utopia, there is simultaneously some 
hesitation about being boastful. Indeed, the site contains many disclaimers 
of the kind that ‘Sweden is not perfect, but…’. One typical passage reads, 
‘Often considered a gender equality role model, Sweden has come a long 
way. Still, there’s room for improvement’ (Sweden.se, n.d b). There are a few 
critical passages that point to problems. For instance, ‘Gender Equality 
in Sweden’ also states that ‘with a feminist government and a law against 
gender discrimination, how come Swedish board rooms are still heavily 
male-dominated?’.
Gender is not only discussed in the most obvious ways. For instance, out 
of four themes dedicated to fashion, one is explicitly labelled ‘Fashion and 
Gender’, highlighting norm-breaking brands with unisex design and por-
traying fashion as ‘a starting point to explore new ways of expressing gen-
der through their designs, pushing for a less binary and more fluid way of 
understanding masculinity, femininity and everything in-between’ ( Sweden.
se, n.d. c). Other highlighted features and headlines of the site include de-
pictions of ‘10 Swedish Superwomen’, many of whom are young women 
entrepreneurs in the entertainment industry. An image of footballer Lotta 
Schelin, rather than an image of, say, Zlatan Ibrahimovic, is used as the 
front image of the article ‘Swedish Superstars in Sports’.
A systematic gender-mainstreaming effort is visible in many of the themes 
on the website. Gender equality appears in one out of five themes covered 
on the site (31 of 159). For example, the theme ‘How To Start Up the Swedish 
Way’ features stories from three women and three men, zipper-wise (first 
a woman, second a man, third a woman, fourth a man, etc.). An article 
entitled ‘5 Reasons to Work in Sweden’ emphasizes the rights enjoyed by 
workers, with equality (including anti-discrimination and gender- equality 
provisions) as a second reason, and family-centred policies as a third. In 
‘Fashion as an Experiment’, which lists brands that stand out, female de-
signers dominate. In the several ‘best of’ rankings provided on Sweden.
se, men and women are equally represented. For example, the article ‘10 
Must-Read Swedish Books’ includes presentations of four books authored 
by women and six by men. Swedish film facts highlighting famous Swedish 
actors, genres and directors feature five females and seven males. This ap-
pears to be a systematic effort.
As in Denmark, Finland and Iceland, a number of stories highlight how 
Sweden was the ‘first’ to take various steps, underscoring the preferred Nor-
dic image as avant-garde. In various places on the site, one can learn that 
Sweden was the first country in the world to allow for the legal change of 
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gender identity (1972), the first to replace maternity leave with parental leave 
(1974), the first to create a ban on spanking children (1979), the first to pass a 
law to prohibit the purchase but not sale of sexual services (1999), and so on. 
As we shall see, the Finnish brand, analysed next, has not integrated gender 
equality to anything like the same degree as Sweden, even if the role-model 
claims are just as strong.
Functional Finland
The national brand of Finland was not fully launched until 2013, even though 
the process of developing a brand platform began in 2007, when the MFA 
and the Tourism Board of Finland hired consultants to draft a branding 
plan. Moilanen (2016) has described this process well. The branding plan 
emphasized the need to involve broad sectors of society as stakeholders and 
to ensure commitment to the brand from central political, business, cul-
tural and sports actors. Until 2011, the work to develop the brand was quite 
ambitious, involving a high-level Country Brand Delegation (made up of 22 
prominent Finns with varied backgrounds, including business, academia, 
culture and the arts, media, politics, public administration and sports), the 
consultancy of premier brand entrepreneur Simon Anholt, who has also 
been involved in the development of the Swedish brand, and outreach activ-
ities involving society at large (Moilanen, 2016). The delegation submitted 
its final report in 2010, entitled Mission for Finland.
The 2011 elections, which involved a change of government, led to eroded 
support for the ongoing branding initiative (Moilanen, 2016). Branding 
efforts were now moved to a new ‘Team Finland’ network, which was es-
tablished in 2011 with massive private-sector interest, to develop Finland’s 
external economic relations and financial interests. Team Finland was not 
a new organization with its own budget and dedicated staff – it was instead 
a network among existing agencies and organizations. It is steered by the 
prime minister, with the Ministry of Employment and the Economy, the 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Education and Culture 
at the centre of the network, and it involves Finnish diplomatic and other 
offices abroad. The board of Team Finland, which is chaired by the prime 
minister, is almost exclusively made up of private-sector directors, a dra-
matic break from the earlier attempts to involve broad sectors of society. 
In 2013, the Unit for Public Diplomacy of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 
with the help of US strategic communications agency Kreab Gavin Ander-
son, published the Finland Country Image Communications Workbook, to be 
used by all Team Finland participants and other interested parties (Minis-
try for Foreign Affairs, Finland, 2013).
Also in 2013, the Finland Promotion Board was formally brought into 
Team Finland and tasked with defining, coordinating and implementing 
the national brand strategy. The Finland Promotion Board is made up of 
marketing and communications professionals, and the board is chaired by 
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the prime minister. The Finland Promotion Board maintains Finland’s of-
ficial country brand website at Finland.fi, which is called ThisisFINLAND 
(produced by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland). The website was 
originally established in 1995 and changed its name to ThisisFINLAND in 
2009. In 2017, the Finland Promotion Board published Finland’s Country 
Branding Strategy 2017, a brief document that built on Finland’s earlier 
country brand strategy. Despite its brief five years of existence, the Finnish 
brand platform – pivoting around the concept of ‘functional Finland’ – is 
quite coherent and well established.
Turning to our analysis of Finland.fi, the Finnish brand is clear and con-
cise and has consistently centred on Finland as a highly ‘functional’ society. 
Three interrelated themes are central to the 2017 brand platform: ‘Educa-
tion and Knowledge’, ‘Nature’ and ‘Solution Oriented’ (Finland Promotion 
Board, 2017). The brand message on Finland.fi is indeed one of a nation 
of active, nature-loving and solution-oriented people who are products of 
one of the world’s best education systems. Finns, we learn, value equality 
and environmentally sustainable technology and solutions. Because of its 
excellent, egalitarian public education system, this is a nation poised to find 
innovative and sustainable solutions to virtually any problem. Finland, the 
site conveys, is a place where things work and people are happy (in fact, the 
happiest in the world according to the featured European Happiness Equal-
ity Index). In short, Finland is branded as a highly functional place.
Before we turn to the issue of gender, we might note that there is not the 
same explicit emphasis on Finland as a homogeneous national community 
that we find in relation to Denmark on Denmark.dk. The Swedish-speaking 
and Sami minorities of Finland are present, and there is brief mention of mul-
ticulturalism and even racism in Finland.9 Visually, people of colour appear 
here and there in the photos on the site, giving the visual impression of an 
almost but not entirely white society. A discussion of Nasima Razmyar, dep-
uty mayor of Helsinki and former member of parliament for the Social Dem-
ocrats, begins by describing her as an Afghanistan-born woman ‘living as a 
Finn in Finland’. What does ‘living as a Finn’ entail? Focus is placed on her 
work for women’s rights, which – along with her successful political  career – is 
attributed to Finland’s ‘legacy’ of gender equality (Finland.fi, n.d. b).
The place of gender equality in the Functional Finland brand is paradoxi-
cal. On the one hand, Finland.fi does not rely extensively on gender equality, 
at least not textually. Of the hundreds of articles that appear on the Finland 
site, only around ten are expressly about gender equality (tagged ‘gender’ 
or ‘equality’) and they are not centrally placed. A few more mention equal-
ity between the sexes (Finland.fi, n.d. c). And yet when gender equality is 
discussed, the discussion is anything but modest. On Finland.fi, Finland is 
consistently depicted as a gender-equality leader, both in terms of present 
conditions and in terms of leading the way historically. No less than four 
articles concern an international gender-equality prize that the govern-
ment of Finland launched in 2017. The prize serves to set up Finland as a 
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gender-equality authority, with Finland as a place that knows gender equal-
ity and is qualified to promote it elsewhere: ‘Finland has been a leader when 
it comes to issues relating to gender equality over the past 100 years, and this 
is the first high-profile prize of its kind in the world,’ declares a quotation 
from the state secretary at the Prime Minister’s Office. Indeed, the express 
function of the prize is to ‘cement Finland’s role as leader in gender equality 
issues’ (Finland.fi, n.d. d). A similar prize was established in 2019 to recog-
nize the promotion of LGBTQ inclusivity. The prize is named ‘Hän Honor’ 
after the new, gender-neutral pronoun ‘hän’ (Finland.fi, n.d. e).
Finland’s historically pioneering role on women’s rights is also empha-
sized. Readers learn that, in 1906, the Finnish parliament was the first in 
the world to recognize women’s right to run for office and the first in Eu-
rope to recognize women’s suffrage (Finland.fi, n.d. f). Lively portraits of the 
accomplishments of historical women’s rights activists in Finland are pre-
sented, along with information about how they are celebrated in contempo-
rary Finland. For instance, Finnish flags are flown on 1 October each year 
to commemorate Miina Sillanpää, an activist and one of the first women 
elected to the Finnish parliament (Finland.fi, n.d. g), and 17 March is Minna 
Canth Day, to celebrate the nineteenth-century author and women’s rights 
activist. As in the Swedish brand, there is little if any emphasis on contem-
porary resistance to gender equality in Finland, such as among supporters 
of the radical right populist party True Finns.
As in the Danish case, there is a range of obvious opportunities for high-
lighting gender equality that are not seized. For instance, to express what 
is unique about Finland and the Nordic region, one article features the re-
flections of a Finn in the USA on life as a professional in the two coun-
tries (Finland.fi, n.d. h). Finland’s public funding of daycare, education and 
healthcare for all is compared with costs in the USA. This comparison could 
very easily have been presented in gender-equality terms: given existing gen-
der roles with respect to children and the family, public daycare is crucial for 
enabling women in particular to combine work and parenthood. Instead, 
the professional in question is a man whose main worry is the bottom line 
– how much all these things cost. It would indeed have been simple to high-
light the gender-equality implications of the differing systems, but this is not 
done. Another article, with the title ‘Smart People Build Smart Machines in 
Finland’, emphasizes how people from Turkey and China come to Finland 
to learn and build things. Women are notably absent from this story, how-
ever, as the images and people in the article are only men. The reproduction 
of the connection between being smart, science and masculinity is quite 
stark in the article. This could have been an opportunity to break up such a 
stereotypical connection and instead showcase women in science (Finland.
fi, n.d. i). There are numerous other instances of stereotypical depictions of 
men, including an article on the accessibility of Finnish nature entitled ‘Into 
the Finnish Wild’, which features a muscular man, rather than a woman, 
riding a mountain bike (Finland.fi, n.d. j). The contrast with Swedish efforts 
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to use every opportunity to present women and men in non-stereotypical 
gender roles and settings is striking.
Inspirational Iceland
Conscious efforts to manage Iceland’s international reputation can be 
traced to the ‘Iceland Naturally’ marketing programme that was launched 
in North America in 1999 by the New York offices of the Icelandic Tourism 
Board and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Overseas Business Services to 
serve Icelandic tourism and business interests (Pálsdóttir, 2008). The pro-
gramme is still running. In 2006, it was expanded to Europe. In the same 
year, the Icelandic government hired a specialist and commissioned a more 
systematic report on Iceland’s image. The next step in developing the Ice-
landic national brand took place in 2010, with a new campaign ‘Inspired by 
Iceland’. This was launched after the volcanic eruption that caused massive 
air-traffic disruptions in Europe (Benediktsson et al., 2011) and relies on 
extensive collaborations between the government of Iceland, the city of Rey-
kjavík and tourism-related companies. A new website was set up,10 mainly 
dedicated to attracting tourists. The Icelandic parliament passed a Promote 
Iceland Act in 2010, founding an agency specifically dedicated to strength-
ening Iceland’s image and reputation. Promote Iceland is a public–private 
partnership managed by an executive board consisting of four members 
from the private sector and three appointed by the government. It runs the 
official country website, Iceland.is, and its most recent country document, 
simply called ‘Iceland Brochure’, comes from 2016 and is a slight reformula-
tion of previous versions.
The official gateway to Iceland, Iceland.is, conveys a message of Iceland 
as a progressive, modern society, ranking at the top of measurements for 
quality of life. The story it tells is of a country characterized by harsh na-
ture and isolation, which produced a resilient people. Probably owing to the 
country’s heavy dependence on the tourism industry, both the website and 
the country brochure are dominated by beautiful nature shots, and some 
pages are devoid of any text (Promote Iceland, 2016).
Gender equality is not heavily present on the website, and information 
about gender relations in Iceland is not easy to find. The term ‘gender equal-
ity’ only gives four hits in the website’s search engine. However, the two 
occasion-specific articles that draw attention to the ‘Centenary of Icelandic 
Independence and Sovereignty’ (2018) and ‘Anniversaries of Equality’ (2015) 
highlight Iceland as being highly progressive with regard to gender equality, 
even a ‘frontrunner in gender equality’. They describe Icelandic women’s 
path towards gender equality in detail:
Iceland has topped the Gender Gap Index for nine years in a row… 
recent revolutions [have contributed] such as Free the Nipple against 
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online gender-based violence, the Reykjavik Slut Walk where people 
marched against sexual violence and returned the shame to the perpe-
trators and the international #metoo movement.
(Iceland.is, n.d. a)
These descriptions provide an interesting contrast to the Swedish narrative 
about gender equality, where the feminist struggle is mostly written out of 
the story. The Icelandic brand stresses ‘fight’, ‘revolutions’ and ‘marches’, 
all highly contentious repertoires of the feminist movement (see also Er-
lingsdóttir, this volume). Gender equality is thus represented as a matter of 
ongoing competing interests rather than as a cultural trait that is character-
istic of the Icelandic population as a whole as a result of developments in a 
historical past.
While the slogan for the Iceland Brochure and the website is ‘Come and 
be inspired by Iceland’, gender equality is not something utilized for inspi-
rational purposes. The page in the brochure specifically named ‘Iceland as 
Inspiration’ lists Icelandic culture – for example, music, narrative poetry, 
writers and performance art, along with a ‘well educated population with 
one of the most extensive literacy rates in the world’ – and ‘commitment to 
sustainability’. Notably, gender equality is not mentioned. This matches the 
very scarce information on the website dedicated to gender equality, which 
is buried in occasional notes. Iceland undoubtedly has a lot to boast about 
when it comes to gender-equality achievements, and yet this is rarely done. 
When it is, gender-equality ‘firsts’ are emphasized, much as in the other 
national brands. For instance, we learn that Iceland had the first democrat-
ically elected woman president in the world (1980) and the first openly gay 
prime minister in the world (2009).
This last fact does not lead to LGBTQ rights being prominently featured 
on the website, however. Yet again, when we do find a relevant article, this 
time called ‘Rights of the Individual’, there is a lot of substantial information 
evidencing Iceland’s achievements. The article tells a story of Iceland as ‘the 
oldest parliamentary democracy in the world’; however, ‘despite old tradi-
tions, the Icelandic political mentality is progressive with the country repeat-
edly receiving top ranking in studies measuring political freedom, gender 
equality, and human development’ (Iceland.is, n.d. b). The evidence of this 
progressive mentality brought up later in the text is: gender equality, with the 
country having ‘topped the World Economic Forum’s Global Gender Gap 
Report in recent years’; LGBTQ rights; and being ‘the most peaceful nation 
in the world according to the Global Peace Index’. In sum, the branding web-
site Iceland.is does present the country as having many achievements with 
regard to gender equality, and also specifies that Icelandic society reached 
this point through feminist struggle. However, the information about these 
achievements does not figure prominently on the website and is not well in-
tegrated in the visual and textual representation of the country.
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Conclusion
Although the brands of the Nordic states are not equally coherent and clear, 
they all rest on a similar foundation and highlight traits that are in line 
with the broader national narratives of the individual Nordic countries. All 
five brands highlight egalitarian and welfare-providing institutions, mod-
ern and secular values, nature-loving peoples, and environmentally and 
hi-tech-oriented economies. None of these branding sites relies on images 
or narratives that objectify and sexualize women (see Jezierska and Towns, 
2018), the kind of branding that has been documented in Canada and Japan, 
for instance (Miller, 2011; Rankin, 2012). All of the sites utilize images that 
represent men and women in various roles – as parents, workers, innovators, 
and so on. This tells us not only that gender equality is key to Nordic na-
tional identities, but also that branding, to be regarded as successful, must 
be in line with the self-images and the policies pursued by the individual 
countries of the Nordic region. The images of nature include both men and 
women as active explorers: there is little trace of representations of empty 
swaths of land subjected to the male gaze, which Loftsdóttir (2015) claims 
characterized previous Icelandic nation-branding campaigns. None of the 
brands displays overt gender inequality, and all of them make an effort to 
include men and women more or less equally in the visual representations. 
That said, the degree to and way in which gender equality is highlighted 
varies quite drastically.
Still, it is surprising how different the branding of gender equality is on 
the country websites. Whereas the Swedish online brand has incorporated 
gender equality throughout the country’s website, neither Denmark.dk nor 
Norway’s sites make much effort to brand gender equality or women’s rights 
as part of what is Danish or Norwegian. Finland and Iceland do so to a 
greater extent, but neither has integrated gender-equality messages into the 
entirety of the national narrative in the way that Sweden has. Interestingly, 
wherever Finland and Iceland do address gender equality, they do so force-
fully. Both claim to be ‘first’ on a number of gender-related accomplish-
ments, and both present themselves as international leaders or role models 
on gender equality. Given the boldness of these claims, it is a bit curious 
that the gender-equality dimension is not emphasized more prominently in 
the Finnish and Icelandic brands. In the light of the above, it is evident that 
the suggestion of the Nordic Council of Ministers that each Nordic country 
promote gender equality has yet to come to fruition online.
In the competitive field of nation-branding in the international arena, 
the Nordic countries play a mixed game. On the one hand, they appear 
as team players. There is surprisingly little comparison or explicit com-
petition between the Nordics in the analysed documents and websites. 
Even when claiming firstness in various gender-related rankings, this is not 
done in contrast to other Nordic competitors. Such a move contributes to 
the fact that, especially from a distance, the Nordics appear as a group 
of like-minded countries, which all share commitment to gender equality 
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as a fundamental element of their respective national identities. There is a 
risk that the nation brands become indistinguishable, however. Thus, on 
the other hand, a more subtle competition between the Nordics also takes 
place. As evidenced above, their nation brands feature gender  equality 
to a varying degree, positioning them differently in the international 
nation-branding game. Here, the simultaneous challenge is not to appear as 
self-righteous in the quest for moral status, as that would usurp the moral 
superiority crown. This concern might explain the different choices the 
countries have made regarding how explicit and vocal they are about their 
gender-equality achievements.
Notes
 1 See https://denmark.dk, https://finland.fi/, https://www.iceland.is/ and https://
sweden.se/. Norway stands out as the only country that does not maintain an 
official country website. Instead, https://www.norway.no/ is used as the portal 
for the embassies and missions of the Norwegian Foreign Service, and multiple 
other sites serve to brand Norway. Most important of these is the travel guide at 
https://www.visitnorway.no/. Our analysis of Norwegian nation-branding is thus 
more limited than that of the other states.
 2 Email correspondence with the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 25 October 
2018.
 3 This text is taken from the details found at the bottom of all pages of the website 
at denmark.dk (accessed December 2018).
 4 The official website of the Norwegian government is located at www. regjeringen.
no; an English-language version is available at www.government.no.
 5 See https://www.norway.no.
 6 See www.visitnorway.com. 
 7 See www.studyinnorway.no. 
 8 See https://www.innovasjonnorge.no.
 9 See, for example, Finland.fi (n.d. a).
 10 See https://www.visiticeland.com/ (accessed December 2018).
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The Nordic brand has experienced a great upsurge over the last 20 years 
within a range of areas that include design, cuisine, welfare and the focus 
of this book – gender equality. Nordic countries are often seen as ‘super-
powers’ of gender equality, and the Nordic model of gender equality has 
been discussed and emphasized by many (see, for example, Melby et al., 
2009). A quick search on the website of the New York Times for the terms 
‘Nordic’ and ‘gender equality’ yields headlines such as ‘Nordic Gender Gap 
Is Thinner’ (New York Times, 2005) and ‘Nordic Nations Remain Gender- 
Equality Leaders’ (Clark, 2010). Gender equality is a key image conjured 
when thinking about the Nordic region: ‘In an international comparison, 
gender equality is probably among the features distinguishing the Nordic 
societies of today’ (Lagerspetz, 2003: 57). The Nordic brand is seen as strong 
and successful (see Browning, 2007), and the brand thus entails clear advan-
tages. However, different sides of this brand may also warrant exploring. 
Are there negative sides to the Nordic brand with regard to gender equality, 
and reasons to avoid using it?
Branding can be seen as a process that, among other things, ‘differenti-
ates the product from its competitors’ (Davcik et al., 2015: 3). In Sweden, 
for example, the government has adopted a feminist foreign policy (see Sol-
heim and Moss, 2020). This may serve to differentiate the Swedish Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs (MFA) from its counterparts in Denmark and Norway, 
whose governments have not taken an active feminist stance but are dedi-
cated to working with gender equality. Van Ham (2001, 2008) argues that 
the branding of states and places is a key aspect of public diplomacy and the 
use of soft power. More specifically, he argues that ‘the art of politics pur-
sued through old-style diplomacy has been shifting to encompass the new 
art of brand building and reputation management’ (Van Ham, 2008: 129), 
a development that closely ties foreign ministries to their countries’ nation- 
branding activities (see also Angell and Mordhorst, 2015). Glover (2009), 
however, speaks of nation-branding as imaging communities rather than 
imagining nations (see also Jordan, 2015).
In branding efforts, whether it is communities, nations or something else 
that is to be branded, the notion of brand equity is central. This term refers 
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both to the positive qualities of a brand and to its liabilities, which, in turn, 
either increase or decrease favourability in reactions and responses to the 
brand. Brand equity is thus the overall value that a brand entails or creates 
(Bailey and Ball, 2006). Keller (1993: 8) speaks of customer-based brand eq-
uity, defining this as ‘the differential effect of brand knowledge on consumer 
response to the marketing of the brand’ – in other words, the image consum-
ers have of the brand, the level of awareness they have of it, the degree of 
loyalty they have to it, and the strengths and weaknesses they associate with 
it. How, then, do such issues about brand creation and management relate 
to Nordic gender equality?
In this chapter, I explore how diplomats from Norway, Denmark and 
Sweden talk about the Nordic brand in relation to gender equality. As part 
of their everyday work, diplomats are tasked with managing and creating a 
national brand. They are operators of soft power. It is therefore particularly 
interesting and valuable to ask them how they manage gender equality in 
their everyday activities, and how the Nordic or country-specific brand is 
intertwined with this.
Gender equality is important to the identities and self-imaginaries of all 
the Nordic states. Towns (2002: 162), for example, states that ‘Sweden, like 
the other Nordic countries, developed an identity as a gender-equal state’. 
Similarly, a Norwegian diplomat interviewed for the study presented in 
this chapter stated that ‘gender is central to our state identity and sense 
of who we are as a people’. Ministries of foreign affairs are key actors in 
both nation-branding and reputation management (Angell and Mordhorst, 
2015), and function as sites for handling regional and state identities (Towns, 
2002). What positives and negatives do they emphasize about the Nordic 
brand? Why and when is it useful, and what rhetoric is there against brand-
ing gender equality as Nordic among the diplomats? The analysis that fol-
lows is based on semi-structured interviews with Scandinavian diplomats.
The Nordic gender brand in action
Browning (2007) notes that there have been increasing efforts to market and 
make use of the shared Nordic brand. As becomes clear from the diplomats’ 
accounts presented below, however, there are sometimes conflicting views 
about what the content of such a Nordic brand might be. The Nordic coun-
tries may go about this Nordic brand differently, both in general (Hansen 
and Wæver, 2002) and also specifically in relation to gender equality (see 
Larsen, this volume; Jezierska and Towns, this volume). Nevertheless, as 
Browning (2007: 30) argues,
aside from these various and sometimes divergent narratives, the Nordic 
countries have collectively and rather deliberately tried to construct and 
market a singular ‘Nordic brand’, a particular common ‘Nordic experi-
ence’ or way of doing things that is also presented as applicable for others.
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Magnus (2016) agrees that the Nordic brand is a brand, since the world al-
ready refers to the Nordic region as a brand. He does ask, however, whether 
‘five countries and three autonomous territories really [can] be bundled to-
gether under a common brand’. Both inside and outside the Nordic region, 
images of the region vary extensively, and Magnus therefore discusses the 
challenges posed by grouping together a ‘number of nations under a com-
mon branding identity’.
The internal divisions become visible in the analysis presented below, and, 
as other chapters in this volume demonstrate, there is extensive variation in 
how the Nordic countries engage in branding (see, for example, Larsen, this 
volume; Jezierska and Towns, this volume; Skjelsbæk and Tryggestad, this 
volume). Further, the Scandinavian diplomats interviewed for this study 
approach the question of to how to utilize or avoid the Nordic brand in dif-
ferent ways. How, then, do the diplomats handle the Nordic brand in their 
work with gender equality? Do they emphasize the assets or the liabilities of 
the Nordic brand’s links with gender equality?
The data material for this chapter consists of semi-structured interviews 
with diplomats from Denmark, Norway and Sweden in the period 2018–2020, 
conducted as part of the University of Oslo’s Nordic branding project. The 
diplomats were recruited either by directly reaching out to focal points on 
gender equality in the foreign ministries of the three countries or by asking 
contacts for input. Snowballing was also used. Three – often  interrelated – 
work focuses were used to identify diplomats that would be asked to partic-
ipate in the interviews: if a diplomat worked specifically (but not necessarily 
only) with gender; if they worked with branding and communication; and, 
for Sweden and Norway, if they were involved in those countries’ campaigns 
for membership of the UN Security Council.1 The interviews were mainly 
carried out at the ministries in the three capitals, but some were also con-
ducted at embassies/consulates in three locations outside Europe. Interviews 
were mainly done one on one, but at times two or three diplomats were inter-
viewed at the same time. A few people were interviewed twice or more. I con-
ducted 23 interviews with Scandinavian diplomats (Norway, 11 interviews, 
11 different people; Denmark, 5 interviews, 6 people; Sweden, 7 interviews, 
8 people). The sample consisted of both senior diplomats in higher office and 
more junior diplomats. I also conducted 8 interviews with other individu-
als (local staff at embassies, 5; a representative from the Nordic Council of 
Ministers, 1; representatives of other ministries, 2). Of the 34 people in the 
sample, there were 27 female and 7 male participants.2
The interviews commonly lasted around 60 minutes. Only a few of the 
interviews were recorded; for the rest, I relied on extensive notes, helped by 
a coding system that enabled me to get the majority of the sentences down 
word for word (when I compared the recorded interviews with my notes 
for those interviews, I found that I had captured about 80% of the words 
used). To establish rapport, all respondents were informed that they would 
be given the transcript of their interviews to edit as they saw fit. This was 
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important, as I believe much of the information shared would not have been 
shared without this measure. The editing varied from relatively minimal 
changes, to corrections on factual points, to editing out whole issues. While 
this ‘cost’ me material, it also allowed for greater awareness of which issues 
were considered particularly sensitive, which proved very useful in further 
interviews, as I was able to ask specifically about issues I might otherwise 
not have known about.
When asked about the Nordic brand in relation to their work with gen-
der equality, participants emphasized both advantages and disadvantages 
with the brand. Wanting to focus on these positive and negative sides to the 
Nordic brand, I analysed the material, looking for how the diplomats were 
positioning the brand and the imaginaries of the Nordic brand related to 
gender equality, and from these readings I constructed four themes. The 
first focused on links between the Nordic brand and ideas of moral superior-
ity; the second focused on the Nordic brand as an old-fashioned approach to 
increasing gender equality; the third discussed internal differences that lead 
to a competitive emphasis on national brands rather than the regional Nor-
dic brand; and, lastly, the fourth examined the expectations regarding the 
use of the Nordic brand for lobbying and collaboration across the region. 
What becomes clear from the nature of these four themes is that the need for 
caution when handling the Nordic brand was emphasized more by respond-
ents than the positive aspects of the Nordic brand. The two first themes refer 
to negative aspects of the brand, the third to internal competition, and only 
the last directly to positive aspects of the brand.
It should also be added that in the interviews with the Swedish and Dan-
ish representatives, I became Norway. As a Norwegian, I was frequently 
positioned as a country representative, rather than being a more ‘neutrally 
placed’ researcher. This was demonstrated time and again in the interviews: 
‘We have a long tradition of working with gender equality. As you do in 
Norway’ (Swedish diplomat), and ‘We are good at the Women, Peace and 
Security agenda. But you are of course also very strong when it comes to 
that’ (Danish diplomat).
Balancing perceptions of moral superiority
In the interviews, it was made clear that the Nordic brand can carry ele-
ments of moral superiority, with the Nordics telling the world how things 
should be done. This narrative of moral superiority has been problematized 
(see, for example, Liinason, 2018; and, in relation to Sweden, Towns, 2002) 
and has been coupled with the Nordic exceptionalism narrative (see Rastas, 
2012).
All the participants brought up the problematic moral superiority asso-
ciated with the Nordic brand. A senior Norwegian diplomat declared: ‘The 
Nordic brand comes with a real danger of being seen as superior and know-
it-all.’ Here the diplomat made it clear that her ministry wanted to avoid 
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the imaging this entailed. One Norwegian diplomat working especially with 
gender equality commented that the Nordic brand risked evoking moral su-
periority, making it beneficial to instead brand the ministry’s gender focus 
as Norwegian, as she explained that the moral superiority was much more 
explicitly tied to the Nordic overarching brand than to the Norwegian. This 
was echoed in other interviews with Norwegian diplomats, as well as in 
those with Danish and Swedish diplomats. There was thus the impression 
that moral superiority was seen as more of a challenge with the regional 
rather than the country-specific brands (even though there may very well 
also be elements of moral superiority linked to these). A Danish diplomat 
disagreed, however, and said that within her portfolio it was the Swedish 
rather than the Nordic brand that was seen as morally superior – a view with 
which she also agreed: ‘And the Swedes do think they are a bit more impor-
tant that way.’ The diplomat further emphasized that the Nordic brand did 
not invoke the same connotations: ‘I do not think that this Nordic aspect is 
that much of a problem within my area of work.’
To avoid the Nordic moral superiority stamp, the diplomats could instead 
choose to focus on their national brands. In presenting their individual 
country brands, the diplomats seemed mindful of the moral superiority la-
bel attached to the Nordic brand, and appear at times eager to emphasize 
that their national brands differ from that of the Nordic. One way of doing 
this could be through emphasizing their non-superiority on moral issues – 
that is, by avoiding a ‘glossy image’ of the national brand. While acting as 
the Norwegian expert for a Nordic gender-equality seminar organized by 
the Nordic embassies in a non-European capital a few years ago, I was told 
several times by the Norwegian ambassador that I needed to give a non- 
utopian image of the gender-equality situation in Norway. It was empha-
sized that it was not constructive for the audience to hear too much about 
how good Norway is at working with gender equality, and that what was 
required was a more balanced version of events that also emphasized the 
challenges that remained.
A complicating factor here is the difference between internal attempts at 
branding and the external life of brands. To be meaningful, a brand needs 
to be seen as distinctive by others (Ringmar, 2002). An audience may asso-
ciate specific approaches with the country brand or the regional brand in-
dependently of what the countries in question intended. ‘Others can easily 
see us as the Nordics, even if we try to opt out of the brand’, one Norwegian 
diplomat said. Trying to emphasize one’s country instead of the regional 
belonging can thus be difficult, which speaks to Browning’s (2007) point 
that brands cannot merely be proclaimed, as they depend on an audience.
Downplaying the Nordic to achieve gender results
Some of the diplomats quickly brought up the issue of results when discuss-
ing the Nordic brand. They emphasized that, pragmatically, their ministries 
have better push-through for actual projects – such as, for example, efforts 
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to combat female genital mutilation, family planning initiatives or increased 
female participation in peace processes – if these gender initiatives come 
from countries that are less established in terms of gender equality. A Dan-
ish diplomat said that even though such collaborations take place, this area 
of teaming up with partners from regions with less support for gender equal-
ity was one with room for improvement from the Nordics:
I think we are trying to be creative in our alliance-building, because we 
do not have to convince those who already agree with us. It is the others 
we should get onboard. China, Russia and the MENA countries, they 
cannot be bothered to listen to moralizing talk. Speaking to them, there 
are some other things we need to grasp. There, we are not up to scratch, 
I would say. It requires extensive thought work and relation-building to 
get such new collaborative constellations [on gender equality] up and 
running.
There was agreement among the diplomats that such collaborations were 
important for achieving results. A diplomat working specifically with gen-
der in the Norwegian MFA explained:
Talking about Nordic branding of gender issues to an external audience, 
this is a bit old-fashioned. The optics of it does not serve the purpose. 
We need to think: Does it strengthen or weaken the message that five 
white people are pushing this agenda? We need to measure the optics of 
this up against the relevance to the intended audience. It is often more 
powerful if the message is fronted by South Africa or Colombia rather 
than the Nordic countries.
It hardly comes as a surprise that the Nordic countries vote for and push 
for gender equality in international fora. This stance is expected, both by 
audiences within the Nordic countries themselves and by other countries. 
But it seems that some of the diplomats see it as more effective if initiatives 
on gender-equality measures come from other countries, potentially in col-
laboration with a Nordic country. ‘The end result is often better then,’ one 
Norwegian diplomat commented in relation to the increased international 
traction on gender equality in such a situation. She continued: ‘The more 
of us from the Nordic countries there are when presenting gender-equality 
projects, the more detrimental to the results.’ This was also backed up by 
other diplomats. A Norwegian diplomat said: ‘It is often more powerful if 
the message is fronted by South Africa or Colombia rather than the Nordic 
countries.’ Another Norwegian diplomat working with the UN explained in 
the interview:
It is important to emphasize that very often the message on gender 
equality can be more powerful when it comes from someone non- 
Nordic. When it comes from someone in the Africa group or the Middle 
68 Sigrun Marie Moss
East group… this can have a greater impact and make the message 
reach further.
A senior Swedish diplomat offered a somewhat different take:
It is a core sentiment in diplomacy that we are stronger when we work 
together…. We clearly work actively to include countries in the global 
South, with whom we can go arm in arm so that we achieve greater plu-
rality in the voices on this [gender equality]. It does not work well if only 
we up north talk about this.
These extracts may speak to different country-specific branding processes. 
On the one hand, some diplomats express the view that the best way to im-
prove traction on gender equality is when other countries or organizations 
front gender-equality messages – where one’s initiative is not tied to one’s 
own country – which entails that one forgoes the branding opportunity pre-
sented by the initiative. Instead, the focus is on how a particular gender- 
equality suggestion will have the most impact and thus the aim is to have 
someone else front the initiative, as we see in the above quotations from 
Norwegian diplomats. On the other hand, other participants comment that 
it is better to front such issues together with other countries that are not 
known as gender-equality forerunners, and to go arm in arm with these, 
as in the example from the Swedish diplomat. Another Swedish diplomat 
echoed this arm-in-arm stance:
It is not beneficial that the five of us Nordic countries stand side by side 
fronting something. Often the cause in question is better served by a 
different type of presentation. Certain questions should absolutely not 
be driven as Nordic questions. That can backfire. Then it can seem we 
think of ourselves as having all the answers. Now it has to be cross- 
regional. Anti-terrorism for example, is something we front together 
with Jordan and South Africa.
Even if the diplomat is here using anti-terrorism as an example, rather than 
gender equality, the element of fronting something together with, rather 
than through, other nations is evident again. Here, nation-branding is not 
set aside but instead emphasized, with Sweden taking the lead in particular 
forms of collaborations. These two approaches potentially speak to differ-
ences in branding: The first (here represented by the Norwegian diplomat’s 
extract) emphasizes the gender-equality results over the brand, and, here, 
diplomats are willing to forgo branding opportunities involved in linking 
the initiatives to their own countries. The second focuses both on the results 
and on the brand, as when the Swedish diplomats advocate for partnering 
with another country in fronting issues. Such differences in approaches to 
branding are seen across the interviews with all the diplomats and are also 
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visible in other nation-branding activities (see Jezierska and Towns, this vol-
ume), with the starkest difference perhaps between Norway and Sweden. 
In both of the examples discussed above, however, there is agreement that 
branding gender equality as something Nordic can have negative effects, as 
shown in the Swedish quote: ‘It does not work well if only we up north talk 
about this.’ A Norwegian diplomat working with the UN said that there 
are many settings in which Norway would try to brand gender specifically 
as something universal rather than Nordic or Norwegian. In line with this 
reasoning, gender equality has its clear limitations in nation-branding pro-
cesses, and the Nordic brand is one that needs to be handled with care if it 
is not to be detrimental to the cause.
Internal Nordic differences and competition
In the interviews, the diplomats speak about different priorities when it 
comes to gender-equality work. These differences in priorities can lead to 
country-specific rather than Nordic approaches to gender-equality work. 
One example of this came up in an interview with Danish diplomats: ‘When 
we front the sexual and reproductive health and rights agenda, we have of-
ten stood alone, without getting strong support from the other Nordics.’ The 
respondent here seems to express a sense of disappointment with the Nordic 
neighbours on this particular issue. In the interviews with Norwegian dip-
lomats, however, one explanation for this lack of support came to the fore.
During several interviews with Norwegian diplomats, it was indicated 
that gender may be one of the areas in which the Nordic countries compete. 
Sweden has an explicitly feminist foreign policy and habitually portrays it-
self as being at the very forefront of the fight for gender equality: ‘In Sweden, 
we have come far by international comparison; in fact, we have come the 
farthest in the world. We gladly share our experiences, we readily export our 
Swedish model for gender equality.’3 Several of the other diplomats agreed 
that the Swedes are the strongest when it comes to gender. A Danish diplo-
mat, for example, commented that ‘of the Nordic countries, the Swedes are 
best at gender’. However, in interviews with diplomats from the other two 
countries, there is at times a tendency towards frustration with the fact that 
the Swedes want to ‘go it alone’. A junior Norwegian diplomat observed that 
‘the Swedes see gender equality as their thing, with their feminist foreign 
policy and their strong focus on this. That can challenge the Nordic cooper-
ation at times.’ This may be a motivation to focus less on the Nordic brand 
per se, and may make the brand difficult to use. One Norwegian diplomat 
involved in peace and reconciliation stated that ‘the Nordic cooperation is 
difficult…. It is challenging to have real Nordic cooperation on this. The 
result is then that everyone does their own thing.’ A Danish diplomat posted 
at a non-European embassy commented that the Swedes are very focused 
on gender, while the Danes are ‘more pragmatic when it comes to gender 
issues’. Such differences in focus, according to this diplomat, could make 
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the shared Nordic brand more uncertain, as the contents of the brand are 
not synchronized across the Nordic or Scandinavian countries. The Swedes 
may place gender equality more centrally in their brand and therefore wish 
to focus on their national brand over the regional brand (see also Skjelsbæk 
and Tryggestad’s chapter in this volume). For example, in a 111-page hand-
book on Sweden’s feminist foreign policy (Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 
Sweden, 2019), the Nordic is only mentioned seven times. Distinctiveness – a 
key factor in branding – is established along the lines of the national iden-
tity, not the regional one.
Together the Nordics can make the message count
Some of the participants expressed the view that the Nordic regional brand 
did have potential for furthering work on gender equality and that it was 
useful especially when fronting particular topics, such as showcasing how 
societal structures that allow for extensive female participation in the work-
force have extensive economic benefits. A senior Norwegian diplomat com-
mented that the Nordic brand and Nordic cooperation on gender-equality 
issues could play a key role in certain advocacy and public relations issues 
in cases where there is strength in numbers, before going on to say add: ‘It is 
useful to share experiences, but it should also be more than a talking club.’ 
The same point was reiterated by diplomats from the two other countries. A 
Swedish diplomat working with Scandinavian collaboration declared: ‘We 
think that cooperation will lead to something better. We are bigger together, 
and can get more traction.’ Similarly, a Danish diplomat working with gen-
der equality talked about the potential of the Nordic gender-equality work: 
‘Together we can deliver a Nordic bar for raising the standards of gender 
equality.’ Another Danish diplomat reiterated this when talking about the 
Nordics and gender equality: ‘I think we are seen as trustworthy. That is 
partly because, combined, we are weighted more, and thus our message 
counts.’ This latter Danish diplomat praised the Nordic collaboration on 
the topics she was working with and emphasized its value in terms of end 
results:
We have such a good collaboration that we easily can get relatively 
strong influence. We are all small countries, so no one suspects we are 
running a superpower agenda, which one sometimes can think that the 
USA or others are. At the same time, we speak with a very strong voice 
because we collaborate so well…. As we are not one country, we are not 
suspected of having a hidden agenda.
This last quote is not directly tied to the Nordic regional brand but speaks 
to the advantages of collaborating and speaking with a shared Nordic voice. 
This also nuances the previous theme of how internal Nordic competition 
can stand in the way of the use of the Nordic brand. This Danish diplomat 
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works within an area in which the Nordic collaboration is evidently an as-
set and where the Nordic bloc is spoken of favourably, which potentially 
makes the Nordic brand more relevant and unproblematic in that particular 
sphere. The context of the branding audience is thus a necessary component 
in any assessment of a brand’s equity.
A few of the diplomats also emphasized that the Nordic brand can be in-
spirational and show that the gender policies promoted by the Nordic coun-
tries and others are not only possible but also an asset in both social and 
economic terms. Together, the Nordic countries can showcase gender equal-
ity in society across five different countries. A gender expert from the Nor-
wegian MFA stated that in order to demonstrate that more gender-equal 
societies are both possible and economically viable, it is valuable to show 
this in practice: ‘We need to show our process. Show that it is possible across 
different settings. Then the Nordic gender equality is valuable.’ Here the 
Nordic imaging provides ‘proof’ that gender-equal societies can make finan-
cial and societal sense. In this context, several diplomats emphasized that 
five cases may constitute better ‘proof’ than a single standalone case. As a 
Swedish diplomat working with human rights emphasized:
We are pioneers on this [gender equality], together with our Nordic 
neighbours. We have ourselves had large-scale reforms on this; we have 
built solutions that give us legitimacy to talk about these topics now. 
We have introduced progressive laws and reforms over several decades. 
This has not gotten us quite to the finish line yet, but it has brought us 
far – even if there is still much left to do. The opinion in Sweden has also 
come far in terms of issues of equality and rights. We can thereby show 
our own practice to show others that equality is important in building 
good and strong societies.
Here, the social representation of the in-group, the Swedes, is in focus, as 
well as the moral obligation to take this representation, and the associated 
practice, and spread it. At the same time, the Nordic brand on gender equal-
ity is also discussed, as the diplomat reverts back to the ‘proof’ represented 
by the positive aspects of the Nordic way of doing gender equality. This 
could be a valuable aspect of the Nordic brand when it is considered desira-
ble to point to the successfulness of this region in terms of gender equality, 
as well as to provide ‘proof’ of the value of such gender-equality policies.
Conclusion
As can be seen above, the interviewed diplomats mostly focused on the neg-
ative or non-functional sides of the Nordic brand. According to Browning 
(2015: 284), ‘states and nations have always, and necessarily so, paid atten-
tion to matters of image representation and identity cultivation in their rela-
tions with others’. A brand is thereby successful if it manages to be known as 
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something better than other brands, on relevant criteria: ‘As such, the brand 
becomes something people recognize, admire and even aspire to have or as-
sociate with’ (Browning, 2007: 29). Browning further emphasizes, however, 
that brands can also come across as outdated or unsuccessful, in that they 
may seem worse than other brands or lose popularity.
The interviewed diplomats all shared a strong awareness of the poten-
tially negative sides of the Nordic brand, while most also mentioned the 
potentially positive aspects. These characteristics can be understood as ex-
amples of brand equity – assets and liabilities linked to the brand. The lia-
bilities may be particularly challenging when dealing with brand alliances 
and co-branding (see Keller and Lehmann, 2006), as the imaging of the re-
gion depends on and varies with several actors. For example, when Sweden 
adopted its feminist foreign policy in 2014, this may also have influenced the 
Nordic gender-equality brand. This is a particular risk, as one Norwegian 
diplomat pointed out, since many see the Nordic region as a single entity, so 
that what one country does can be seen as something that all five countries 
do and may thus be linked to the Nordic brand in general. Dinnie (2015) 
speaks of national brand alliances, where both negative and positive spillo-
ver effects are possible. Countries can opt out of or downplay national brand 
alliances to avoid stigma. For example, Ghana could focus on its country 
identity over the West African identity during the Ebola crisis. Focusing on 
the national brand rather than the regional brand is also linked to the core 
of branding, namely, differentiation. The chapter thus speaks to how these 
Scandinavian diplomats manoeuvre the Nordic and national brands, and 
how they actively attempt to avoid applying the Nordic brand.
There were occasions, however, when several of the diplomats empha-
sized the value of applying the Nordic brand, particularly in relation to the 
idea that there was strength in numbers when advocating for different Nor-
dic approaches to gender equality. Several also stated that there could have 
been more collaboration between the individual countries, but that gender 
equality is a topic that is often marked by Nordic competition.
It should be noted that other diplomats specifically praised the Nordic 
cooperation, so the narratives on Nordic cooperation over competition vary 
with the sector of the MFAs in question as well as with the individual diplo-
mats interviewed. Browning (2007: 30) emphasizes that discussions regard-
ing the shared Nordicity can be difficult: ‘Nordic identity means different 
things to different people in different locations.’ This variation is also evi-
dent in approaches to gender equality, as well as in questions related to inter-
nal collaboration and competition, as demonstrated in the various accounts 
elsewhere in this volume. This brings us back to Magnus’ (2016) questioning 
of whether the Nordic is a meaningful brand at all, given the challenges 
entailed by a brand identity that encompasses five different nations. Either 
way, comments by the diplomats interviewed for this study suggest that the 
Nordic brand may have more negative aspects than positive ones in the con-
text of their work on gender equality. The internal and external imagining 
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of the Nordic countries as gender champions may have come at a cost, with 
connotations of moral superiority and utopian (or dystopian, depending on 
the audience) characteristics of the Nordic model.
Notes
 1 Norway was vying for a seat on the Security Council for the period 2021–2022, 
and Sweden for the period 2017–2018. Both were successful in attaining their 
seats on the Council. The campaigns for a seat on the UN Security Council are 
relevant arenas for seeing how these countries’ foreign ministries use (or avoid) 
their brand as superpowers on gender equality.
 2 I did attempt to sample on diversity criteria, to include more men, but, as one 
diplomat said: ‘If you want to talk about security, you get more men; about gender 
equality, more women,’ indicating that gender divisions are still present in the 
gender-equality-focused halls of the Scandinavian ministries of foreign affairs.
 3 See Swedish government communication on gender equality policy, Skr, 
1999/2000: 24, p. 6.
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For several decades, Sweden has taken great pride in being considered at the 
forefront of gender-equality policies, and the current government has de-
clared itself to be the world’s first feminist government (Regeringskansliet, 
2019). While this means that feminist insights are to guide the government 
in all matters, one policy area has for several decades already been guided 
by feminist analysis and aims: sexual violence. Sexual violence is linked to 
gender equality both in the sense that it is deemed to exist because of lack 
of such equality and because its existence is defined as being a barrier to 
gender equality. Sexual violence thus becomes not just an important policy 
area, but also one that serves as a barometer for the state of the nation in 
an area that is important to Sweden: gender equality. This chapter explores 
how rape legislation has been used as nation-branding to keep Sweden on 
top, and how the desire to remain a norm entrepreneur impacted on legal 
revisions. Sweden’s legislation on gender and violence has been presented as 
an important political achievement, but it has also partly led to an increase 
of reported rapes. This chapter discusses this paradox, and how the paradox 
influences the branding of Sweden.
Legislation as inspiration
In the platform for the ‘first feminist government in the world’, the Swedish 
government stated that gender equality is a given in a ‘modern welfare soci-
ety’, and that one of the instruments for achieving it is to put an end to men’s 
violence against women (Regeringskansliet, 2019). Sweden has prioritized 
bringing an end to men’s violence against women, including sexual violence, 
for several decades, and the issue has been put at the top of the agenda by 
various white papers and, not least, a series of legislative changes. As in 
many countries, sexuality has been an important issue for Swedish femi-
nism, and as a policy issue it has been marked by changes in how the bal-
ance between sexual freedom and the protection of sexual integrity has been 
struck. Since the middle of the 1980s, Sweden has made several major revi-
sions to its legal framework that have expanded the reach of the criminal law 
into acts and situations previously considered private and/or non-intrusive. 
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In the 1980s, the most important debates concerning gender and violence in 
a broad sense were on domestic violence and sexual abuse of minors – the 
so-called incest debates – but sexuality per se came to the fore from the 
1990s onwards, which turned out to be a decade in which criminal laws on 
sexuality multiplied. This was possible because sexual integrity had become 
a central social value in Swedish society, and sex-crime legislation has been 
enacted, and subsequently revised, to protect sexual integrity. Through 
a series of white papers, matters considered to be about gendered harms 
were placed at the top of the political agenda, and debates about rape law 
formed part of this movement towards greater governmental intervention. 
Several policy steps and processes led to the issuing of the 1998 Act on Vio-
lence Against Women (Government Bill 1997/1998: 55), which established a 
 continuum-of-violence perspective (Kelly, 2012) within Swedish law in the 
sense that it addressed sexual harms in a broad way, criminalizing breaches 
of personal and sexual integrity in the small and the large, the public and the 
private. The package of reforms that made up the Act on Violence Against 
Women marked a radical shift that brought a broad range of acts within 
the same legal and analytical framework (for an analysis of this package, 
see Leander, 2005). Female genital mutilation, stalking, domestic violence, 
rape and prostitution were addressed as part of the same phenomenon – as 
expressions of gendered power relations and as crimes that men systemati-
cally commit against women. Several of the components of the law package 
were considered legal innovations, such as the 1999 unilateral ban on the 
purchase of sex and the 2000 ban on ‘gross violation of a woman’s integrity’. 
These innovations, as well as the larger law package of which they formed 
a part, attracted national and international attention and played a part in 
branding the nation and creating Sweden’s reputation as a women-friendly 
nation and, not least, a country where law, including criminal law, is used 
as a key instrument for achieving gender equality (Svensson and Gunnars-
son, 2018). The legislative package was intended to communicate acceptable 
norms and acts to the population and to broaden the police’s reach into 
domains and acts that were previously considered private.
Subsequent revisions of Sweden’s Criminal Code have also followed shifts 
in the normative climate on gender, sexuality and violence. Proponents of 
legal revisions argued that these would serve to push social norms further, 
making law serve as a vehicle for social transformation (Burman, 2010). 
Criminal law thus serves not just instrumental purposes but also more 
 expressive ones, and this has been an explicit aim of legislative change on 
sex crimes in Sweden. That criminal law is intended to be both instrumental 
and expressive is not exclusive to Sweden, but Swedish criminologist Henrik 
Tham (2001) has argued that such an approach is considered more legiti-
mate in Sweden than elsewhere. This type of approach means that laws are 
not just understood as having expressive characteristics; they are explicitly 
designed with that intent. Particularly important here is how criminal law in 
Sweden is considered a means of achieving gender equality (Burman, 2010). 
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As previously mentioned, sex crimes are viewed in Sweden as something 
that both stems from and produces gender inequality, so combating sex 
crimes is a way of both protecting individual victims and ensuring the gen-
der equality of all. But the audience for legal revisions is not just domestic. 
In the case of the revisions to the law made in the late 1990s, Swedish poli-
ticians stated that their progressiveness would also serve as an inspiration 
to other countries (Kulick, 2003). It is this ambition that I hone in on in this 
chapter. In order that it might serve as an example to the rest of the world, 
a particular development has to contribute to the impression that the Swed-
ish way leads to success. In the last few years, however, Sweden has seen a 
steep increase in the number of cases of rape reported to the police (see, for 
example, Amnesty International, 2019), which gives rise to something of a 
paradox: If Sweden is the gender-equality haven that various international 
rankings and Sweden itself have claimed it is, why is it that rape is on the 
rise? While there are good reasons to not just take the figures on reported 
cases of rape at face value, it is also not entirely easy to discard them. And 
while the figures seem to have had little effect on Sweden’s image of itself, 
they do represent a challenge to Sweden’s position as a gender-equality role 
model for others.
In the summer of 2018, Sweden amended its legislation on rape to crim-
inalize sexual activities conducted ‘with someone who is not participating 
voluntarily’. The new law replaced an act that criminalized forcing someone 
to undertake sexual activities ‘by assault or other violence or by threat of a 
criminal act’.1 The new law was intended to contribute towards both expres-
sive and instrumental aims, in the sense that it was intended to shift social 
norms about sexuality and power and to improve Swedish authorities’ abil-
ity to prosecute in cases of rape. I argue that moving from a coercion-based 
definition of rape to one based on non-voluntariness was branded by those 
engaged in the debate surrounding the change as something that built on 
and strengthened Swedish values. However, making the new rape act into 
a part of the Swedish brand, an innovation to be exported to other coun-
tries, was not a straightforward process, as parallels to the new way in 
which the harm and crime of rape was formulated within Sweden already 
existed in many countries and had done so for hundreds of years. But, as 
I will demonstrate, the trick of making something ‘Swedish’ is not about 
establishing it in Sweden, but about establishing it as a particularly Swed-
ish thing. I will demonstrate the steps that were taken to achieve precisely 
this goal during the presentations of and debates on the new revision to 
the law on rape in the Swedish parliament and the media. I particularly 
focus on how the desired role as a norm entrepreneur emerged during these 
presentations and debates. While the content of the new rape law did not 
constitute a legal  innovation – such provisions already existed in jurisdic-
tions on three  continents – I find that key Swedish players still presented it 
as ground-breaking. I apply branding as an analytical lens to discern the 
patterns and logics involved in the presentation of the law revision as ‘first’ 
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and/or ‘best’, and I view the recent revision of the rape legislation as an 
example of a contemporary case of ensuring the continuation of the Swed-
ish brand. To have a distinct identity and value – that is, a brand – matters 
not just for the level of visibility enjoyed by a state but also for the traction 
it has in international forums (Viktorin et al., 2018). Small countries can 
‘punch above their weight’ if their brand establishes them as particularly 
important to pay attention to. Having an established reputation as a nation 
that can protect its citizens from harm, including sexual harm, grants a 
degree of superiority in an international political climate that increasingly 
emphasizes protection of rights. Gender equality has been a policy area 
in which many international harmonizing efforts have been made (Houge 
et al., 2015), and to be the one to set the example, rather than the one who 
has to follow suit – that is, to be disciplined by other countries or the inter-
national community – can play a role in establishing a nation as a leader. In 
this way, feminism becomes useful to power, and the relationship between 
feminism and governance in Sweden may serve as an example of what Janet 
Halley (2018) has termed ‘governance feminism’, where feminism not only 
becomes incorporated into governance structures but also becomes part of, 
the performativity of state power. Feminism is indeed so ingrained in ruling 
in Sweden that the goals of feminism are now the goals of the ‘first feminist 
government in the world’.
In the following sections, I will first describe the way statements regarding 
the extent and nature of rape were discussed in relation to Sweden’s repu-
tation as a gender-equality haven, before turning to how debates about the 
revisions of the rape legislation can be understood as a response to the harm 
done to this reputation.
Bad at rape: harming the reputation of gender-progressive 
Sweden
Rape is a topic that receives a lot of attention in Sweden. Information about 
the extent and character of rape, especially with a focus on individual cases, 
is integrated into debates on what policies should be applied to remedy the 
situation (Nilsson, 2019). The background to the attention the phenomenon 
has received in recent years is the fact that cases of rape reported to the 
police in Sweden have increased over a long period, and the numbers are 
among the highest per capita in Europe (Aebi et al., 2014). The high numbers 
of reported rapes, however, might not mean that numbers of incidents are 
indeed increasing. Crime statistics are sensitive to changes in reporting prac-
tices, increasing awareness in the population and increasing pressure on vic-
tims to report to prevent future crimes. That the number of reported rapes 
is high and increasing in Sweden may thus be interpreted to mean that the 
country is particularly good at raising awareness on the issue. Also, the legal 
definitions have changed over time, which means that acts that would not 
previously have been considered rape are now included, and international 
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comparisons of crime statistics are made difficult by the fact that different 
jurisdictions may use the same term but apply wider definitions and thus 
lower thresholds. However, there are also findings that support the claim 
that there is indeed something happening in Sweden. One factor that indi-
cates that the rise in registered cases is representative of rising incidence is 
that population-based victimization surveys also find that numbers of inci-
dents have steadily risen, at least until 2017 (Swedish National Council for 
Crime Prevention, 2019a).
As mentioned above, one reason why the rape figures in Sweden are so 
high is that the legal thresholds are lower than in many other places, and 
public awareness and the legitimacy of reporting higher. Still, these figures 
nationally and internationally appear to represent a worsening of the Swed-
ish authorities’ ability to protect especially women from sexual harm. Be-
ing considered a country with many incidents of rape is uncomfortable for 
a country that depicts itself as being one of the most gender-equal in the 
world (Jezierska and Towns, 2018). Further, the high numbers alone are not 
the only characteristic of rape that has attracted attention in the case of 
Sweden. Many of the most attention-grabbing cases are multi-perpetrator 
rapes performed by male migrants (Nilsson, 2019). This has fuelled anti- 
immigrant sentiments and is something the radical right party the Sweden 
Democrats has been able to capitalize on (Skilbrei, 2020). In many instances, 
this party is trying to dismantle many rights structures that are considered 
key to Swedish gender-equality policies (Martinsson et al., 2017), but at the 
same time it takes gender equality as a core norm and has made the issue of 
rape a matter of national identity and protection. The party seems to start 
from the assumption that to be Swedish is to be gender-equal (Martinsson 
et al., 2017), a type of rhetoric that is facilitated by the way in which gender 
equality is ingrained in Swedish national identity (Grip, 2012; De los Reyes, 
2017). Such a position seems to lead to two political consequences: first, that 
further gender-equality policies are not needed since Sweden ‘has arrived’ 
as a gender-equal society; second, that non-Swedes are what threatens the 
established gender and sexuality order, which enables the Sweden Demo-
crats to argue that immigration should be curbed because it undermines 
the ‘Swedishness’ of Swedish society, including in relation to how it protects 
women from sexual violence. Immigration has come to be strongly associ-
ated with crime in general over the last few years (Heber, 2014), with debates 
on the relationship between immigration and crime typically focusing on 
sex crimes. Fighting immigration thus comes to be about fighting sexual 
violence.
The Sweden Democrats are the key proponents in domestic debates of the 
argument that Sweden has become ‘bad at rape’ because Swedish society 
has allowed another concern, that of being tolerant and generous towards 
migrants, to come before the interests of Sweden and the safety of Swedish 
women and girls. This is a position that can also be found in discussions 
of Sweden’s high rape figures in the international arena. In the UK, for 
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example, the leader of the right-wing party UKIP, Nigel Farage, famously 
stated that ‘Malmo is now the rape capital of Europe, and some argue, per-
haps the rape capital of the world’ (Lusher, 2017). In 2016, the Turkish news-
paper Günes, often presented as a communication channel for the Turkish 
government, warned Turkish citizens against travelling to Sweden on their 
front page, under the heading ‘Sweden, a Country of Rape’, as well as via 
the hashtag #DontTravelToSweden on their Twitter account (Local, 2016). 
Shortly after, a poster apparently funded by Günes was hung at Istanbul 
Atatürk Airport (Middle East Eye, 2016). The poster included a picture of 
the front page mentioned above with the additional text ‘Travel warning! Did 
you know that Sweden has the highest rape rate worldwide?’ (see Figure 4.1).
The extent of rape is not the only challenge to the Swedish brand as a 
gender- equality haven. The accusation that Swedish authorities are unable 
to deliver justice to victims is equally problematic. Very few reported cases of 
rape end in a conviction, and this is spoken of as the ‘justice gap’ that is con-
sidered an expression of how ‘laws may have been stripped of their most bla-
tantly misogynistic manifestations, but the processing of rape cases through 
the criminal justice system remains problematic’ (Temkin and Krahé, 2008: 
1). As previously mentioned, the number of reported cases of rape in Swe-
den is high and increasing every year, at the same time as prosecution and 
conviction rates are dropping (Swedish National Council for Crime Preven-
tion, 2019b), which means that the discrepancy between reported cases and 
convictions is increasing. Taken together, high numbers and high attrition 
Figure 4.1 T ravel Warning Poster, Istanbul Atatürk Airport, 2016.
Source: Anadolu Agency (AA).
Keeping Sweden on top 81
rates seriously threaten the image of Sweden as a moral authority, as this 
image relies on Sweden’s capacity to provide gender equality and protec-
tion of sexual integrity. Other problems, such as long delays throughout the 
criminal justice process, have also been critiqued. A blow was delivered to 
Sweden’s reputation, for example, when the UN special rapporteur on vio-
lence against women in 2007 concluded that Swedish gender- equality poli-
cies were not effective in addressing issues related to gender and power (see 
Edgren, 2019). In 2019, Sweden’s poor performance in securing convictions 
was also highlighted by the Group of Experts on Action against Violence 
against Women and Domestic Violence (GREVIO, 2019), the control body 
for the Council of Europe’s Convention on Preventing and Combating Vi-
olence against Women and Domestic Violence, commonly referred to as 
the Istanbul Convention. Taken together, these developments make Sweden 
look like a country that is unable to provide justice to victims and is marked 
by a lack of gender equality.
There are thus several different aspects involved in current attacks on 
Sweden’s position as an authority on gender equality generally, and on the 
protection of women against sexual violence specifically. The fact that these 
developments undermine the message that Sweden wants to convey about 
itself means that the role the Swedish government has had in international 
forums in the field of sexual violence may suffer. Sweden has been consid-
ered a driving force in shifting European and global agendas (for example, 
by making the fight against violence against women and girls a priority in its 
foreign policy; see Tham et al., 2011), and the Swedish authorities also take 
their country’s global reach and impact into consideration when designing 
policies (Towns, 2002; Holmström and Skilbrei, 2017). Poor performance on 
these issues at home is something that may reduce Swedish traction abroad, 
and thus harm the nation brand’s legitimacy on this point (see the chapters 
by Hellum and Erlingsdóttir in this volume for the potential ramifications 
of pushing norms abroad that one is not performing particularly well on 
domestically).
The critique of how Sweden approached rape came from several direc-
tions at the same time, involving both a critique of the government for pri-
oritizing tolerance towards migrants over the safety of its citizens and a 
critique from a more traditional feminist position that victims of rape are 
not provided with adequate justice. In the light of the strong reactions this 
threat to the image of Sweden as a gender-equality haven has generated in 
Sweden, it would not be surprising if this critique was one of the reasons 
why a legislative proposal that had not moved forward since it was issued in 
2016 was once again back on the table in 2018.
Taking charge of Sweden’s image so that  
the world looks to Sweden
To be presented as a country unable and unwilling to protect its citizens 
from rape, and unable to deliver justice if they are subjected to rape, is 
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something that is difficult to combine with building a brand as the ‘first fem-
inist government in the world’. There had been ongoing debates in Sweden 
about whether to revise the rape law for some time, especially after the 2016 
white paper, but the issue gained momentum during the various critiques 
the government was subjected to. There are also other valid explanations for 
why the revision to the law occurred when it did, but I will not go into these 
now. What I am interested in here is to identify what in these debates can be 
interpreted as key strategies for reinstating the value of the Swedish brand 
as a gender-equality haven to the world. There have been two discernible 
strategies for alleviating the threat to the brand posed by the problematic 
situation regarding rape in Sweden.
The first strategy was for politicians to argue that there is no reason to 
problematize rape in Sweden by rejecting the whole premise that Sweden 
was experiencing a large increase in the numbers of rapes. I have credible re-
ports of several incidents where Swedish politicians have commented on the 
figures off-camera in supranational forums. One example is when a repre-
sentative of the government of a European country contacted me to inquire 
whether Swedish claims that the number of rapes in Sweden had consist-
ently decreased over several years were correct. One such incident was also 
caught on-camera, and this episode ended in a public retraction. This was 
when Swedish Minister for Employment and Integration Ylva Jo hansson 
was interviewed by BBC Newsnight in 2017. During the interview, Johans-
son was confronted with the increasing levels of reported rapes in Sweden. 
She responded, ‘We can see that the level is going down, and going down, 
and going down’ – a statement she would later have to retract (Local, 2017). 
That a representative of the Swedish government would argue that rape was 
on the decline during a period in which crime statistics showed a steep in-
crease may give us some idea of just how much is at stake. It is also interest-
ing that high rape figures in Sweden attract so much attention that that the 
BBC considered the matter worth covering. That Johansson was caught in 
a lie brought fuel to the fire for anti-immigrant debaters that were already 
arguing that the Swedish government was lying to its own population about 
the consequences of migration for society.
The second strategy in debates leading up to 2018 was to shift the at-
tention from the actual situation to the planned revision to the law, thus 
changing the narrative on rape. Instead of discussing what it had not done, 
the Swedish government was instead able to direct attention to what it 
was doing. What it was doing might not be very radical, but key debaters 
presented the law revision as a progressive and brave move. One aspect of 
this was the way the ‘Swedish approach’ to rape was represented as social 
norms that the legal norms had to ‘catch up’ with. The existing legislation 
was thus considered out of sync with the progressive views and practices of 
the population. The new rape law of 2018, which establishes that voluntar-
iness is the premise for ‘just sex’ (a term from Cahill, 2016), not non-force, 
was intended not just to align with but also to strengthen social norms 
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about sexuality and power (Andersson et al., 2019: 3). A key argument 
in Swedish debates about law is that laws need to be in alignment with 
prevailing social norms; not only that, they should also express what the 
values are to fortify them. Tham (2001: 416) has identified this as a key 
component of the expressive character of law in Sweden, whereby laws 
should be ‘demonstrating (perceived) central social values’. This point is 
important in the context of the present discussion, as the value of express-
ing Sweden’s emphasis of the protection of sexual integrity is intended to 
reach far beyond Sweden. The claim that the law revision was a response to 
the progressiveness of the population under-communicates two discerni-
ble contexts to the law. First, few mentions are made in debates to the fact 
that similar laws already existed in many jurisdictions, including juris-
dictions that are normally not considered progressive or gender- equality-
minded. While the 2016 white paper on rape law makes references to the 
fact that consent-based rape laws exist in many countries, the failures and 
successes of those examples did not inform discussions about whether 
Sweden should introduce a similar law either in that document or in sub-
sequent debates. Whether Sweden should revise its rape law was generally 
not discussed in terms of the country following in the footsteps of other 
countries, but instead in terms of leading the way. Possible benefits of and 
problems with different formulations were discussed with reference to par-
ticular Swedish cases and hypothetical situations, instead of through an 
examination of how penal codes in other countries are formulated and 
seem to work. That experiences elsewhere were not a natural frame of ref-
erence was noticeable throughout the debates (Nilsson, 2019), as well as 
after the law revision was in place. At that point, several powerful actors 
presented the revision as a legal innovation and a new way of addressing 
rape born from the fact that Sweden is one of the most gender-equal coun-
tries in the world.
Perhaps the most noteworthy example of this is how leading Swedish legal 
scholar Madeleine Leijonhufvud (2017) discussed the upcoming law revi-
sion in a TED talk published on 25 May 2017:
Remember when Neil Armstrong stepped out of the lunar module, that 
day in July 1969, and stepped onto the moon? A small step for a man, a 
giant leap for mankind, Armstrong said. Well, a giant leap for mankind, 
at least for the part of it here in Sweden, it’ll mean when we change our 
rape law to a consent based law”.
While Leijonhufvud towards the end here modifies the claim by mentioning 
that this is an approach new to Sweden, implicating that she is well aware 
that this way of defining rape is not new to the world, she goes on to describe 
consent-based rape law as a radical legal innovation, as “a rethinking of the 
whole issue of sexual behaviour”, one that departs from the “outlook that 
has guided mankind” (2017).
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Leijonhufvud is not just anyone. She has been one of the main propo-
nents of a consent-based law in Sweden for 20 years (see, for example, 
 Leijonhufvud, 2008) and was a force to be reckoned with in public debates 
in Sweden.
That a country that undertakes brave moves to address sexual harm might 
link this to taking a strong position on sexual integrity and gender equal-
ity is very understandable, but what was under-communicated here was the 
fact that Sweden was very far from being the first country in the world to in-
troduce a consent-based definition of rape in penal law. In Anglo-American 
jurisdictions, this is the norm, which means that England and Wales, and 
many of the England’s former colonies, already have such legislation. Rape 
legislation elsewhere is addressed briefly in the white paper that preceded 
the revision, which states that the committee has assessed the experiences 
of a handful of countries (Regeringskansliet, 2016), but references to the 
success – or lack thereof – of prosecution of rape in countries such as Eng-
land and Wales, Luxembourg, Belgium, India, Ireland, Scotland, Germany, 
Cyprus, Canada, parts of Australia (at least Canberra) and Mexico were 
not included in debates. Further strengthening the impression that the law 
was presented as ‘a first’ is some of the media coverage of its introduction. 
For example, Svenska Dagbladet (2018), one of Sweden’s largest newspapers, 
in the coverage of the introduction of the new act, stated that ‘the [Swed-
ish] consent law has both been criticized, heralded and attracted attention 
abroad’. I would argue that the absence of references to experiences else-
where is notable, and that there is reason to believe that it speaks to a need 
to be seen as ‘the first’, even when this was not the case.
The second context of the law that was under-communicated in debates 
was its relationship to international obligations. The fact is that European 
jurisdictions are under pressure from NGOs and others to revise their rape 
laws to explicitly criminalize non-consensual sex. It is notable that debaters 
did not draw on such obligations to build the argument that Sweden should 
follow suit. This is particularly relevant in relation to the obligations Sweden 
has under the Istanbul Convention. Several NGOs active in the Nordic re-
gion have argued that the Convention mandates a consent-based definition 
of rape, and this has been a key argument in debates about law revisions 
in neighbouring Norway (Amnesty International, 2019). As available argu-
ments are not applied, one may suspect that framing the matter as stemming 
from national values and ‘Swedishness’, rather than as a response to inter-
national obligations, serves a purpose (see, for example, Holst, 2018: 113).
When branding is viewed as an issue of representation (Clerc and Glover, 
2015), the question of whether the revised rape act really represents some-
thing new becomes unimportant. Similar acts already existed, but this way 
of defining rape had not been branded ‘Swedish’ previously, which means 
that the definition was transformed from an old relic of common-law coun-
tries, typically in England and Wales and former English colonies, to a 
modern feminist law representing the modern and progressive will of the 
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people. A discernible difference between rape laws that were already in 
place elsewhere and the Swedish rape law was also established by terminol-
ogy. While the law was explicitly intended to address acts where ‘consent’ 
was not present, the law uses the term ‘voluntariness’. The two terms have 
the same meaning in this context, and they are also used interchangeably in 
the white paper. The same document also acknowledges that the new law is 
indeed a consent-based law (Regeringskansliet, 2016: 45): ‘The legislation 
we propose is usually referred to in the public debate as consent-based leg-
islation.’ In preparatory works, it is stated that this is meant to encompass 
situations where there has been an ‘expression of voluntariness’ and ‘an ex-
pressed choice to participate voluntarily’ (Regeringskansliet, 2016: 48), and 
consent must be assumed to be equal to ‘an expression of voluntariness’. The 
main reason why the Swedish authorities chose to replace the more common 
term ‘consent’ with a formulation that serves as a synonym is expressly tech-
nical: there is already a concept of consent in the Swedish Criminal Code 
that should not be confused with the one applied in rape law, but the change 
of term has the effect of causing the rape act to appear unique to Sweden.
Conclusion
The example discussed here is a case of a strong brand being under threat 
from both national and international actors, and the chapter presents and 
discusses efforts that through their effects, and perhaps also by intention, 
reinstate Sweden as ‘best’ on protecting its citizens from sexual harm, and 
‘first’ in the sense that policies in Sweden are assumed to be followed by 
others.
Experiences from other countries have shown that consent-based rape 
law is not inherently feminist. Rape laws are difficult to prosecute in coun-
tries with and without consent-based laws. The active referencing and recep-
tion of the new rape law as ‘Swedish’ contributed to establishing a situation 
where this particular way of formulating the crime of rape became feminist 
by being appropriated in Sweden, as feminism is understood as guiding all 
policy developments in that country. By introducing a law revision that can 
be represented as feminist, and therefore innovative, feminism has aided the 
Swedish state in its desired performance as a trailblazer (Halley, 2018).
Referring to Valaskivi’s (2016) study of nation-branding in Finland and 
Sweden, Jezierska and Towns (2018) note that Sweden’s efforts to market it-
self internationally valorize being ‘first’. In the particular case under exami-
nation here, the law revision could have been presented as a case of Sweden 
looking to other countries for examples and adopting a policy that existed 
elsewhere, but this did not happen. Both at home and internationally, it has 
been under-communicated that this was not a revolutionary law. The Swed-
ish rape law thus takes on the appearance of being yet another Swedish legal 
innovation in the area of sexual violence, and this may contribute to brand-
ing consent-based law as Swedish. Indeed, as Sweden is often regarded as 
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a model for others to emulate (Jezierska and Towns, 2018), a consent-based 
definition of rape might not have been considered the ultimate feminist solu-
tion until it was adopted by Sweden. As consent-based rape law comes to 
be presented as Swedish and feminist, Sweden in a sense becomes the ‘first’ 
country to introduce consent-based rape law for ‘the right reason’, based on 
a modern gender-equality argument. The Swedish rape law in this way may 
take the form of a ‘political myth’, in Della Sala’s (2010) sense, representing 
Sweden as an innovator also in the field of rape. I have already found for-
mulations in international blogs and media that contain encouragements to 
‘follow Sweden’ in this area (see, for example, Skovira [2018] for a petition to 
the Danish prime minister to ‘follow Sweden’s lead’), which indicates that 
Sweden has already claimed or been given ownership of a policy that al-
ready existed elsewhere – in countries, however, that others are less eager 
to emulate.
The international negative attention to the levels and characteristics of 
sexual violence in Sweden and the lack of justice for victims cannot alone 
explain why Sweden made a major revision to its rape law at the time it did, 
but how that revision is represented may in part be a response to such neg-
ative attention.
Note
 1 The first formulation is from Brottsbalk (the Swedish term for the Penal Code) 6: 
1, Law 2018: 618, the second from the former version of Section 1 of Brottsbalk 6.
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The period 1970–2020 can be characterized in terms of a slow process of 
tearing down gendered power structures in Icelandic political and economic 
life. In the 1970s and 1980s, women’s movements spurred critical debates 
about gender inequalities, which were instrumental in putting women’s rights 
on the political agenda. Feminist activism led to the first women’s strike in 
1975, during which women left their jobs or homes for a day to demonstrate 
the importance of their contribution to society. Another important event 
was the 1980 election of Vigdís Finnbogadóttir as the world’s first democrat-
ically directly elected female head of state. And 1983 witnessed the electoral 
breakthrough of a women’s only movement – the Women’s Alliance – which 
was represented in the Icelandic parliament until 1999. In all these cases, de-
mands for the empowerment of women deeply influenced Icelandic society 
and the male-dominated political parties.
These achievements, however, were followed by an anti-feminist backlash 
in Iceland during the first decade of the twenty-first century. What has been 
dubbed the ‘era of masculinities’ coincided with a neoliberal turn driven by a 
group of businessmen with the active support of the political elite (Þorvalds-
dóttir, 2014: 52; see also Enloe, 2013; Loftsdóttir, 2015b). This led to the adop-
tion of privatization and deregulatory policies and an unprecedented foreign 
expansion of Icelandic banks and private enterprises. The masculinized 
boom-era culture that accompanied this business–government collusion 
was, of course, part of a global trend. However, its effects in Iceland were 
especially strong and manifested themselves in essentialist and misogynist 
attitudes and practices. It was a classic case of the persistence of ‘hegemonic 
masculinity’ – the attempt to legitimize, normalize and reinvent patriarchy 
and the subordination of women (Connell, 1998; Enloe, 2017). Women were, 
for instance, increasingly relegated to the ‘feminine sphere’ by excluding 
them from power positions on the grounds that they were not ‘risk-takers’ 
and were too cautious by nature (see, for example, Johnson, 2018: 49).
As a result, the feminist movement in Iceland was forced on the defensive 
and became less influential within political structures than it had been in 
previous decades. The dominant political culture was guided by neoliberal 
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and individualistic ideas about the irrelevance of gender as a political and 
social category. It was not until the end of 2008 – during the height of the 
global financial crisis, when Iceland experienced the biggest banking col-
lapse that a country has ever suffered relative to the size of its economy – 
that this trend was reversed. The ensuing political and economic instability 
did not just challenge a masculine culture of impunity; it also created the 
conditions for the revival of a women’s agenda in the politics and economy 
of Iceland based on feminist critiques of the hegemonic masculine model.
Since then, gender equality has been a central focus of Icelandic gov-
ernment policies, playing a major role in domestic reconstruction efforts 
and nation-branding abroad. What the financial crisis did was to reopen 
a space for women in terms of political representation and participation. 
On an individual and symbolic level, it began, in 2009, with the formation 
of a left-wing government and the appointment of Jóhanna Sigurðardóttir 
as Iceland’s first female prime minister – and the world’s first gay person 
to hold such a position – and continued with the appointment of Katrín 
Jakobsdóttir as Europe’s youngest female prime minister in 2017. Finally, 
from 2009 to 2020, driven by the women’s movement and feminist members 
of parliament, successive coalition governments, spanning the entire politi-
cal spectrum, have enacted gender-equality laws with the aim of increasing 
the number of women on company boards, making equal-pay certification 
obligatory, extending parental leave from nine months to a whole year, and 
expanding abortion and transgender rights (see Prime Minister’s Office, Ice-
land, 2019).
Nation brands have a high policy value because they create and relate 
to images and reputations that are deeply anchored in the minds of con-
sumers and audiences (Viktorin et al., 2018: 3). Iceland’s effort to put into 
effect a strong gender-equality model has been a key factor in reversing its 
negative image after the financial collapse – together with other important 
 factors, such as the quick economic recovery, the defiance of powerful for-
eign  financial and political interests, especially in Britain and the Nether-
lands, and the decision to bring those responsible for the financial crisis to 
justice. Indeed, Iceland has topped the list of the World Economic Forum’s 
Global Gender Gap Index every year since 2009. According to the World 
Economic Forum’s 2020 survey, Iceland has closed almost 90% of the over-
all ‘achievement gap’ between women and men in four key areas: health and 
survival, political empowerment, economic participation and opportunity, 
and educational attainment (see World Economic Forum, 2020).
In this chapter, I focus on the role of Icelandic gender-equality images 
in national identity projections and foreign imaginaries following the 2008 
financial crash. I show that there has been a fundamental change in the 
gendered branding of Iceland, which is directly tied to post-crisis recon-
struction discourses and practices. Before the banking collapse, Icelandic 
image constructions, as well as foreign perceptions of them, were in many 
ways characterized by gendered and sexualized representations. The master 
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narrative described modern-day Viking conquerors who took the world by 
storm on the basis of a unique Icelandic business model, combining quick 
decision-making and risk-taking with the maximum flexibility of a small 
state. In addition, Iceland was projected as a place where a vibrant urban 
nightlife and female promiscuity were juxtaposed with stereotypical exotic 
landscapes and purity of nature (Huijbens et al., 2012).
Following the financial crisis, however, the narrative shifted rapidly from 
masculine reification and female objectification to that of highlighting the 
level of gender equality in Iceland. Rooted in earlier feminist struggles of 
the 1970s and 1980s, this rebranding was largely made possible by activists 
who used the opportunity to advance a societal critique that paved the way 
for the adoption of concrete gender-equality policies as a crisis-response 
mechanism (see Enloe, 2013: 77). Their success in promoting this progres-
sive programme was aided by a widespread belief that there was a need to 
escape a stigma – an image centring on a nation willing to sacrifice itself 
to the highest bidder during the boom era. This feminist agenda has not 
only been made part of official image campaigns – and inserted into the 
vocabulary of advertising agencies, even if they are still under neoliberal 
influences – but has also been incorporated into public policy and foreign 
policy discourses.
Sexualized imaginaries of the nation
As Viktorin et al. (2018: 2) have pointed out, nation-branding ‘seeks to en-
hance international credibility, draw foreign investment, create interna-
tional political influence, charm tourists, intensify nation building, attract 
and retain talent and, often, change negative connotations’. Since the nine-
teenth century, gender has been an important tool in such branding. In their 
chapter in this volume, Katarzyna Jezierska and Ann Towns (2021) argue 
that a number of states, including Iceland, have relied on ‘androcentric and 
sexually objectifying representations’ in the promotion of their countries. 
In contrast, they argue, Sweden has avoided such gendered image-making. 
Before the financial crash, such a portrayal was, indeed, applicable to Ice-
land. In the 1990s and the 2000s, when it came to nation-branding abroad, 
the emphasis of private companies was not only on Iceland’s natural beauty 
but also on the people who lived there. As part of that strategy, Reykjavík 
was introduced as a ‘global party capital’.
To underpin highly gendered marketing campaigns, there were references 
to beautiful Icelandic women, including two Miss World titleholders, which 
fit into a broader picture of alluring and healthy Nordic women with sex-
ually liberal attitudes (Þorvaldsdóttir, 2011: 421). In the early 2000s, tour-
ist promotional strategies reinforced the stereotypical image of Icelandic 
women as being promiscuous. It culminated in a highly controversial Ice-
landair advertising campaign in London under the heading ‘Fancy a Dirty 
Weekend in Iceland?’ – which included phrases like ‘Miss Iceland Awaits’, 
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‘One Night Stand in Reykjavík’ and ‘Free Dip in Every Trip’. This sexualiza-
tion of the public square was underlined by the sudden increase of sex clubs 
in Iceland, which started in the mid-1990s, reaching a peak in 2000 when 12 
such clubs were operating in Iceland, mostly in the capital area (Þorvalds-
dóttir, 2011: 424). Much of this nascent industry was based on trafficking in 
women from various countries, which drove Icelandic feminists to agitate, 
successfully, for the shutting down of these clubs in the years following the 
2009 crisis. Originally, the target group was young men, who made up the 
majority of tourists visiting Iceland and who were to be tempted by a wild 
nightlife. This worked so well that in 2005 Reykjavík nightlife was cited 
by tourists as one of the five major reasons for visiting Iceland; it scored 
higher than nature walks, horseback-riding or whale-watching (see Icelan-
dic Tourist Board, 2005). In other words, those in charge of marketing for 
Icelandic tourist companies decided that Icelandic women were to be spe-
cifically targeted, in a predatory way, as ‘exotically white’ sexual objects. 
While this trend of the hypersexualization of Icelandic women was severely 
criticized by Icelandic women’s groups, it did not exist in a cultural vacuum; 
it was very much a part of the persistence of patriarchal norms in a society 
that nonetheless prided itself on upholding women’s rights (Þorvaldsdóttir, 
2001). It demonstrated the paradox of women being objectified in a nation 
internationally recognized for a high degree of gender equality (Huijbens 
et al., 2012: 19–32).
This image-construction coincided with the backlash against feminist 
politics and policies in Iceland during the highly masculinized boom era 
mentioned above. It reflected a set of values that were closely associated 
with the influence of neoliberal ideology. Clichés about modern-day Viking 
territorial conquerors became household metaphors for the foreign invest-
ment drive preceding the banking collapse. Such metaphors were promoted 
by Icelandic businessmen and parroted by the political elite and the media 
(see, for example, Grímsson, 2005). One can argue that the original meaning 
of the word ‘brand’ as an attempt to mark ownership captures the essence of 
this exercise of patriarchal power. A brand was, after all, a piece of charred 
or burning wood, or a hot iron mark, that farmers used to identify their 
stock (see Viktorin et al., 2018: 5).
As Nigel Morgan and Annette Pritchard (1998: 217–219) have stressed, 
tourism is intimately related to broader societal structures – whether histor-
ical, economic, political, cultural or social. Within the Icelandic context, the 
image of the ‘sluttish supermodel’ was used to describe the status of women. 
Indeed, even though the branding was clearly excessive in its objectification 
of women and was not based on the actual position of women in Iceland, it 
was allowed and sustained by a degree of patriarchal attitudes in Icelandic 
culture. Those who created such images were, of course, products of a soci-
ety that perpetuated them. As part of a nation-branding strategy, they thus 
sought to control and channel information and to manipulate the resulting 
imagery (Viktorin et al., 2018: 3).
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The resurrection of the women’s movement after  
the financial crisis
The challenges the feminist movement faced as a result of the neoliberal 
turn were enormous. A group of about 30 businessmen accumulated enor-
mous economic power, enabling them to stage what has been compared to a 
societal ‘takeover’. These ‘oligarchs’ became the primary donors to  political 
candidates and parties, bought private media companies, and made spon-
sorship deals with public/private education and cultural institutions 
 (Ingimundarson, 2010). The political elite aided and abetted this  process. 
Finance Minister and later Prime Minister Geir Haarde put it this way in 
2005:
few things are more rewarding in politics than to see when a good idea 
becomes embedded and wins in the ideological struggle…. I am sure 
that no one wants to return to the time when the financial sector was 
subjected to political control.1
The result was the weakening of state institutions, including those that were 
supposed to oversee the banks.
As Cynthia Enloe (2013: 76) has pointed out, the masculinized practices 
that led to the banking crash suggest that, for all its success, the Icelandic 
feminist movement in the 1990s had not yet transformed the patriarchal in-
ternal cultures of political parties’ leaderships and the country’s banking 
establishment. Hence, it should not have come as a surprise that feminists in 
Iceland feared another gender backlash after the economic crisis deepened 
(Ólafsdóttir, 2009). They reacted by setting up what they termed a women’s 
emergency forum in October 2008. This was an informal feminist platform, 
established initially as a Facebook group, whose goal was to approach the 
crisis through a gender lens and monitor the government response to the cri-
sis. It was politically active for several months and highly visible in the pro-
test movement that included broad sections of society, shaking Iceland. The 
international media reported regularly on the Emergency Forum, which 
probably influenced news stories about women taking over the political 
sphere. The group, however, became less visible a few months later when, 
in the spring of 2009, the left-wing government of Jóhanna Sigurðardóttir 
was formed and the group’s agenda was largely taken up by the government.
The shift to the left meant that the government adopted a strategy of 
 redistribution – with the rather surprising blessing of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), which had challenged the austerity course adopted 
by many other governments. Facing a massive post-crisis deficit, the Sig-
urðardóttir government resorted to spending cuts in healthcare and educa-
tion, which hit women harder than men, especially the decision to shorten 
the period of paid parental leave. To cushion the blow, however, it increased 
welfare revenues – including unemployment benefits, housing subsidies and 
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pension guarantees – for lower-income groups and reduced benefits for higher- 
income earners. Activation and job-creation programmes were greatly 
stepped up and proved very important in combatting unemployment. The 
tax burden of the lowest earning 60% of households was reduced (Ólafsson, 
2019).
The Icelandic response to the financial crisis has gained much inter-
national attention and praise, if for different and opposing reasons. Elite 
international institutions, such as the IMF, came early to the conclusion 
that Iceland’s recovery programme was a major success in economic terms 
and were quick to take credit for its implementation. Conversely, anti- 
establishment grassroots movements in Europe, such as Podemos in Spain 
or ATTAC in France, viewed the Icelandic political experience as a form of 
‘people power’ as manifested in the determination to oppose the power of 
far stronger states and financial interests, the adoption of socially responsi-
ble policies and the decision to involve the public in writing a new constitu-
tion (Ingimundarson et al., 2016).
Iceland may have been able to stage a more successful economic comeback 
than most of the other European countries that were particularly badly hit, 
such as Greece and Portugal. What shows the societal impact of the crisis 
is that Iceland’s surprisingly speedy economic recovery – which resulted in 
high growth rates, full employment and debt levels that were far lower than 
before the banking collapse – failed to transform, politically, into a ‘new 
normal’. Instead, highly contested political narratives about the causes and 
nature of the crash or about the assignment of responsibility have emerged 
(Ingimundarson, 2016). Yet no backlash against women’s rights has oc-
curred, even though the number of female members of parliament dropped 
in the 2017 elections. On the contrary, different governments have backed 
gender-equality policies and used Iceland’s place on the World Economic 
Forum’s Gender Gap Index to promote Iceland on the international scene, 
heralding a new slant to the international branding of Iceland as a paradise 
of gender equality.
The spotlight, as noted earlier, has also been on the role of women in Ice-
landic reconstruction efforts. Under the leadership of Jóhanna Sigurðardót-
tir, it was claimed, women were ‘cleaning up the mess’ left by Icelandic men.2 
Internationally, much was made of the fact that two of the three new bank 
directors tasked with the resurrection of the Icelandic banks were women. As 
it was put in one exaggerated media account: ‘Women took over the country 
and fixed it, that’s what happened’ (Carlin, 2012). Similarly, when a young 
female TV reporter, Þóra Arnórsdóttir, decided while heavily pregnant, in 
2012, to run for president against the incumbent, Ólafur Ragnar Grímsson 
– who had been intimately tied to banking expansion but managed to cut 
his losses by taking sides with protesters against a deal with foreign state 
creditors – it was portrayed as yet another sign of women’s power in Iceland 
and representative of its gender-equality model. To be sure, Arnórsdóttir’s 
pregnancy generated a slew of both laudatory and sceptical reactions. On 
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the one hand, it was argued that her condition showed that Iceland was in 
a class of its own when it came to women’s rights; on the other, many ques-
tioned the young mother’s ‘ability’ to serve as leader of a nation while simul-
taneously fulfilling her role as a mother.3 But, in general, her presidential 
run received much international coverage. After the election results were 
announced, her defeat was in some countries, such as France, considered 
more newsworthy than the victory of Ólafur Ragnar Grímsson. Indeed, one 
could detect a certain media disappointment.4 It reflected a typical journal-
istic interest in ‘positive’ accounts of ‘female accomplishments’ – suggesting 
that gender equality is possible. This news reporting also showed how ready 
and willing the international media were to participate in such fantastical 
constructions of gender equality in Iceland, even turning a blind eye to the 
fact that Icelandic opinion polls had suggested well before election day that 
Grímsson would win with a decisive margin.
The hour of the woman: gendered national rebranding
A major change occurred in the projection of Iceland abroad after the crash, 
which flew to the other extreme of the sexualized gendering that had charac-
terized the first decade of the twenty-first century. In line with the agenda of 
the left-wing government, which came to power in 2009, tourism promoters 
in Iceland began to emphasize the country’s achievements and international 
reputation in the field of gender equality, thereby undermining the hegem-
onic patriarchal discourses that sustained the paradox of image versus re-
ality. Even while the marketing of Iceland continued to focus on nature and 
social recreations, such as glacier trips, whale-watching, and hot springs 
and natural swimming pools (notably the Blue Lagoon, a major tourist at-
traction), far less emphasis was put on Reykjavík nightlife, although the city 
was still often portrayed as being ‘cool’ and cosmopolitan. Overtly sexual-
ized imagery disappeared from advertising campaigns.
In the period since the crisis erupted, one can see greater similarities be-
tween the Icelandic and the Swedish cases when viewed from the perspective 
of official and non-official branding efforts. There are no longer systematic 
efforts to market Iceland as a tourist destination on the basis of what has 
been termed ‘gendered stereotypes in which Icelandic women are portrayed 
as sexually available and closely connected to Icelandic nature’ (Loftsdóttir, 
2015a: 255). Kristín Loftsdóttir sees some continuity in the 2010 promotion 
campaign ‘Inspired by Iceland’, which relied on an extensive collaboration 
between the government of Iceland, the City of Reykjavík and tourist com-
panies.5 She argues that its use of the exotic could be read as an engagement 
with prior representations of Icelandic women as symbolizing untouched 
(‘wild’) nature waiting to be touched and explored. However, the 2010 cam-
paign was, in many ways, gender-sensitive and bears no real resemblance to 
the previous campaigns.
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‘Inspired by Iceland’ was launched shortly after the banking collapse, 
when there was a tremendous need for strong female role models. After a 
2010 volcanic eruption in Iceland made global headlines and resulted in 
stranded passengers around the world, the decision was taken to market 
Iceland as a safe and secure place, with beautiful, unspoiled nature, good 
food and world-class artists. This approach proved to be a major success, 
resulting in a sharp increase in the number of tourists visiting Iceland in the 
following years. The pressure for a women-friendly image projection was 
not only reflected in grassroots activism but also felt at the official level. 
The left-wing government took active steps to make women’s rights a core 
part of its foreign policy and its branding of Iceland abroad. Thus, while 
Iceland’s relative success in relation to gender equality during the 1980s and 
1990s was not used to draw tourists to Iceland, this has changed in the last 
decade. Many tourists visit Iceland precisely because of its image as a so-
cially progressive country, where security and well-being are seen as part of 
gender equality. It is this redrawn image that has been seized, appropriated 
and transmitted by the global media in its coverage of Iceland as an ideal-
ized haven of gender equality.
Iceland is commonly placed somewhere in the mythical or poetical North 
where the impossible is possible – where gender equality is a fact but at the 
same time a kind of chimera, as it is often confined to an imaginary space. The 
argument can be made that Icelandic women are now seen as being strong – 
indeed, so powerful that that they are almost fantastical. The image is now 
differently gendered: Icelandic women are still figured as extraordinary, but 
their power has more to do with public influence rather than with beauty 
or sexuality, as had been the case in the past. Such gender constructions of 
women can also be seen within the context of the gender- equality imaginaries 
of other Nordic countries. A contemporary case in point is the international 
media reporting of women leading the way in response to the first wave of 
the COVID-19 pandemic. The seven countries that were seen as offering the 
most effective policies were led by women. They included four Nordic coun-
tries: Iceland, Finland, Denmark and Norway (see  Wittenberg-Cox, 2020).
Yet the Icelandic paradox of image versus reality persists. While, like the 
other Nordic countries, Iceland has been portrayed abroad in inspirational 
terms when it comes to gender equality, there has been a suppression of the 
darker side of Icelandic gender realities and of obstacles facing women. One 
can also trace this trend to the coverage of the Icelandic financial crisis. In 
the article ‘The Death of Macho’, published in the journal Foreign Policy 
in 2009, Reihan Salam went as far as to announce the demise of masculine 
rule. Citing Iceland as a case in point, he maintained that voters ‘threw out’ 
the all-male elite responsible for the financial catastrophe and ‘named’ the 
lesbian Jóhanna Sigurðardóttir as their prime minister. In my critique of this 
article, I noted that, although inspiring, this account of a gender revolution 
in Iceland was idealized and premature. This was not to minimize the fact 
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that the crisis exposed the bankruptcy of ‘macho rule’ or that a handful of 
Icelandic women replaced men in real power positions, but rather to point 
out that the male elite had not been destroyed. In 2018, when the ten-year 
anniversary of the crash was remembered in Iceland, the ‘old boys’ network 
was still alive and clinging to power. Its continued presence was shown by 
the fall of two Icelandic governments – one over the Panama Papers scandal 
and the other over accusations of a political cover-up in connection with the 
government handling of a child abuse case – in 2016 and 2017, respectively.
As I have stressed here, there has been a clear shift towards gender equal-
ity in Icelandic national branding, which is sponsored officially by Promote 
Iceland, the official tourist board, in cooperation with private companies. 
Such branding has moved away from the sexualized female object to the 
image of a powerful woman leader. Being ‘first’ in some capacity is a major 
part of this portrayal – whether as the first elected women president, the 
first lesbian prime minister or the youngest female prime minister (see also 
Jezierska and Towns, this volume; Larsen, this volume). On the other hand, 
it is rarely made explicit that all these leaders came to power following a ma-
jor crisis, as was the case with Prime Minster Jóhanna Sigurðardóttir, who 
had to deal with the biggest financial crisis since the founding of the Icelan-
dic Republic in 1944, and with Prime Minister Katrín Jakobsdóttir, who 
took office in December 2017 after the collapse of the third male-led centre–
right government that lost the confidence of the Icelandic population before 
serving out its full term. Regardless of the fact that these women came to 
power under disturbed circumstances, their role as leaders strengthens the 
image of women in power, successfully lending itself to this form of nation- 
branding, as both male and female politicians have realized.
Creating the ‘equal rights paradise’
The relationship between Iceland’s positive branding of itself and the in-
ternational media’s affirmation and creation of this brand is significant be-
cause such image-making seeks to stimulate a desire to own the ‘product’ 
by way of consumption (Viktorin et al., 2018). Iceland’s reputation has cap-
italized on a broader representation of the classic Nordic societal model, in 
which a market economy is combined with a strong welfare state based on 
gender equality. Nordic governments, which work closely together in inter-
national organizations, have been eager to maintain and promote this pro-
file. For decades, the Nordic Council of Ministers has projected the image 
of ‘world leadership in gender equality’.6 Celebratory news stories7 about 
Iceland’s top ranking on the World Economic Forum’s index for 11 con-
secutive years have given the impression that gender-equality processes are 
linear and straightforward and that they can be easily be measured. Yet the 
index is more about gender gaps than about levels of gender equality (see 
Rúdólfsdóttir, 2014). The desire to ‘own’ a product through consumption, 
however, has kept the image of Iceland as a paragon of gender equality alive 
and unblemished. Thus, Iceland is considered to have the smallest gender 
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gap, which has sometimes been erroneously interpreted as meaning that it 
has achieved full equality.
Apart from female government and parliamentary participation, a key 
World Economic Forum index measures the number of years women have 
exerted political power by focusing on their ratio in government and parlia-
ment. Also taken into special consideration is the number of years, in the 
past half a century, that women have served as heads of state. Since Vig-
dís Finnbogadóttir served four consecutive four-year terms as the president 
of Iceland – from 1980 to 1996 – this partly explains Iceland’s high score 
on the list – together with Jóhanna Sigurðardóttir’s term as prime minister 
from 2009 to 2013 and that of the current prime minister, Katrín Jakobsdót-
tir, who has been in office since 2017. Moreover, the measurement scale on 
which the World Economic Forum survey is based also uses simple explan-
atory variables that do not show the whole picture. They do not, notably, 
include weak points, such as the persistent degree of gender segregation in 
the labour market, violence against women, or the uneven sharing of re-
sponsibilities for the upbringing of children or the care of the elderly. These 
factors are overlooked despite the fact that they have a great impact on gen-
der equality in the labour market and women’s chances of gaining more 
economic or political power.8 While Icelandic feminists have consistently 
sought to correct such misconceptions, foreign media reports tend to gloss 
over the persistence of domestic violence and gender pay gaps in Iceland.9
Awareness of these inequalities, however, should not deflect from ac-
knowledging the enormous efforts made by Icelandic feminists in the last 
decade to use a more progressive political climate to push through greater 
gender-equality measures. Historically influenced by several factors such 
as equality laws in other Nordic countries, international agreements and, 
more recently, European Union/European Economic Area legislation, Ice-
landic gender-equality legislation is now being given a wider social role as 
part of an intersectionalist approach. Its agenda has widened to include 
groups such as the LGBTQI+ community, which has led to the introduc-
tion of affirmative-action programmes and legislative measures mandating 
the public sector to fight gender inequality and discrimination.10 The status 
of non-state actors, including enterprises and NGOs, such as the National 
Queer Association of Iceland, has also been strengthened by law and gov-
ernment contracts in recent years.11 Earlier, the prevailing opinion was that 
women were to seek education and establish themselves in the lower strata 
of society and work upwards from there to positions of greater influence and 
power. This opinion was consistent with liberal ideas that were predominant 
in other Nordic countries in general. It echoed the traditional liberal ide-
ology based on the presumption that giving women equal legal rights was 
sufficient for the position of women vis-à-vis men to improve in due course 
until full equality would be reached.
While in the other Nordic countries there has been a steady rise in wom-
en’s representation, in Iceland changes only seem to occur when there is 
a major systemic challenge in politics or the economy. Icelandic political 
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scientist Auður Styrkársdóttir (2012) has aptly compared waves of women’s 
democratic enfranchisements throughout the twentieth century with nat-
ural upheavals, such as earthquakes or volcanoes (see also Erlingsdóttir, 
2011). The financial crisis proved to be one such seminal moment. In the 
2009 parliamentary elections, the number of women members of parlia-
ment rose from 32% to 43%. These results were also reflected in munici-
pal elections the following year, where the levels of women reached 40%. 
Never before had women been better represented at the national and local 
levels in Icelandic politics. When the left-wing government was formed in 
2009, gender parity was achieved for the first time, with women holding an 
equal number of government posts as men. Many saw this as a culmination 
of feminist activism dating back to the 1980s, when the Women’s Alliance 
played an instrumental role in boosting women’s representation in parlia-
ment and other political institutions.
The increased participation of women in Icelandic politics has, histori-
cally, been based on the women’s movement for equal rights and representa-
tion. This movement was evident in the 2009 government, which identified 
itself with feminist ideology, highlighting equality and women’s liberation in 
its manifesto.12 Soon after assuming power, it pushed several laws through 
parliament that had been on the agenda of the Icelandic women’s movement. 
The changes included making paying for sex illegal as in the Swedish model, 
banning strip clubs – making Iceland the first country to do so on gender 
grounds rather than religious ones – and imposing a gender quota system on 
the boards of both private and state-owned major companies. The govern-
ment also initiated work on an Equal Pay Standard, which was published in 
2012 and served as a basis for a 2018 law on equal-pay certification. This law 
made Iceland the first country in the world to require companies with 25 or 
more employees to obtain official certification to prove they offer equal pay 
for work of equal value regardless of gender.13 The same year, legislation on 
the equal treatment of individuals irrespective of race, ethnic origin, reli-
gion, life stance, disability, reduced working capacity, age, sexual orienta-
tion, gender identity, sexual characteristics or gender expression was passed.
Interestingly, the policies adopted in 2009 have been expanded by suc-
cessive governments, which have included right-wing parties with a history 
of opposing affirmative-action programmes. While the left has historically 
been responsible for developing such policies, all the established parties, 
including the moderate right, have taken part in implementing them. To 
be sure, some conservative and populist political forces have been far less 
supportive of policies such as the liberalization of abortion rights, but there 
has been no backlash over them. This shows that there is a cross-political 
consensus on the promotion of the gender-equality model, which, in turn, 
has been seen in conjunction with Iceland’s post-crisis rebranding efforts. 
Combined with the ongoing efforts of feminist organizations in the coun-
try, the agenda of gender equality is now firmly entrenched in the political 
matrix. Thus, in 2019, Iceland passed legislation on trans and intersex rights 
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without any public conflict (Fisher, 2019). The same year, the parliament 
passed a bill on abortion, repealing the previous Act on Abortion dating 
back to 1975. The new law codifies women’s personal autonomy and self- 
determination over their own bodies and legalizes the termination of a preg-
nancy within the first 22 weeks regardless of circumstances.14
Finally, as an example of the influence of Icelandic feminist activism 
abroad, two additional developments can be mentioned: First, the women’s 
strike in 1975 (also called ‘Women’s Day Off’), which brought the country 
to a standstill, recently served as a historical model both in Iceland and 
internationally. While the strike has been repeated five times in Iceland – in 
1985, 2005, 2010, 2016 and 2018 – it was used as a reference point in Poland 
in 2016, when thousands of women went on strike in protest against pro-
posals for a total ban on abortions.15 The initiative inspired women’s and 
feminist organizations in Argentina, including the Ni Una Menos collective, 
to organize a one-hour strike and mass mobilizations that were replicated 
in most countries of Latin America and the Caribbean (James, 2018). This 
cascade inspired by the Icelandic model led to a global movement with the 
first International Women’s Strike taking place in more than 50 countries on 
8 March 2017 (Topping and Redden, 2017). Second, the Women’s Alliance 
has been tied to political empowerment of women not only in Iceland but 
also in other countries (Schneier, 1992). More than 30 women’s parties have 
been established on the national or municipal levels since 1987 (Evans and 
Kenny, 2019). Until the early 1980s, the participation of women in Icelan-
dic politics had been very low, with women comprising only about 2%–5% 
of parliamentarians and being mostly excluded from traditional political 
parties. The Women’s Alliance’s entry into parliament led to major changes 
with respect to female political representation.
Thus, what has made Iceland so visible in the area of gender equality 
internationally is that it has been able to integrate the image of the Nordic 
welfare state with specific feminist actions in the past as part of a successful 
crisis response in the present. While this branding has both been intentional 
and unintentional, it has served to enhance the country’s profile and reputa-
tion management abroad.
The elevation of gender equality in Iceland’s foreign policy
Given the intense pressure facing the Icelandic government abroad in the 
wake of the financial crisis, it realized it had to make sustained efforts to 
improve its image in a field where it could show credibility. Needless to say, 
this led to the abandonment of the disastrous masculine nation-branding 
 strategy – as articulated by politicians, businessmen and the media – based 
on the ‘successes’ of the Icelandic banking expansion (Prime Minister’s Of-
fice, Iceland, 2008). Instead, gender equality was made a core issue in Icelan-
dic foreign policy (Cull, 2016: 156). While it is true that gender equality had 
already become part of Iceland’s international development cooperation in 
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2007, when a feminist foreign minister, Ingibjörg Sólrún Gísladóttir, put 
women’s empowerment on the agenda, it was not yet firmly embedded. 
Gísladóttir, a former member of parliament for the Women’s Alliance, was 
at that time the leader of the Social Democratic Alliance, which formed a 
coalition government with the conservative Independence Party from 2007 
to 2009. This government was brought down by the financial crisis. The 
piecemeal inclusion of gender issues in government policy by Gísladóttir 
was a direct legacy of the Women’s Alliance. Even if the women’s movements 
and feminist ideologies had a fundamental impact on Icelandic society 
in the twentieth century, they were hardly reflected in Iceland’s realist- 
oriented foreign policy based on its military ties with the United States and 
NATO during and after the Cold War. Iceland’s international image and in-
teraction with other nations, in other words, did not include issues of gender 
equality. After the crash, however, things began to change. There was a sig-
nificant increase in the number of women in the foreign ministry and among 
ambassadors, and even the influence of the peace agenda of the Women’s 
Alliance, which had been ignored in Iceland’s foreign policy in the 1980s 
and 1990s, can be detected after 2009 (Ómarsdóttir, 2010).
Thus, gender equality has been prioritized in Iceland’s foreign policy 
thanks in large part to feminists inside and outside political parties who 
have put pressure on the government (Ómarsdóttir, 2010). Among further 
measures taken was the establishment in 2009 of a United Nations Gender 
Equality Studies and Training Programme (GEST) – funded by the Icelan-
dic Foreign Ministry and targeted at students from developing and post- 
conflict countries – at the University of Iceland.16 Gender-equality expertise 
has often been presented as a Nordic export commodity. EU countries Swe-
den, Finland and Denmark have mostly focused on influencing other EU 
member-states, while Norway and Iceland’s aim has been to promote gender 
equality in developing and post-conflict countries. The GEST programme17 
was promoted by academics on the grounds that if Iceland was to spon-
sor development projects in the geothermal, fisheries and land-restoration 
fields – where its performance had been noted abroad – gender equality was 
another area where Iceland could play a role and take on international re-
sponsibility. GEST thus owes its very existence and funding to the fact that 
it is seen as playing up the strengths of Iceland in the field of gender equality, 
and it is an integral part of Iceland’s development policy and peacebuilding 
agenda. Its mission and academic aim is to engage in a critical debate about 
equality, not to impose standards or policies for women’s empowerment on 
developing countries. The driving force behind the project is a critical, even 
radical, feminist stance on development and international politics. This 
means that its content does not always harmonize with the Foreign Min-
istry’s broader national-branding agenda or political interests, even if it re-
flects the goal of promoting gender equality. Yet, being at the same time part 
of Iceland’s governmental efforts, it is sometimes challenged by official ideas 
about nation-branding and feminism in its neoliberal form.
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Another part of Iceland’s foreign policy and gender strategy includes po-
litical and financial support for UN Women, and, recently, it has extended 
its agenda to addressing discriminatory stereotypes of masculinity and en-
gaging men and boys for gender equality. Towards this effort, the Ministry 
for Foreign Affairs has organized so-called Barbershop discussions around 
the world, which are consistent with Iceland’s participation in the HeForShe 
campaign. The Barbershop concept was developed jointly by the Permanent 
UN Missions of Iceland and Suriname (countries ranked best and worst in 
the World Economic Forum’s 2013 report) within the context of the 20th 
anniversary of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action in 2015. 
The purpose was to bring men to the table as partners for gender equal-
ity, encouraging them to look at their own attitudes and behaviour. Several 
Barbershop conferences have been held, including at the UN, the Nordic 
Council of Ministers, NATO, the Council of Europe, the Icelandic parlia-
ment and the Icelandic Ministry for Foreign Affairs.18 While they were en-
visaged as a discussion platform for men, they have always been open to 
women (United Nations, 2015).
To be sure, the initiative has not been without criticism. According to 
Dyan Mazurana, who contributed to the 2002 Women, Peace and Security 
report for the UN Security Council, women ‘don’t want to be spoken for, 
we’d like to speak for ourselves’. She also noted that the UN ‘has a long and 
disgraceful history of men-only meetings on issues that are foundational 
to the rights of women’ (Tulinius, 2014). The idea was, however, welcomed 
by others, such as Gary Barker, who works for Promundo, a Brazilian 
organization that aims to enlist men in the struggle for gender equality on 
the grounds that it was not meant to replicate ‘smoke-filled rooms’ but to 
create a safe space for male political leaders to talk about ways to engage 
men in the ongoing efforts to reduce violence against women (Tulinius, 
2014). The idea can, in fact, be attributed to former Icelandic President 
Vigdís Finnbogadóttir, who had for many years appealed for ways to in-
clude men in the gender-equality debate. The idea was subsequently de-
veloped further by feminists within the Icelandic Foreign Ministry, who 
wanted to experiment with it at the United Nations. Foreign Minister 
Gunnar Bragi Sveinsson decided to organize and campaign for the Bar-
bershop conference there in 2015. In a disastrous instance of the paradox 
of gender equality existing within and alongside patriarchal behaviour, 
Sveinsson’s mandate was tainted by his role in a political scandal with 
highly gendered dimensions in 2018. He was among a few male parliamen-
tarians and one woman member of parliament caught on tape demeaning, 
in a highly misogynistic way, their female parliamentary colleagues. Thus, 
while Mazurana’s criticism of male-dominated meetings was not directed 
at Sveinsson personally, it conveyed an eerie sense of premonition. It un-
derlined the need for a systemic rooting out of patriarchal misogyny from 
society if the image and aspiration of gender equality was to become real-
ity (Grettisson, 2018).
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On the international stage, however, Iceland continued to play its part in 
furthering the agenda of gender equality. Elected to the UN Human Rights 
Council following the withdrawal of the United States from the body in 
June 2018, it focused in particular on women’s rights and gender equality, 
LGBTQI+ rights, and the rights of the child. Another initiative that fed 
into the international view of the equality brand was the annual Reykjavík 
Women Leaders Global Forum,19 which was launched in 2017 with the par-
ticipation of women leaders from all over the world. It has now been organ-
ized three years in a row in Iceland with a growing number of participants. 
Here, far removed from its earlier branding as the dirty-weekend capital, 
Reykjavík has been rebranded as a platform where women leaders share 
ideas on how to further advance society with explicit references to Iceland’s 
place on the World Economic Forum’s Gender Gap Index and to past and 
present Icelandic female leaders. Former President Vigdís Finnbogdóttir is 
internationally praised for her part in paving the way for women’s political 
leaders; former Prime Minister Jóhanna Sigurðardóttir played a key role 
in the post-crash reconstruction efforts and became globally known as the 
first openly lesbian prime minister when the international media got wind 
of her sexual orientation. In Iceland, however, her sexuality was never made 
an issue or considered worthy of any media exposure. In continuance of this 
legacy, the current prime minister, Katrín Jakobsdóttir, accepted in Feb-
ruary 2020 the appointment to the chair of the Council of Women World 
Leaders, an organization established by Finnbogadóttir in 1996 (Govern-
ment of Iceland, 2020a). And, in line with the government promotion of 
gender equality, in Iceland and abroad, the competency for this policy area 
was transferred from the auspices of the Ministry of Welfare to the Prime 
Minister’s Office in January 2019.20
In spite of all its prominence in terms of gender equality on the inter-
national stage, one should not exaggerate the influence of a small country 
like Iceland on the gender-equality policies of other countries. However, its 
stature is enhanced in association with other Nordic countries with which it 
shares a reputation as a ‘norm entrepreneur’ in the field of gender equality 
(Ingebritsen, 2002). Iceland’s credibility is also enhanced by its consistent 
support for gender equality since 2009, irrespective of whether governments 
have been led by the left or right. In this sense, as I have argued here, gender 
equality and state-supported feminism have become part of both a national 
aspiration and a national branding strategy that seems to work well for Ice-
land on the level of foreign policy and business.
Conclusion
While adhering to international notions of altruistic Nordic ‘ exceptionalism’, 
Nordic gender-equality branding has also much to do with Realpolitik 
or with what Louis Clerc and Nikolas Glover (2015: 12) have termed ‘the 
necessity for small states to act in character’. This applies to Iceland’s 
 nation-branding with respect to gender equality, which was about creating 
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an image or a product to negotiate an emotional relationship between brand 
owners and prospective customers to repair its reputation abroad (Viktorin 
et al., 2018: 4). It points to the inherent tension in such politicized market-
ing projects – with self-interested state and corporatist practices often be-
ing conflated with idealistic motivations for social change and partnerships 
with civil society (Viktorin et al., 2018: 11). Since Iceland has by no means 
achieved gender parity, such image-making not only can adversely affect the 
struggle for women’s rights and help ‘normalize’ gender discrimination but 
can also reinforce the notion that a state of perfection has been reached. In 
other words, the Icelandic gender-equality imaginary risks being appropri-
ated and redefined by the state, which is as much concerned with elevating 
Iceland as a national brand driven by market motives. The lack of any criti-
cal engagements with the measurement flaws inherent in gender-gap indices 
or the persistence of gender inequalities in Icelandic society undermines the 
official message about Icelandic ‘exceptionalism’.
This is not to say that nothing has been achieved. Exoticism, with its many 
problematic gender connotations, has continued to dominate the marketing 
strategies of the Icelandic tourist industry. But, in contrast to the first dec-
ade of the twenty-first century, Icelandic companies have, as I have stressed, 
moved away from the objectification and sexualization of women. What is 
more, the branding of equality made it possible to access positive memo-
ries of past feminist successes as well as to overcome the stigma associated 
with the Viking business expansion and its masculine-driven excesses. It is 
true that Icelandic policies on gender cannot be separated from what can 
be termed symbolic politics. Successive governments continue to issue uni-
versal proclamations on gender equality even if they pay little attention to 
minorities, such as immigrants, and provide inadequate financial resources 
to develop and finance policy decisions. Nonetheless, the Icelandic Foreign 
Ministry and the tourist industry have managed to capitalize on Iceland’s 
gender-equality record in government-supported nation-branding cam-
paigns. That this image fits with pre-existing, traditional ones of Iceland as 
being progressive on women’s rights also explains why state representatives 
harp on the issue, for they know that it resonates among foreign publics 
(Clerc and Glover, 2015: 12). Such attitudes only confirm that strategies of 
nation-branding are less about mutual understanding among nations and 
more about image management by publicly touting positive ‘national char-
acteristics’. However, as the Icelandic experience in the past decade shows, 
they can also be used effectively to further an agenda of gender equality, 
even while rescuing the national brand of a small state that was in acute 
danger of permanent damage.
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The international context in relation to gender and peacebuilding has 
changed dramatically over the last two decades, in ways that have had a 
 major impact on the branding of Norway and other Nordic countries abroad. 
The most important change on the international scene was the adoption in 
October 2000 of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace 
and Security. This resolution was inspired by, and adopted five years after, 
the Fourth World Conference on Women, convened by the UN in Beijing in 
1995. The Beijing conference was the largest international women’s confer-
ence that had ever been organized, and the first that had a strong focus on 
gender and armed conflict.
In broad terms, UN Security Council Resolution 1325 focuses on wom-
en’s participation in peacebuilding; on their protection from gender-based 
violence and its prevention; and on women’s inclusion in post-conflict relief 
and recovery activities (Tryggestad, 2009). Resolution 1325 also calls on the 
international community, including UN member-states such as Norway, 
to do more to include women in all matters related to international peace 
and security. In the years that have passed since the adoption of the resolu-
tion, nine follow-up resolutions have been adopted, and Norway has played 
an active global role, both normatively and financially, in advancing what 
has now formally become the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda 
(Skjelsbæk and Tryggestad, 2019). Norway has become known as a WPS 
champion.
The WPS agenda has provided Norway with an opportunity to highlight 
and bring together two prominent features of its national self- identification – 
gender equality and peace promotion – at the global level. Norway was also 
one of the first UN member-states to adopt a national action plan on WPS 
in 2006 and has played an active role in promoting this agenda through 
various UN entities (such as the UN Peacebuilding Commission). More 
recently, the inclusion of women in peace mediation activities has become 
a central part of Norway’s international peace and reconciliation efforts, 
most notably in Colombia (Salvesen and Nylander, 2017), which has also 
added to Norway’s reputation as an ardent WPS supporter. Finally, WPS 
has been highlighted as a thematic priority for Norway’s membership of the 
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UN Security Council for the period 2021–2022 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Norway, 2020). Still, Norway appears to be reluctant to make the most out 
of the branding opportunity that this development represents. How can we 
understand this hesitance – and what impact does it have on the branding of 
Norway as a peace nation?
In this chapter, we discuss what the promotion of gender equality entails 
for Norwegian peace mediation efforts, along with the types of branding 
challenges and opportunities that emerge in this context.1 In addition, we 
ask how its involvement in such processes affects the gender-branding of 
Norway as a peace nation. We will examine these questions in the light of 
the establishment and practice of the Nordic Women Mediators (NWM) 
network and a set of Nordic national action plans (NAPs) that set out how 
the individual Nordic countries intend to follow up UN Security Council 
Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security. A comparison with the 
other Nordic countries facilitates further understanding of why and how 
Norway has been so hesitant to incorporate gender equality in the branding 
of its role as an international peace mediator.
Proclaiming, like Sweden, that it will have a feminist foreign policy is not 
on the table in Norway. The term feminist cannot be found in any of the key 
documents adopted on Norwegian foreign policy, including the most recent 
action plans on WPS (Norwegian Ministries, 2019) and gender equality in 
foreign policy and development cooperation (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Norway, 2016). A competitive space is thus emerging in which Norway is 
engaged in the highest number of peace and mediation efforts of all the 
Nordic countries (Wallensteen and Svensson, 2016), and Sweden is the most 
pronounced when it comes to gender engagement in its foreign policy, which 
serves to differentiate Norway and Sweden on the international scene. Swe-
den becomes the global forerunner on gender equality and women’s rights, 
while Norway is less so even if the two countries have comparable histories 
on domestic and foreign engagement in this policy field. In Norway, there 
appears to be a tension within the foreign policy apparatus between, on the 
one hand, declaring Norway a global leader in terms of its commitment to 
gender equality in its foreign policy and, on the other, shying away from 
publicly and explicitly promoting the country’s concrete efforts on gender – 
not to mention proclaiming Norwegian foreign policy feminist. As we argue 
below, these tensions stem from a particular conceptualization and practice 
of Norwegian peace mediation that emphasizes the virtues of being a neu-
tral facilitator rather than a ‘mediator with muscle’.
Norwegian-style peacebuilding
Engagement for peace has been an element of Norwegian foreign policy that 
has enjoyed considerable support among various governments, despite their 
differing political ideologies. ‘Norwegian foreign policy remains stable,’ has 
been a political mantra both in election campaigns and in the declarations 
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of a range of different foreign ministers in recent decades. This engagement 
has been uncontroversial and viewed almost as an extension of seemingly 
inherent Norwegian national characteristics: a small state with benign in-
tentions coupled with a non-colonial past.2 In a study of newspaper articles 
on Norway’s peace engagement in the period 1993–2003, a dominant dis-
course can be detected in which ‘Norway was invested with considerable 
agency, power and ability in promoting peace, with discursive links between 
“Norway”, “peace promotion” and “success” being established’ (Skånland, 
2010: 35).
In parallel with the contemporary notion of Norway as a peace nation, 
Norwegian gender-equality policies emerged in the 1980s and 1990s within 
the country’s domestic political arena after a period of strong Nordic state 
feminism and the rise of prominent female politicians (Hernes, 1987). These 
policies were particularly epitomized by the social democratic government 
led by Gro Harlem Brundtland (Norway’s first woman prime minister), 
when Brundtland in 1986 formed the world’s most gender-balanced govern-
ment to date with a 40% representation of women ministers.
In tandem, these two dimensions of Norwegian public identity formation 
have created a sense of Norwegian exceptionalism – a way of thinking and 
arguing that promoting peace and gender equality is an essential ingredi-
ent of a Norwegian national identity and core societal values. Interestingly, 
and despite the prominence of pro-gender norms and policies in Norwegian 
society overall, the articulation of gender-equality norms and aims has un-
til recently not been as explicit within Norwegian foreign policy, at least 
not in the ‘traditional’ domains of foreign policy nor in the field of peace 
and reconciliation engagements. We also observe that the integration of 
gender- equality norms within Norway’s peace engagement has not been ad-
dressed in the existing body of literature that explores in considerable depth 
Norway’s engagements for peace in the Middle East, Sri Lanka and Sudan 
(Taulbee et al., 2014; Nissen, 2015; Salter, 2015), despite the fact that central 
actors in these processes have argued that they were concerned with gender 
dimensions (Skjelsbæk and Tryggestad, 2020).
The role that Norway has come to take on within international peace 
mediation must be viewed against a long historical backdrop. Considerable 
emphasis has been placed on peace engagement within Norwegian foreign 
policy, and some have argued that it has been the most central aspect of 
Norwegian foreign policy since even before Norway gained its independ-
ence from Sweden in 1905 (Knutsen et al., 2016: 96).3 Post-independence, 
the Norwegian nation-building project was based in part on the notion of 
Norway and Norwegians as a particularly peace-loving nation and peo-
ple (Leira, 2013). The fact that it is Norway that awards the annual Nobel 
Peace Prize, while Sweden awards the other Nobel prizes, has added to this 
self-perception.
There is a large Norwegian literature on the trajectories of the Norwegian 
peace engagement (e.g. Tamnes, 1997; Pharo, 2005; Knutsen et al., 2016) and 
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its role in nation-branding (e.g. de Carvalho and Neumann, 2015). What 
this literature points to is that peace engagement has been a key pillar of 
Norwegian foreign policy since at least the 1960s. In the 1960s, Foreign 
Minister Knut Frydenlund (1966: 143) defined the following three goals of 
Norwegian foreign policy: securing Norway’s freedom and sovereignty; se-
curing Norway’s interests; and, last but not least, contributing to securing 
global peace and promoting cooperation between peoples. The argument 
that it is in Norway’s interest to actively engage in international peace and 
security efforts has been made by every foreign minister since Frydenlund’s 
time. The same argument was also advanced as a key justification for why 
Norway was seeking a non-permanent seat at the UN Security Council for 
2021–2022. For a long period, Norway’s peace engagement first and fore-
most took the form of contributions to UN peacekeeping operations and 
political and financial support to the UN system and multilateralism. From 
the early 1990s onwards, however, Norway has become just as well known 
for its many bilateral peace engagements around the world (Taulbee et al., 
2014; Nissen, 2015; Wallensteen and Svensson, 2016; Keskinen et al., 2016).
According to the Norwegian MFA, since 1993 Norway has officially made 
active contributions to peace processes in the following conflict countries 
and regions (in alphabetical order): Afghanistan, Colombia, Guatemala, the 
Middle East, Myanmar, Nepal, the Philippines, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan/
South Sudan and Venezuela. It is also engaged in a number of unofficial 
processes that do not form part of this list (Government.no, 2019a). The first 
major peace processes in which Norway engaged – the Oslo Process (Is-
rael/Palestine) and the Sri Lankan peace process – were characterized by 
the involvement of profiled and politically ambitious individuals and quite 
extensive media attention (Nissen, 2015). Leading politicians from the Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs themselves took on active roles as mediators and 
facilitators. The engagement of these leading politicians led to high visi-
bility, but also raised the stakes in terms of political costs if their efforts 
proved unsuccessful. One example of this risky dynamic came in 2004 when 
anti-Norwegian rallies were organized in Sri Lanka’s capital, Colombo, and 
a doll depicting the Norwegian Special Advisor Erik Solheim was set on 
fire. The majority of the profiled individuals involved in Norwegian peace 
mediation during the 1990s and early 2000s were men. Peace mediation had 
become an attractive career opportunity, bringing with it considerable sta-
tus for the individuals involved. It also appeared as an activity that consid-
erably strengthened Norway’s small-state status in international politics (de 
Carvalho and Neumann, 2015).
In the early 2000s, however, the Norwegian peace engagement gradually 
changed its modus operandi. Norway remained active, but in a more low-
key manner. Top-level politicians at the MFA took on supportive roles and 
involved themselves more actively only when direct political support was re-
quired. More importantly, from the early 2000s Norway’s peace engagement 
also became more professionalized. During the Norwegian engagement in 
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the Sri Lankan peace process, a ‘Sri Lanka Unit’ was set up at the MFA in 
Oslo. In parallel with the Sri Lanka engagement, Norway was also involved 
in a number of other processes (e.g. in Sudan), and it became necessary to 
strengthen the ministry’s support capacities for these types of activities. In 
2001/2002, a decision was made by then State Secretary Vidar Helgesen to 
turn the Sri Lanka Unit into a Section for Peace and Reconciliation. The 
aim was to institutionalize and systematize the lessons and knowledge 
gained from previous and ongoing experiences to make peace mediation 
and reconciliation a profession within the MFA. The establishment of this 
section would also become a turning point for how issues related to the in-
clusion of women and gender perspectives were integrated into Norway’s 
peace engagement.
What also came out of the professionalization process within the MFA 
was the operationalization of the ‘Norwegian model for peace engagement’, 
which was first conceptualized in the mid-1990s by then State Secretary Jan 
Egeland (Neumann, 2015). Some critics have argued that this is not really a 
model as such but rather a way of organizing Norway’s peace engagement 
(Nissen, 2015). As of April 2019, Norway’s peace engagement had the fol-
lowing general features (as outlined by the MFA):
• A long-term willingness to provide assistance, both for economic devel-
opment and for peacebuilding.
• Provision of resources, both human and financial.
• Close cooperation with Norwegian NGOs, which have served as 
door-openers and providers of access.
• Experience, built over many years, including from working with non-
state actors.
• Good relations with key international actors, both individual states and 
multilateral organizations (particularly the UN).
• No colonial past; Norwegian engagement is perceived to be sincere and 
not motivated by political or economic self-interest.4
• A focus on peace facilitation rather than ‘mediation with muscle’.
Interestingly, gender-equality norms or WPS are not mentioned on this list 
as core values or principles of the Norwegian peace engagement model, 
even though the inclusion of women and the integration of gender per-
spectives within peace processes had already become an integral part of 
Norway’s most recent peace engagements when it was made (Tryggestad, 
2014; Salvesen and Nylander, 2017; Norwegian Ministries, 2019). In Decem-
ber 2019, the presentation of the Norwegian peace engagement on the of-
ficial webpage of the MFA was updated, but WPS is still not listed among 
the ‘Hallmarks of Norway’s Peace and Reconciliation Work’.5 Some brief 
statements on how Norway has facilitated the inclusion of women in peace 
processes have been included, along with a link to further information on 
Norway’s activities in relation to WPS (Government.no, 2019b). However, 
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there are no explicit statements on how or where Norway intends to take 
this agenda further.
The omission of WPS from the list of ‘Hallmarks of Norway’s Peace and 
Reconciliation Work’ is also reflected in the actual practice of peace en-
gagement. Often operating under time constraints, Norwegian diplomats 
(mainly men, but also women) involved in the country’s peace engagement 
efforts admit that they have repeatedly experienced shortcomings in terms 
of the operationalization of priorities and the implementation of policies 
related to gender equality.6 While they may have had good intentions in re-
lation to the appointment of women as lead peace facilitators, team leaders 
and thematic experts on the Norwegian side, they have often found it diffi-
cult to carry these intentions through in practice, the argument being that 
they usually mobilized teams and experts on short notice and did not have 
a sufficiently good overview of women within the foreign policy apparatus 
or Norwegian civil society with the specific competences required (generally 
a combination of thematic expertise and language skills). Until the mid- to 
late 2000s, like many other countries, Norway was therefore paying lip ser-
vice to gender-equality ambitions in peace processes but not doing particu-
larly well in practice in terms of including either women or gender-equality 
norms and perspectives in Norwegian peace engagements.
We will argue that this lack of focus on gender equality in peace engage-
ment is related to the nature of Norwegian-style peacebuilding, as described 
in a study on peace diplomacy by Wallensteen and Svensson (2016), who 
have argued that there is a distinct difference between Norway and its Nor-
dic neighbours in this context, in that Norway emphasizes its role as a fa-
cilitator, while the other countries of the region place greater emphasis on 
the mediator role. The Norwegian approach, then, might be compared to a 
situation where one invites guests to a dinner party by opening their house 
for visitors and letting them decide the menu, rather than a dinner party 
where the menu is already set by the host. But how does the notion of gender 
equality complicate this role?
Norwegian-style gender equality
It is puzzling that gender equality is seen as such a central aspect of Nor-
wegian identity but still not put centre-stage in the country’s peace and rec-
onciliation efforts. One explanation for this, however, can be found in the 
conceptualization of state feminism, a term that was first coined by Helga 
Hernes in 1987. The fundamental element of state feminism is the idea that 
the state can act as a constructive partner, even a guarantor, to promote 
greater social equality between men and women. Hernes (1987) argued that 
feminist goals could be promoted by women entering into a partnership with 
the state – by women taking on leading political roles and taking ownership 
of policy development. However, the development and implementation of 
woman-friendly and gender-equal social policies would be dependent on 
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continuous pressure from below, from women and women’s organizations. 
During the 1980s, according to Hernes (1987: 157), the Scandinavian social 
democracies appeared to have ‘the potential to be woman-friendly’. At the 
time, however, such an approach went against the sceptical view of the state 
that prevailed in many feminist milieus (both scholarly and activist), where 
it was customary to analyse the state system as a manifestation of general 
male domination, as one of the core problems of patriarchal power. Hernes, 
on the other hand, argued on the basis of historical analysis and contem-
porary observations that, in time and given the correct socio-democratic 
conditions, the state could become an ally of the feminist cause (see Larsen, 
Chapter 1 of this volume).
Since that time, gender equality has permeated Norwegian society as a 
norm, but not always as a reality in all spheres of life (see Holst and Tei-
gen’s discussion in Chapter 8 of this volume). While Norwegian society has 
changed quite fundamentally since the 1980s, some scholars have noted that 
the state feminist model may have morphed into a foreign policy mode of 
operating (Tryggestad, 2014). As Skjeie (2013: 29) notes:
The older understanding survives… and is of course reflected particu-
larly strongly in UN policy development and institution-building in 
the area of gender equality…. [S]tate feminism today [is] perhaps more 
 relevant transnationally than in a Norwegian or Nordic context.
Skjeie goes on to describe state feminism as a kind of achievable utopia, 
as though the state feminist society would be a woman-friendly society in 
which gender would not determine what one can do – almost as though it 
had been erased. In this ‘achievable utopia’, Norway’s economic wealth is 
seen as linked to gender-equality politics, which, in turn, becomes a form of 
political currency on the international stage. Clearly, achievable utopias are 
also a goal in peace and reconciliation efforts – to enable societies to move 
away from a violent past towards an imagined peaceful and prosperous fu-
ture. Gender equality, then, through a state feminist model with mobiliza-
tion from below and a friendly state apparatus above, becomes not only an 
idealized future but an achievable one. This is both rhetoric and practice for 
Norwegian peace mediators.
One example of this was seen when the World Development Report 2011 
was launched in Norway (World Bank, 2011). At the launch, then Minister of 
International Development and Environment Erik Solheim (who had previ-
ously been the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ special advisor to Sri 
Lanka) gave opening remarks in which he underscored that gender equality 
was just as important for Norwegian economic growth as the discovery of 
oil off the Norwegian coast in the early 1970s (Journalen, 2011). This point 
has been reiterated by several Norwegian ministers, including former prime 
minister Jens Stoltenberg. In a speech on 8 March 2012, Stoltenberg stated 
that the economic value of the participation of Norwegian women in the 
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workforce was higher than that of Norway’s oil revenue (Aftenposten, 2012), 
and he warned that if the participation of women in the Norwegian work-
force was reduced down to the OECD average, the value of the produc-
tion loss would equal Norway’s total oil wealth, including values not yet 
extracted.
Such statements serve two rhetorical purposes. First, they have a ‘look 
to Norway’7 effect in which the country’s experiences of economic growth 
are intimately linked to its national gender-equality, identity and welfare 
politics; second, they suggest that Norway has experiences that can be ben-
eficial to other countries. The argument made by prominent politicians is 
that Norway can offer knowledge and expertise based on its own experi-
ence, and that countries can get wealthier if they prioritize gender equality.8 
This combination – the positive domestic experience with gender-equality 
policies and a willingness to share this knowledge internationally – has be-
come a foreign policy currency, especially in the domain of development 
cooperation.
The adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 in 2000 provided 
an opportunity for Norway to make use of this currency in a new domain of 
its foreign policy – notably, in its peace engagement – though this was some-
thing that needed to be done with care. A core concern in this context turns 
on terminology and the difference between Sweden’s outspoken emphasis 
on a feminist foreign policy and Norway’s cautious emphasis on gender 
equality. In Norway, ‘feminism’ is regarded as a divisive, prescriptive term, 
representing a political project with a radical, transformative agenda. ‘Gen-
der equality’, on the other hand, ‘is typically understood in terms of a har-
monious, linear process of gradual development’ (Teigen and Wängnerud, 
2009: 25) or as a harmonious collaboration with the state, as a practice. In 
the Norwegian context, ‘gender equality’ has emerged as a value-laden term 
around which there is considerable consensus. It has emerged as an identity 
marker of a core value that characterizes ‘us’. ‘Gender equality’ has thus 
become a descriptive term for a national identity.
Below, how Norway balances its cautious approach to gender in its peace 
mediation efforts and engagement will be illustrated through an examina-
tion of two examples: the Nordic countries’ national action plans (NAPs) 
on UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and the Nordic Women Media-
tors network. In our view, a Nordic comparison on these matters provides 
further understanding of why Norway is so hesitant to incorporate gender 
equality in its branding as a peace nation.
Nordic competition over gender equality and peacebuilding
Since the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 in 2000, a grow-
ing number of states have appeared on the international scene as ‘women- 
friendly’, which often means that they have made gender-equality norms 
and images central to their foreign policy. Among the states gaining most 
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attention for such policies are Australia, Canada, Sweden and the UK (Ag-
gestam and Bergman-Rosamond, 2016; True, 2017; Aggestam et al., 2019). 
Sweden is taking the lead with a clearly stated feminist foreign policy. Ag-
gestam and Bergman-Rosamond (2016: 325) have elegantly described what 
they term the ‘three Rs’ in Sweden’s feminist foreign policy toolbox:
Representation, Rights, and Reallocation. In other words, Sweden 
seeks to promote women’s representation and participation in politics 
in general and in peace processes in particular; to advocate women’s 
rights as human rights, including women’s protection from sexual and 
gender-based violence; and to work toward a more gender-sensitive and 
equitable distribution of global income and natural resources.
Clearly these are all priorities that Norwegian foreign policy-makers can 
subscribe to and have done for many years (Skjelsbæk and Tryggestad, 
2019). Still, it is as though there is a resistance not only to the idea of re-
labelling these priorities under the f-word, but also to being explicit about 
Norway’s efforts and achievements in relation to gender equality in its for-
eign policy. A critical reading of the various national action plans on UN 
Security Council Resolution 1325 produced by the Nordic states highlights 
this Norwegian resistance to feminist labelling, particularly in the compar-
ison with Sweden.
The Nordic countries were among the first to develop NAPs on the imple-
mentation of Resolution 1325. Denmark was actually the first country in the 
world to do so in 2005 (Denmark, NAP 2005–2008), followed by Norway 
and Sweden in 2006, and Finland and Iceland had also developed their first 
NAPs by 2008. All the Nordic countries were therefore included among the 
first 12 countries to develop NAPs. And, as can be seen from Table 6.1, they 
have all developed subsequent NAPs that make the WPS agenda a central 
theme in their foreign policies, with increasing strength and emphasis.
In their various NAPs, all of the Nordic countries articulate different 
reasons for why the WPS agenda is important for them. Starting with very 
modest goals, Denmark does not articulate any particular national goals in 
relation to the WPS agenda in its first NAP (Denmark, NAP 2005–2008). 
Table 6.1 N umber of Nordic UN Security Council Resolution 1325 national action 
plans
Country First Second Third Fourth
Norway 2006–2011 2011–2013 2015–2018 2019–2022
Sweden 2006–2008 2009–2012 2016–2020
Finland 2008–2011 2012–2016 2018–2021
Denmark 2005–2008 2008–2013 2014–2019
Iceland 2008–2013 2013–2016 2018–2022
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Norway, however, sees the WPS agenda as integral to Norway’s commit-
ment ‘to promote a more just world’ (Norway, NAP 2006–2011: 2),9 while 
Sweden boldly addresses the lack of women in peacebuilding efforts and 
declares that ‘Sweden is, and will continue to be, at the forefront of work 
to reverse this development’ (Sweden, NAP 2006–2008: 1). Finland devotes 
a whole section of its first NAP to articulating why the WPS agenda is im-
portant for Finland and states that ‘the promotion of the rights of women 
and girls is one of Finland’s human rights policy priorities’ (Finland, NAP 
2008–2011: 11). Iceland declares in its first NAP that one of the objectives of 
its engagement on WPS issues ‘is that Iceland’s special status and strength 
in the area of gender equality will become more visible’ (Iceland, NAP 
 2008–2013: 2).
All of the Nordic countries have revised and updated their NAPs over 
time and have produced at least three different plans, with Norway being 
the exception with four. They all address similar aspects of the WPS agenda, 
linked to peacebuilding, peacekeeping, gender-based violence, reporting 
and accountability, and funding. Over time, the NAPs become longer, are 
given a more professional appearance and use more glossy paper. With each 
new NAP, commitments, strength of language and mode of tracking imple-
mentation increase. The fact that the WPS agenda has become a policy area 
in which the Nordic countries seek to shine on the international stage also 
becomes apparent with each new NAP. The NAPs develop into a compet-
itive space in which they seek to portray themselves as forerunners on the 
WPS agenda.
A good example of this development is provided by the case of Denmark, 
which did not articulate particular national goals linked to the WPS agenda 
in its first NAP, but devotes several pages to the centrality of the agenda for 
Denmark in its third NAP, in which it does not fail to mention that Denmark 
was the first country in the world to develop a NAP. Further, this third NAP 
states that ‘the promotion of the women, peace and security agenda is a cor-
nerstone in Denmark’s foreign, security and development policy [because] 
we know that inclusive and equal societies are essential to prevent continued 
violence and foster sustainable peace’ (Denmark, NAP 2014–2019: 7), which 
links foreign policy aims with domestic experiences with gender equality, as 
well as peace with its neighbours.
Sweden stands out because it sees itself as a model country, not only mor-
ally committed to taking the lead, as articulated in the first NAP, but also 
a ‘look-to country’ for others, as articulated in its second NAP, in which it 
is declared that ‘Sweden was one of the first countries to adopt a national 
action plan and the Swedish plan has attracted interest and inspired several 
other countries and international organisations’ (Sweden, NAP 2009–2012: 
6). In its most recent NAP, Sweden’s leadership is emphasized to an even 
greater extent, and the commitment to a Swedish feminist foreign policy 
is introduced when it is stated that ‘Sweden’s feminist foreign policy has a 
clear focus on supporting women as actors for peace and security’ (Sweden, 
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NAP 2016–2020: 3). A few sentences later, this particular form of foreign 
policy is directly linked to the WPS agenda when it is stated that ‘Sweden 
will have clear political leadership to further the Women, Peace and Secu-
rity agenda’ (Sweden, NAP 2016–2020: 3).
Finland maintains its commitment to women’s rights as human rights in 
its subsequent NAPs. It also points out that
since Finns have experienced wars and conflicts, they have an under-
standing of the long-term impact that conflicts can have both on in-
dividuals and entire nations, including the profound impact on the 
structures of society and the way in which it functions.
(Finland, NAP 2018–2021: 8)
Iceland presented a comprehensive new NAP in 2018 in which it traced na-
tional and international developments linked to WPS. However, perhaps 
most importantly in the context of nation-branding, this NAP enabled Ice-
land to position itself as a model country for others when it stated:
Iceland ranks as the most gender equal country in world according to 
the Global Gender Gap Report. Furthermore, Iceland is among the saf-
est countries in the world. These two facts allow the Icelandic govern-
ment to be both a strong and a credible representative of the message 
contained in Resolution 1325: that gender equality goes hand in hand 
with stability and peace in the international community.
(Iceland, NAP 2018–2022: 7)
While all the other Nordic countries have become increasingly bold in their 
statements about what the WPS agenda means for them, Norway maintains 
a different tone and language throughout its four NAPs. Though ministers 
and others have boasted about Norway as a gender-equal superpower in 
their speeches, we do not find the same language in the NAPs themselves. 
The slogan of the Norwegian campaign for a non-permanent seat in the UN 
Security Council for the period 2021–2022 was ‘consistent partner, common 
future’. This slogan also sums up Norway’s nation-branding in the NAPs. 
Norway’s aim in its commitment to the WPS agenda is described in its first 
NAP as being ‘part of our endeavour to promote global security, peace and 
justice’ (Norway, NAP 2006–2011: 1). In relation to peace mediation in par-
ticular, the second NAP states that ‘Norway will promote the participation 
of women and an integrated gender perspective in peace processes and ne-
gotiations’ (Norway, NAP 2011–2013: 6), an approach that is very different 
from that of the Swedes, who aim to take the lead (see quote above). The lan-
guage does not get any stronger in the following NAP, in which it is stated 
that ‘Norway will play its part in implementing the Security Council resolu-
tions through political leadership, targeted efforts across different sectors, 
diplomacy and financial support’ (Norway, NAP 2015–2018: 5). Finally, 
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what is offered in the most recent NAP is more systematization when it is 
stated that
Norway will have a more systematic focus on women, peace and secu-
rity in our efforts to support the implementation of peace agreements, 
strengthen the gender perspective in international operations and mis-
sions, and increase our efforts for women and girls in our humanitarian 
work.
(Norway, NAP 2019–2022: 4)
It is as though Norway’s track record in gender equality and peace engage-
ments is simply assumed instead of being articulated. The branding efforts 
lie in consistency, hard work and good intentions, as illustrated in the fol-
lowing passage about how gender equality and peacebuilding are conceptu-
alized by Norway:
Norway is working to ensure that peace and reconciliation processes 
are inclusive and that peace agreements safeguard women’s and men’s 
rights, needs and priorities. We strive to ensure that more women partic-
ipate at all levels in peace and reconciliation efforts, and that everyone 
who is involved in a peace process knows how to integrate the gender 
perspective in their work.
(Norway, NAP 2019–2022: 12)
Why has Norway opted for such toned-down language in such important 
branding documents? Why, unlike its Nordic neighbours, does Norway not 
spell out the differences that make Norway unique in the domain of WPS? 
Before discussing this further, we will revisit the Nordic Women Mediators 
(NWM) network, which has become a site for national collaboration on and 
competition over how to brand something that all the Nordic countries seem 
to be good at – namely, gender equality and peace – but which they talk 
about and showcase in very different ways.
The Nordic Women Mediators (NWM) network:  
competitive collaboration
As a direct follow-up to the creation of a network of women mediators in 
the Southern African region in 2014, the Nordic Women Mediators (NWM) 
network was initiated by the Norwegian government and formally launched 
in Oslo in November 2015.10 The central idea of the network was to assemble 
an easily accessible overview/list of Nordic women with direct experience 
of peace mediation/peace facilitation.11 Women included on this list should 
be individuals qualified for high-level international positions (such as peace 
envoys and heads of missions) as well as thematic experts who could join 
peace mediation teams. The aim was both to facilitate access to women who 
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could be recruited to peace mediation positions and to establish a network 
in which they could share their experiences and learn from each other.
At the time of the network’s launch, the Norwegian MFA’s Section for 
Peace and Reconciliation was headed by Tone Allers, a woman who herself 
had direct experience from Norwegian peace facilitation efforts in both Co-
lombia and the Philippines. She was strongly committed to the WPS agenda, 
as were many other employees in the Section (both women and men). Still, 
Norwegian diplomats took care to emphasize that the new network should 
not be promoted as a Norwegian but rather as a Nordic initiative, and it was 
seen as way of creating better peace processes, not as a network with articu-
lated feminist or nationalist goals. The importance of involving the govern-
ments of all five Nordic countries was stressed. Two processes were initiated 
in parallel: while Norwegian diplomats reached out to their working-level 
counterparts in the other Nordic countries to assess the interest in a re-
gional network, the Norwegian Centre for Conflict Resolution (NOREF) 
and the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) were commissioned to de-
velop a concept note, make a first rough list of possible network members 
(from all of the Nordic countries) and start mapping potential operational 
partners in the Nordic countries. In this initial phase of the project, the Nor-
wegian MFA’s main objective was to develop a network primarily of women 
with direct experience from Track One processes.12 Accordingly, the group 
of women would be small and exclusive.
It soon became clear, however, that while Norway could provide the 
names of quite a few women with this kind of hands-on experience (relative 
to the overall number of women in international peace mediation), the other 
Nordic countries were unable to do the same. These countries had been in-
volved in fewer peace processes, and few women had been involved in such 
activities. Norway could therefore have moved along on its own, developing 
a unique network of Norwegian women experts, but chose to stick to the 
original idea of developing a Nordic network and not portraying Norway 
as going at this alone. While there was interest in the initiative among all 
the other Nordic countries, they differed in their approaches to the pro-
ject. Finland immediately expressed support along the lines of Norway’s 
thinking. Iceland also expressed support and interest, but wanted to expand 
the notion of ‘mediation’ to include women with experience from different 
types of international negotiations (such as fishery negotiations). Denmark 
was initially lukewarm, with reference to lack of both financial resources 
and lack of direct experience from international conflict mediation. When it 
eventually decided to become involved, however, Denmark was the strong-
est proponent of the need to apply a broad understanding of ‘peace media-
tion’, one that would also encompass conflict resolution and peacebuilding 
(areas in which Denmark had much more experience). Finally, Sweden also 
opted to support the Nordic network initiative, but clearly saw this as an op-
portunity to link the initiative with its feminist foreign policy, an approach 
that was quite at odds with Norway’s aims.
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Here, again, we observe the differences in how the Nordic countries ap-
proach the question of nation-branding, and these are perhaps most notable 
in relation to Norway and Sweden. While Norway’s approach from the very 
beginning was that of serving as a network facilitator – and emphasizing the 
network initiative as a collective Nordic effort – Sweden has more explicitly 
used the network as an opportunity for self-promotion abroad. Instead of 
making the most out of the NWM initiative as an opportunity to brand 
Norway as the leading ‘gender-equal peace nation’, Norway prioritized Nor-
dic collaboration and sought to make Norway blend in with its neighbours.
Today, the NWM network consists of around 50 women professionals 
from the five Nordic countries with expertise in conflict mediation, peace ne-
gotiations and peacebuilding (broadly defined). Although the institutional 
expertise and affiliation of many of its members are listed as international 
and regional organizations, as well as civil society, the vast majority of the 
members are professionals working within – or recently retired from – the 
ministries of foreign affairs of the five Nordic countries. This adds a par-
ticularly interesting competitive layer to the collaboration. In addition to 
the Nordic-level network, each Nordic country has also established national 
networks of women mediators as branches of the overarching NWM. The 
size, organization and scope of the activities of these five national networks 
vary. The Norwegian network is by far the largest (counting close to 60 
women), while the membership of the other four national networks ranges 
from 15 to 20 members. The size of the Norwegian network is a reflection of 
Norway’s long-time peace engagement, which during the last ten years has 
gradually provided an increasing number of women, both within the MFA 
and in Norwegian civil society, with thematic and technical experience from 
peace facilitation and peace negotiations. It is also a reflection of Norway’s 
emphasis on professionalizing peace mediation by including thematic ex-
pertise among the membership, rather than making the NWM more explic-
itly political and value-driven (as in the case of Sweden). Norway’s ‘peace 
mediation dominance’ could have provided Norway with a unique branding 
opportunity. Still, Norway refrained from adopting such an approach. The 
members of the Norwegian network are members in their personal capacity 
and generally maintain a low profile in the public arena. The Swedish net-
work, on the other hand, stands out and comprises a small number of care-
fully selected senior women who operate as personal envoys of the Swedish 
minister of foreign affairs (the network members were initially appointed di-
rectly by former minister of foreign affairs Margot Wallström), and has been 
branded as an important instrument of Swedish feminist foreign policy.
Further, while all the other Nordic countries have named their national 
networks NWM (Nordic Women Mediators) followed by the country name 
(e.g. NWM-Denmark, NWM-Finland) – and in so doing emphasize the re-
gional connection – Sweden named its national network the Swedish Wom-
en’s Mediation Network, with no direct reference to its being part of a larger 
regional or Nordic initiative. Although the Swedish government was already 
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in dialogue with Norway and the other Nordic countries about the estab-
lishment of the NWM, and plans had been made for its formal launch in 
Oslo in November 2015, Sweden moved ahead and announced its Swedish 
Women’s Mediation Network during the UN General Assembly in Septem-
ber 2015 (Folke Bernadotte Academy, 2015). As can be seen in the ways in 
which Sweden has articulated its role in the NAPs, as discussed above, it 
should come as no surprise that Sweden also in the context of this network 
wanted to take the lead and stand out. The Swedish feminist foreign policy 
commits it to doing so – this is something that they feel other nations expect 
from them, and on which the Swedish government delivers.
Conclusion
Since the launch of the NWM in 2015, there has been a mushrooming of 
regional women mediators’ networks around the globe.13 A Global Alliance 
of all these regional women mediators’ networks was launched during the 
high-level week of the UN General Assembly in September 2019. In all these 
different regional processes, the Nordic countries have been involved in var-
ious ways – either in consultative roles or through the provision of political 
and financial support – with Norway operating as a driving force. In the 
case of the establishment of the Global Alliance, Norway was also the in-
itiator and key facilitator, hosting the first consultative meeting in Oslo in 
March 2018. However, Norway was once again reluctant or careful not to 
take on a role that was too prominent or visible or to use these various net-
work initiatives for its own branding purposes. On the contrary, while it has 
been important for Norway to brand the NWM as a Nordic collaborative 
effort, in the case of the Global Alliance it seems to have been even more 
important to downplay any national interests and to focus instead on facil-
itating inter-regional collaboration on and commitment to a global cause. 
Here again, then, we see how Norway’s approach to both peace engagement 
and the advancement of the WPS agenda is heavily influenced by its self- 
perception as a facilitator. We suggest that this is not based on any form of 
innate characteristics of Norwegians as modest or humble, but must be seen 
as being linked to Norway’s broad engagement in peace and reconciliation 
efforts around the globe. Boasting about gender equality or coming across 
as someone who is imposing gender norms – even when this might serve the 
country well within the competitive space of the WPS agenda – could come 
at a cost for Norway’s many peace engagements. Since Norway’s peace en-
gagement enjoys considerable bipartisan political support in Norway, is a 
source of popular pride (though there are also critical voices) and provides 
the country with access to heavyweight political players on the international 
stage, an overly outspoken focus on gender equality could be risky politics 
for Norway.
Still, the need to be seen as a state with strong gender-equality policies 
also in the domain of foreign policy is an important currency in the intricate 
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game between states on the international scene (Wohlforth et al., 2017; Ag-
gestam and Towns, 2018). The challenge for Norway here is to be recognized 
without gloating – and without proclaiming a feminist foreign policy.
Being among nations of ‘firsts’ on domestic gender-equality policies since 
the 1980s, it is also interesting that it was the African region that provided 
the direct impetus for the establishment of a Nordic Women’s Mediators 
network. The Nordic network did not emerge as a Nordic political innova-
tion, as so many other gender-equality initiatives have. In their thorough 
account of Nordic peace mediation, Wallensteen and Svensson (2016: 173) 
point out that the higher the positions women hold in a given society, the 
more likely it would seem that peace mediation activities will be character-
ized by gender dimensions and gender equity. It is therefore surprising that 
the Nordic countries historically have fared quite poorly in this domain.
On this, Norway is no exception. In its engagements from the Middle 
East, to Guatemala, the Balkans, Sri Lanka and Sudan, neither women’s 
participation in peace processes nor the inclusion of gendered language in 
peace agreements has been high on the agenda. There were attempts to inte-
grate gender dimensions into these processes, but they were on the side and 
marginal. For a long time, in other words, there has been a gap between the 
practice and the rhetoric of peace mediation. In more recent peace engage-
ments, however, such as those in Colombia and the Philippines, a change 
can be observed. There seems to be a cautious and meticulous effort to focus 
on the inclusion of gender-equality norms as part of a pragmatic approach 
to mediation design while at the same time downplaying any suggestion 
that this should be seen as a feminist transformative value-based project. 
Gender- equality measures draw on the state feminist model of practice: 
mobilization from below with a friendly state apparatus above. The NAPs 
and the NWM network have been important sites for balancing the aims of 
promoting gender equality and peace engagement. Norway is consistently a 
low-key player. At a time when a growing number of like-minded states are 
adopting feminist foreign policies, it remains to be seen whether Norway’s 
balancing act will continue to serve Norwegian interests, identity and image 
well. On this question, the jury is still out.
Notes
 1 This chapter builds on Skjelsbæk and Tryggestad (2020). The edits and rewriting 
have been approved by Foreign Policy Analysis.
 2 The non-colonial image remains in the public mind despite the colonizing na-
ture of Norway’s culture and language policies towards the indigenous Sami 
population in Northern Norway, which lasted until the 1980s.
 3 Following the Napoleonic Wars (1800–1815), Denmark lost the Norwegian terri-
tory to Sweden, leaving Norway in a union with Sweden from 1814 to 1905.
 4 For a critical postcolonial perspective on the notion of the Nordic countries as 
outsiders to colonial power relations, see Keskinen et al. (2016).
 5 This information was found on the webpage of the Norwegian government and 
attributed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; see Government.no (2019b).
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 6 This has been shared with the authors both in formal interviews and in informal 
conversations.
 7 This is an expression that stems from a speech by US President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt during the handover ceremony for the Royal Norwegian Navy ship 
HNoMS King Haakon VII at the Washington Navy Yard on 16 September 1942. 
The quote was as follows:
If there is anyone who still wonders why this war is being fought, let him look 
to Norway. If there is anyone who has any delusions that this war could have 
been averted, let him look to Norway; and if there is anyone who doubts the 
democratic will to win, again I say, let him look to Norway.
see Wikipedia (n.d.)
 8 For many years, this form of rhetoric was much used by politicians from the 
centre–left of Norwegian politics. In recent years, however, both national statis-
tics and studies have supported this claim (see, for instance, Østbakken, 2016). 
Increasingly, Norwegian politicians and policy-makers make references to stud-
ies published by institutions such as the World Economic Forum (2017) and the 
World Bank (2018).
 9 For ease of consultation, publication details for the national action plans of the 
individual Nordic countries have been grouped together in a separate section 
following the reference list.
 10 See Hattrem (2015).
 11 For more information, see the Nordic Women Mediators website at https:// 
nordicwomenmediators.org/.
 12 ‘Track One’ refers to official diplomacy that is carried out by official representa-
tives of states or international organizations.
 13 Other formally established regional networks are FemWise-Africa (2017), the 
Mediterranean Women Mediators Network (2017) and the Women Mediators 
Across the Commonwealth (2017). In addition, the ASEAN Women for Peace 
Registry (AWPR) was launched in December 2018, while a meeting was organ-
ized in Cairo in July 2019 to discuss the establishment of an Arab Women Medi-
ators Network.
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If the Nordic countries are imagined to be gender superpowers, Switzerland 
is perceived as a much more conservative country as far as women’s rights 
are concerned. For instance, women got the right to vote and to be elected 
at the federal level only in 1971, 123 years after men and more than 50 years 
after the Nordic countries enfranchised women. As a consequence, women 
were largely excluded from all decision-making positions in the public sphere 
during a large part of the twentieth century. The situation improved after 
the 1970s in the political sphere, but women remained largely out of power 
positions in the business sphere. This led to increasing debate during the last 
15 years within Swiss society, notably concerning the potential introduction 
of quotas to increase the number of women within the boardrooms of the 
larger corporations. In these debates, the Nordic examples were repeatedly 
used. But, why were they used, and to what effect?
The aim of this chapter is to analyse the debates that took place in Swit-
zerland concerning female quotas for corporate boards, and to see what 
images and representations of the Nordic countries were invoked by both 
supporters and opponents of the quota system. Indeed, as Ann Towns (2009, 
2010) has shown, the status of women in society is now used as an interna-
tional standard among states, making it possible both to differentiate be-
tween them and to evaluate and rank them in a hierarchical manner. More 
specifically, the focus is on the issue of gender parity in corporate board-
rooms, which has typically become since the beginning of the twenty-first 
century a benchmark used to distinguish between countries that are consid-
ered ‘good’ or ‘bad’ in terms of their performance.
Generally speaking, the Nordic countries performed ahead of the pack 
in terms of gender equality within corporate boards. Norway, which is con-
sidered ‘the snowball that started the international avalanche in getting 
women on boards’ (Goldeng and Huse, 2017), is often held up by advocates 
of a quota system as a model to be followed. Indeed, Norway was the first 
country to introduce legislated quotas for corporate boards, a fact that has 
been used by the Norwegian government to attract foreign attention and in-
terest in Norway (Danielsen and Larsen, 2015). Still, the effect of individual 
Nordic countries’ efforts to promote their gender-equality policies abroad 
7 A useful tool? 
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is not evident, because the uptake of Nordic gender-equality models abroad 
is always beyond the control of the Nordics themselves. Investigating how 
Nordic countries were used during the debate on gender quotas in the Swiss 
case therefore appears particularly interesting, notably with regard to Swit-
zerland’s conservative political culture, but also because the Nordic coun-
tries have pursued different policies on this matter. As we will see, highly 
different evaluations and interpretations of the Nordic gender-equality pol-
icies were given during the Swiss debates, following the political spectrum 
from right to the left. The issue of sanctions in particular gave rise to lively 
debate.
In the following, I conduct a systematic analysis of the discussions 
concerning the presence of women within corporations that took place 
in the Swiss parliament since the start of the debate in 2003. In addition, 
I  investigate all relevant documentation on female quotas in Swiss firms 
produced by the Federal Commission for Women’s Issues, which is the 
extra- parliamentary permanent commission established to examine all is-
sues that affect the situation of women in Switzerland and equality between 
the sexes. The analysis also includes the main public declarations by the 
Swiss Employers Confederation on this issue, both because of its weight in 
the business sphere as an umbrella organization and because it has been a 
major opponent to the introduction of quotas. All of the sources used in this 
chapter are accessible on the websites of the Swiss parliament and the Swiss 
Employers Confederation.
The analysis covers the 15 years during which the debates on women’s 
quotas took place. In June 2018, Switzerland’s National Council – the lower 
house of the Parliament, representing the people – finally, by an extremely 
narrow margin, ratified the draft revision of the law on public limited com-
panies proposed by the Federal Council, which aimed to increase the pres-
ence of women on the boards of directors of such companies to a level of 
30%, and on their executive boards to 20%. The Council of States – the 
upper house of the Federal Assembly, representing the cantons – also ap-
proved the revision the following year, which meant that the proposition 
of the Federal Council was accepted, despite strong opposition from the 
parliamentary right and business circles.
The rise of gender quotas in business
The progressive political empowerment of women during the twentieth cen-
tury represented a major paradigm shift. Indeed, women had been excluded 
from the rise of democracy in Western societies during the nineteenth cen-
tury, as they were notably explicitly prohibited from voting (Fraisse and 
Perrot, 2002; Towns, 2009, 2010). The presence of women in economic 
decision-making positions, however, remained a neglected issue until the 
mid-2000s (Lépinard and Rubio-Marín, 2018: 3–6). At that time, the per-
sistent gender inequality on corporate boards, at both the strategic and the 
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executive levels, finally began to receive increasing attention from academic 
researchers (see, for example, Singh and Vinnicombe, 2004; Vinnicombe 
et al., 2008; Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Post and Byron, 2015), nongovern-
mental organizations1 and the media. In this context, the presence of women 
on corporate boards became one of the benchmarks that made it possible 
to rank the performance of states in relation to equality. For example, Egon 
Zehnder, a privately owned consulting firm advising senior executives and 
boards around the world, began to track and analyse gender diversity in the 
boardroom from 2004. Its published reports distinguish between ‘Cham-
pions’, ‘Slow Movers’ and ‘Underachievers’ (Egon Zehnder, 2018: 7). Ac-
cording to its latest report (Egon Zehnder, 2018: 11), the Nordic countries 
of Finland, Norway and Sweden are performing ahead of the pack, along 
with several others (Australia, Belgium, France and Italy), with an average 
of over 30% of the directors on their largest corporate boards being female.
Since the start of the twenty-first century, the increasing debate on the 
question of gender parity for corporate boards has led to a related debate 
on whether gender quotas should be used to promote equality. Although 
several countries, such as Norway, France, Denmark, Finland, and Ger-
many, have gradually opted for such an approach, it remains highly contro-
versial, and many countries have shown considerable reluctance to adopt 
such measures. In debates on the subject, Norway is often promoted as a 
forerunner in relation to both gender equality within corporations and the 
use of gender quotas. Norway’s Gender Equality Act entered into force in 
1979. Gender quotas were adopted on a voluntary basis by a majority of the 
political parties as early as the 1970s and were formally imposed by the state 
in 1981 for public commissions to begin with (Teigen, 2018). The debate that 
emerged later, from the mid-1990s onwards, regarding gender parity on cor-
porate boards ‘hit Norway particularly hard, as it interfered with a national 
self-image of being particularly successful in affairs of gender equality’ (Tei-
gen, 2018: 353). In the business sphere, women actually remained largely 
excluded from the boards of large corporations, accounting for barely 5% 
of the members between 1990 and 2002 (Huse, 2012: 14). In 2003, in order 
to address this situation, the Norwegian parliament passed legislation man-
dating gender quotas for corporate boards, according to which both men 
and women should hold at least 40% of board positions in all firms. The 
legislation was initially formulated as a threat to encourage business leaders 
to voluntarily increase the presence of women. If companies did not meet 
this target by July 2005, the legislation would be effected. The proportion of 
women did indeed improve, but failed to meet the 40% target. As a result, 
the government enacted the legislation, which included tough sanctions in 
the event of non-compliance that could go as far as the dissolution of the 
firm (Teigen, 2018: 347–348; see also Hoel, 2008). This led to a dramatic in-
crease in the presence of women on the boards of Norwegian firms – from 
6% in 2002 to 40% in 2008 (Huse, 2012: 14). The adoption of quotas for 
corporate boards simultaneously represented both a continuation of the 
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institutionalization of Norwegian gender-equality policy and a break from 
the state’s previous policy of not intervening in the economy (Teigen, 2018).
After Norway, the implementation of female quotas for corporate boards 
occurred for most countries in the aftermath of the 2007–2008 financial 
crisis (Teigen, 2018: 341). Indeed, that crisis was largely perceived as the 
consequence of a toxic ‘business masculinity’, as Erlingsdóttir describes 
in Chapter 5 of this volume. An infamous claim was that the crisis would 
not have occurred ‘if Lehman Brothers had been Lehmann Sisters’ (Prügl, 
2012; Roberts, 2012). As a result, the debate around female board quotas 
intensified within the European Union from 2008, and in 2012 the European 
Commission’s Vice-President Viviane Reding announced the possibility of 
imposing gender quotas on the corporate boards of the largest listed compa-
nies in the European Union to include at least 40% of the under-represented 
gender by 2020 (Singh et al., 2015: 552; Lépinard and Rubio-Marín, 2018). 
European norms and incentives that favoured gender equality influenced 
national debates concerning the adoption of female quotas for corporate 
boards, among both supporters and opponents alike, with the latter call-
ing for national prerogatives (Lépinard and Rubio-Marín, 2018). Moreover, 
there was a clear process of policy transfer and transnational diffusion, and 
the adoption of quotas in Norway had an effect on the EU’s member-states 
(Lépinard and Rubio-Marín, 2018: 32). In France, for instance, Norway’s 
example was ‘praised’ during the discussion preceding the introduction in 
2011 of the Copé-Zimmerman Law, a quota legislation that aimed to in-
crease women’s representation on supervisory boards to at least 20% by 
2014, and to 40% by 2017 (Singh et al., 2015: 552–553).
Although the Nordic countries are globally perceived as being equally 
gender-progressive, they differ on the issue of female quotas in business 
(Agustín et al., 2018). Freidenvall (2018) has discussed how Sweden, unlike 
Norway, never enacted mandatory gender quotas. The resistance in Sweden 
to such a move was very strong because such measures were regarded as 
discriminatory and contrary to the principle of meritocracy. Political par-
ties in Sweden therefore opted for voluntary party quotas in elected bodies, 
which have proven quite effective, and business actors implemented vol-
untary codes of conduct. In 1999, a regulation that sought to bring about 
increased gender balance on the boards of Swedish state-owned compa-
nies was adopted. Despite the absence of sanctions in the event of non- 
compliance, the objective of reaching a level of 40% for women by 2003 was 
achieved (Freidenvall, 2018: 383). In order to avoid legislated quotas, busi-
ness elites established corporate governance codes, which were adopted as 
part of the Swedish Code of Corporate Governance in 2005. These applied 
to all large companies listed on the Stockholm stock exchange and included 
a stipulation of gender-balanced boards – though again excluding sanctions 
in the event of non-compliance. In 2014, the self-proclaimed ‘first feminist 
government in the world’ launched a bill on mandatory quotas for corpo-
rate boards that aimed at a level of representation of at least 40% for each 
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gender on the boards of public limited companies and publicly owned firms, 
which was never enacted owing to strong opposition within the parliament 
 (Freidenvall, 2018: 390). Legislated quotas have continually been perceived 
as undesirable interference by the state in the business sector.
In Denmark, gender quotas have also been very controversial and, 
unlike in Norway and Sweden, there are no gender quotas for political 
parties (Agustín et al., 2018). Despite this lack of incentive, Denmark’s 
political elites have been characterized by a high representation of women 
since 1998 in comparison to other European countries (Agustín et al., 
2018: 402). In relation to the private sector, where women’s representation 
was less advanced, the use of quotas to improve the presence of women on 
corporate boards has faced strong opposition from the Liberal Party and 
private corporations. Different strategies have thus been adopted instead, 
including voluntary quotas and the adoption in 2012 of a law compelling 
the largest public and private firms to set goals for gender equality on their 
boards, an approach that has been labelled the ‘Danish model’ (Agustín 
et al., 2018: 414).
Lagging behind the Nordic countries
According to the above-mentioned report by Egon Zehnder (2018: 11), Swit-
zerland was clearly lagging behind most European countries – and espe-
cially the Nordic countries – in relation to female membership on corporate 
boards. In 2018, only 22.3% of the members of the boards of the country’s 
largest public companies were women. In comparison, France was in the 
lead with 42.1%, followed by Norway and Sweden with 36.7% each. With 
33.3% of board seats held by women, Finland was also above the Western 
European average of 29.0%, while Denmark was the only Nordic country 
below that average, with 25.8%.
Switzerland’s backwardness can be explained by several factors. First, 
Switzerland remains a very conservative country when it comes to women’s 
rights and can be considered something of an anti-model in comparison 
with the Nordic countries. For instance, all the Nordic countries introduced 
full political rights for women around the time of World War I, whereas 
Switzerland first did so in 1971 (Sineau, 2002: 634; Studer, 1996). In 1981, the 
principle of equality between women and men was enshrined in the Federal 
Constitution. However, the 1912 marriage law, which allowed a husband to 
forbid his wife to work outside the home if her doing so was considered a 
threat to their marriage, remained unchanged until 1987 (Schulz, 1994: 132). 
In addition, Swiss legislation was particularly underdeveloped in relation to 
childcare. For instance, maternity leave was only introduced in 2005, after 
a ten-year debate, and paternity leave is only about to be adopted in 2021. 
These examples illustrate the strong persistence of the male-breadwinner 
model in Switzerland, in contrast to, for example, the Swedish dual-income 
earner model (Freidenvall, 2018).
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Switzerland’s conservatism was favoured by a political context marked 
by the dominant position of the country’s major right-wing parties since 
the second half of the nineteenth century. The ‘bourgeois bloc’, a term that 
refers to the alliance between the country’s right-wing parties and its most 
powerful business interest associations, has remained particularly stable 
across time, although its cohesion has been challenged since the beginning 
of the twenty-first century (see Mach et al., 2021).
Towards the end of the 1990s, two initiatives calling for the introduction 
of female quotas to ensure adequate or equal representation of women at 
the political level were overturned by rulings of the Federal Supreme Court 
(Kägi-Diener, 2014: 27). The presence of women among political elites has 
however increased steadily since they obtained the right to vote and to be 
elected at the federal level in 1971. In relation to corporate boards, several 
factors have contributed to slowing down a similar increase (see Ginalski, 
2020). State-owned companies, which have often been the first to introduce 
female quotas (see, for example, Heemskerk and Fennema, 2014, on the 
Dutch case), are few in number. The importance of a military career for ac-
cessing board appointments has been an indirect obstacle for women, as the 
army is compulsory for men only. Another factor is the absence of the right 
of employees to be represented on company boards, which typically played 
a key role in the adoption of corporate board quotas in Norway when a par-
allel was drawn between employee representation and gender representation 
(Teigen, 2018). As a consequence, women comprised only 7.7% of the mem-
bers of the boards of directors of the 110 largest Swiss firms in 2000, and 
only 9.7% ten years later (Ginalski, 2020).
The backwardness of Switzerland in comparison with other Western 
countries led to growing debates within Swiss society from the beginning 
of the twenty-first century, which have crystallized around the issue of quo-
tas. In November 2013, the Federal Council, which is the highest executive 
authority in the country, announced that women should make up 30% of 
the board members of corporations owned by the state or with close ties 
to the Confederation by 2020. Two years later, it proposed a project to re-
form the country’s company law. One of the key elements of this proposal 
was the introduction of gender quotas for public limited companies accord-
ing to which women should constitute at least 30% of the members of their 
boards of directors and 20% of their executive boards by 2020. Although the 
project was formulated as a mere recommendation and no sanctions were 
planned, it provoked significant opposition from the right-wing majority in 
the parliament as well as within the private sector.
The next sections will analyse the most salient aspects of the debate on
gender equity within corporate boards since the first discussions in the
Swiss parliament in 2003. The analysis will include the questions, postu-
lates, interpellations and motions addressed by parliamentarians to the
Federal Council, the parliamentarian initiatives proposed, and the different 





More specifically, the analysis focuses on the different interventions that 
mentioned, in one way or another, the Nordic countries. Three main phases 
can be distinguished in the discussion concerning the introduction of female 
quotas in Swiss firms. The first began in 2003 and lasted until the financial 
crisis of 2007–2008, when the initial discussions on gender equity within 
corporate boards took place in the Swiss parliament. Women belonging to 
the Swiss Socialist Party and the Green Party carried out different actions 
in favour of quotas, which did not lead to the introduction of concrete meas-
ures. They frequently invoked Norway as a model and a forerunner in order 
to plead their case. The second phase began with the financial crisis in 2007, 
which contributed to the creation of a less radical image of the Norwegian 
model. The last phase started with the 2013 decision of the Swiss Federal 
Council to increase the presence of women on the boards of directors of 
large firms with close ties to the Confederation, and subsequently on the 
boards of public limited companies.
‘Progressive Norway’: debating female business quotas in the 
Swiss parliament
The debate started with a parliamentary initiative entitled ‘Mehr Frauen 
in die Leitungen von Aktiengesellschaften’, meaning ‘More Women in the 
Management of Public Limited Companies’. This was launched on March 
2003 by Franziska Teuscher, a member of the National Council, represent-
ing the Green Party. Teuscher’s aim was to increase the percentage of women 
in the boardrooms of public limited companies listed on the stock exchange 
to at least 40%. Moreover, she suggested that these companies should doc-
ument on an annual basis the measures they had adopted to implement real 
equality between women and men, notably in terms of salary. On 7 October 
2004, during the debate on her initiative in the National Council, she made 
explicit references to the Norwegian model:
If you follow my parliamentary initiative, that would not make Swit-
zerland a special case. Similar laws have been proposed by the govern-
ments in Norway and Sweden and are in preparation. Norway is the 
country where this implementation is most advanced. The Norwegian 
 government – nota bene a bourgeois government – is proposing to in-
crease the proportion of women in state enterprises and public limited 
companies in this area to at least 40%. If a company does not comply 
with this requirement, it will be refused entry in the commercial regis-
ter. I do not go that far with my parliamentary initiative. The Norwe-
gian government introduces this law, even though women are already 
much better represented on management committees and boards of di-
rectors there than in Switzerland.
(National Council, 2004)3
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In her declaration, Teuscher thus invoked Norway as the most gender- 
progressive country and a forerunner in terms of equality in the private sec-
tor on the basis of the initiative to introduce female quotas for corporate 
boards that was currently underway there. Interestingly, she pointed out that 
Norway had a ‘bourgeois government’, like Switzerland, but that at the same 
time it was performing better in this area than Switzerland, as though she 
was anticipating opposition from the country’s right-wing parties. However, 
as the quote shows, she also made clear that she did not want to go as far as 
the Norwegian government in relation to sanctions – that is, forced dissolu-
tion of companies that did not comply with the law. Even if the aim of these 
comments was essentially to convince and reassure the right-wing majority, 
her remarks implicitly presented Norway as being too progressive. The ma-
jority of the National Council’s Committee on Legal Affairs, which was re-
sponsible for examining Franziska Teuscher’s initiative, agreed that women 
were under-represented in public limited companies but claimed that quotas 
were not an appropriate means of achieving gender equality in the business 
realm and refused to adopt legal provisions restricting the sphere of auton-
omy of companies. The National Council followed the Committee’s recom-
mendations and refused to act on Teuscher’s initiative by a large majority.
In June 2003, a few months after Teuscher’s first initiative, Barbara Haer-
ing launched a similar, though more modest, parliamentary initiative call-
ing for an increase in the proportion of women on the boards of state-owned 
firms through an amendment to the existing law on public limited compa-
nies included in the Swiss Code of Obligations. Representing the Socialist 
Party, Haering argued that women were still under-represented in the man-
agement of these companies, and that the state had a duty to encourage the 
presence of women at least in the boards of corporations in which it was it-
self a shareholder. Haering argued that Norway offered ‘a good example’ of 
‘an appropriate quota’ to achieve this goal, although she proposed a quota 
of 30% instead of 40% (Parliament of Switzerland, 2003). In this sense, the 
early proponents of a measure to increase female board membership were 
imaging Norway as a country that was very progressive, but perhaps overly 
so, and thus an example that could only be followed to a certain extent. For 
instance, during the parliamentary debate on Haering’s proposition, Su-
sanne Leutenegger Oberholzer, a Socialist member of the National Council, 
defended Haering’s initiative by arguing that it was very ‘moderate’ in com-
parison to measures taken by other countries that had gone much further, 
such as Norway, whose legislation had stipulated a higher quota for women 
and included private companies (National Council, 2005). By a very small 
majority, the National Council decided on March 2005 to proceed with the 
initiative, and a subcommittee was instructed to draw up a preliminary leg-
islative draft.
A few years later, in June 2007, Teuscher re-entered the dispute with a 
question addressed to the Federal Council about the presence of women 
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in corporate boardrooms. She claimed that Switzerland was still ‘lagging 
behind’ Norway, Sweden and ‘even’ Great Britain. In the following extract, 
the ‘Nordic exceptionalism’ with regard to policy innovation in the field of 
gender equality is clearly invoked, along with the specific position of Nor-
way, which is described as being the most advanced country in this area:
Several studies have assessed the place of women in the world of work. 
The conclusions are disappointing: with the exception of the Nordic 
countries, which have put in place targeted measures to support wom-
en’s career prospects, the number of women on boards of directors 
seems destined to remain modest. Committed to improving diversity 
and promoting equal opportunities, Norway – which ranks first in 
terms of the proportion of women in the economy – has taken a further 
step by introducing quotas for the boards of directors of the 650 largest 
publicly traded companies.
(Federal Council, 2007)4
In June 2008, the preliminary legislative draft initiated by the National 
Council in 2005 was narrowly rejected by the same National Council, which 
followed the recommendation made by the National Council’s Committee 
on Legal Affairs on Haering’s proposition. The main arguments against the 
draft were as follows: choices regarding the members of a board of directors 
should be made in complete independence and should solely be based on the 
company’s requirements; the proposed quotas represented excessive state 
interference in the economy; quotas would put public-sector companies at 
a disadvantage compared to the private sector; and quotas entailed the risk 
that a woman might be appointed because of her gender rather than because 
of her competencies. Finally, a majority of the Committee’s members were 
opposed to the idea of using legislation as a tool to pursue an ‘ideological 
project’ and claimed that gender quotas were not an appropriate means of 
achieving gender equality (Committee on Legal Affairs, 2008). Thus, during 
the first debates in the Swiss parliament, proponents of the quota system – 
mostly women – were repeatedly using the Nordic countries, and Norway 
in particular, to call into question the Swiss system, which was described in 
comparison as being much more ‘traditional’, and by implication more con-
servative.5 They failed, however, to convince their opponents, who mainly 
denounced quotas as an undesirable state intervention in the economy.
The financial crisis as a turning point
The 2007–2008 financial crisis gave a new impulse to the debate on female 
business quotas in Switzerland and led to a shift in how the Norwegian 
model was perceived by the proponents of a quota system. After the fail-
ure of the two parliamentary initiatives proposed by Franziska Teuscher 
and Barbara Haering, Maria Roth-Bernasconi, a Socialist member of the 
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National Council, took advantage of the crisis to submit in December 2008 
a new initiative to introduce gender quotas of 30% for each gender in both 
state-owned firms and public limited companies. Unlike her predecessors, 
Roth-Bernasconi did not mention the Nordic countries. Her argument was 
to denounce predominantly male corporate boards, which, according to her, 
‘drove the companies into bankruptcy because they were only concerned 
about their own profits’ (Parliament of Switzerland, 2008). However, dur-
ing the parliamentary session of September 2009, a proponent of the Roth- 
Bernasconi initiative, who was also member of the Socialist Party, again 
mentioned Norway as an example to be followed. Once more, the initiative 
met with strong opposition from the right-wing majority in the parliament, 
who largely rejected it. Two new arguments were put forward against quo-
tas by Oskar Freysinger, a member of the National Council from the Swiss 
People’s Party, the right-wing populist party that was the largest party in the 
Federal Assembly at the time. Freysinger claimed that many women were 
not interested in sitting on corporate boards and should not be forced to 
fill quotas. Moreover, according to him, a quota system would put Swiss 
firms in unfair competition with foreign companies listed on the Swiss stock 
exchange and not subject to a similar regulation (National Council, 2009b). 
He thus denounced quotas as a measure that not only went against the prin-
ciples of economic freedom and free competition, but also went against the 
interests of women themselves, insinuating that they would be forced to sit 
on boards of directors against their will – a type of rhetoric similar to that 
used by his party a few decades earlier to argue against women’s suffrage, 
suggesting that such a stance was allegedly for their own good (see Studer, 
1996: 372–374).
In March 2009, Katharina Prelicz-Huber, a member of the National 
Council representing the Green Party, once again raised the issue of the 
insufficient presence of women on the boards of directors of Swiss firms 
through a motion addressed to the Federal Council that argued in favour 
of a legal solution based on the Norwegian model. Prelicz-Huber declared 
that ‘Norway is setting an example here; in particular, it has a system of 
sanctions for non-compliance with these requirements’ (National Council, 
2009a).6 Two years later, in March 2011, she made the following statement 
about the adoption of quotas in Norway during the parliamentary session 
discussing her motion:
The model country of Norway proves that it works. The claim in Nor-
way did not come from a leftist woman, but from a bourgeois man. He 
made the move for economic reasons, because there was a need for 
well-educated women, and otherwise it would take too long.
(National Council, 2011)7
Prelicz-Huber did not specify in her speech which ‘bourgeois man’ she was 
referring to. The important point here is that her argument generally echoed 
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the discourse of a rising liberal feminism that, in the wake of the 2007–2008 
financial crisis, increasingly claimed that women represented ‘untapped re-
sources’ for business (Roberts, 2012). Susanne Leutenegger Oberholzer went 
a step further in September 2012 when she proposed two parliamentary ini-
tiatives to increase the membership of women on the boards of corporations 
listed on the Swiss stock exchange or with close ties to the Confederation 
to at least 40%.8 The proposals also included a stipulation that if corpora-
tions failed to comply with the initiative, they would have to withdraw from 
the stock exchange. Her proposals were thus clearly inspired by the Nor-
wegian system of sanctions. In her initiative covering corporations listed 
on the Swiss stock exchange, Leutenegger Oberholzer quoted a study made 
by the  previously mentioned consulting firm Egon Zehnder that showed 
that the ‘Nordic countries’ – namely, Norway, Finland and Sweden – were 
above the European mean in relation to female membership of corporate 
boards, while other countries such as Italy, Austria, Luxembourg and Por-
tugal were lagging behind (Parliament of Switzerland, 2012). In so doing, 
she was using the status of women to evaluate and rank the performances 
of states on equality in a hierarchical manner (see Towns, 2009, 2010). Dur-
ing the parliamentary debate on Leutenegger Oberholzer’s initiative in De-
cember 2013, Mathias Reynard, also a Socialist member of the National 
Council, claimed that Norway, a ‘pioneer country in this field’, had made 
‘impressive’ progress thanks to the introduction of quotas, and that France, 
a neighbouring country of Switzerland, had also just adopted a similar sys-
tem (National Council, 2013b).
As these different examples show, the financial crisis thus contributed t
a change in the use of Norway’s image by the advocates of a quota syste
Indeed, as we have seen, the first interventions by the Greens and the S
cialists invoked Norway as a forerunner and an example to be followed, b
only partially. They thus created, in the end, an image of a Norway that w
almost too progressive, even if such a judgement was never stated expli
itly. After the financial crisis, the promoters of a quota system, who we
still drawn from the Green and Socialist parties, increasingly created t
image of an ‘exemplary Norway’ in the sense that the latter was portraye
as a forerunner and a reasonably progressive country. Once more, howeve














For the first ten years, the debate on gender inequality in corporate boards 
took place mainly in the arenas of the Federal Assembly and was marked by 
the repeated failures of the various quota initiatives. The next phase began 
with the decision of the Swiss Federal Council in November 2013 to increase 
the presence of women on the boards of directors of the large firms with 
close ties to the Confederation (Federal Council, 2013). The aim was to set 
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a target quota of 30% of each gender by 2020. Such a proposal had been 
first put forward during the parliamentary debates on Susanne Leutenegger 
Oberholzer’s initiatives (see above) without arousing any particular oppo-
sition. In December 2013, the Liberal–Green parliamentary group submit-
ted a motion at the National Council through the intervention of Kathrin 
Bertschy, asking the Federal Council to ‘impos[e] the “apply or explain” 
principle to combat sex discrimination in employment’ in companies listed 
on the Swiss stock exchange (National Council, 2013a). By adopting such an 
approach, the Liberal–Green group was proposing a measure that was in 
fact softer than that of quotas and followed the Swedish model:
While in Switzerland fixed quotas are seen as an excessive infringement 
of economic freedom and are therefore unlikely to be adopted, the fact 
remains that the previously favoured voluntary measures have hardly 
moved the lines. We therefore call for companies listed on the stock 
exchange to be obliged to comply with a model based on the principle 
of ‘apply or explain’, in order to gradually eliminate the gender discrim-
ination that still prevails in the labour market, as Sweden has done, not 
without success.
(National Council 2013a)9
Sweden, which until then had been invoked far less frequently in the de-
bates, thus appeared as an alternative to the Norwegian model, which was 
perceived as too restrictive by opponents of the quota system. The Federal 
Council proposed to reject the motion but pledged that it would reflect on 
the issue. Two years later, the Federal Council launched a project to reform 
the legislation on public limited companies. Among other things, the re-
forms would introduce gender quotas for these companies, aiming to ensure 
that women would constitute 30% of the membership of their boards of di-
rectors and 20% of their executive boards by 2020 (Federal Council, 2015). 
Although no sanctions were planned in the event of non-compliance, the 
issue remained highly sensitive and led to passionate debates both in and 
outside the parliament. Within the parliament, the project was mostly sup-
ported by the Greens and the Socialists – who had been in favour of some 
form of quota from the start – and opposed by members of the Radical- 
Liberal Party and the Swiss People’s Party. Proponents of quotas continued 
to cite Norway as an example to be followed. For example, the Federal Com-
mission for Women’s Issues published in March 2014 a declaration in favour 
of gender quotas that would seek to bring about a level of 40% for women’s 
membership of the boards of directors and 33% for the executive direction of 
state-owned companies, companies listed on the stock exchange and com-
panies with more than 250 employees (Federal Commission for Women’s Is-
sues, 2014). Moreover, the Commission spoke in favour of sanctions should 
companies fail to respect these objectives. In the working document that led 
to this declaration, elaborated by Regula Kägi-Diener (2014: 3, 17), several 
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references were made to Norway, pointing out that the Norwegian example 
had led to discussions all over Europe about the relevance of legal require-
ments in efforts to improve the presence of women on corporate boards and 
declaring that Norway ‘was leading the world’ on these issues.
The Federal Council’s reform project provoked a general outcry among 
business circles, and notably the Swiss Employers Confederation. Already 
in December 2012, the latter had published in collaboration with Econo-
miesuisse, the major Swiss business interest association, a report that ar-
gued in favour of more women among leading positions in Swiss firms, but 
against quotas (Swiss Employers Confederation and Economiesuisse, 2012). 
Interestingly, the report explicitly contrasted the Norwegian model with the 
Swedish one. It accused the former of having favoured the accumulation of 
mandates by a small number of women, which was viewed as contraven-
ing principles of good corporate governance. In raising this point, it ech-
oed the criticism voiced by some Norwegian scholars who claimed that the 
introduction of quotas in Norway had led to the development of a female 
elite holding multiple board positions, dubbed the ‘golden skirts’ (see, for 
 example, Huse, 2012: 17).10 Moreover, the report pointed to the fact that 
only 5% of the chairpersons of the boards of Norwegian corporations were 
women. In the end, the Swiss Employers Confederation and Economiesu-
isse thus depicted the Norwegian model as elitist, rather than progressive. 
By contrast, Sweden was presented as a successful model and an example of 
the efficiency of voluntary measures.
In 2018, the Swiss Employers Confederation repeated its attacks against 
the Norwegian system of sanctions. In addition to the above-mentioned ar-
guments, it criticized the fact that the numbers of women within middle 
management had not increased, which was regarded as a failure of a quota 
system that favoured only a small elite circle:
The Swiss Employers Confederation is opposed to the inscription in the 
law of quotas for women in positions of responsibility… [Norwegian] 
quotas have not resulted in the expected results… [no] increase in the 
pool of potential candidates in the middle management population and 
[few] women [have] been allocated additional directorships.
(Swiss Employers Confederation, 2018)11
This argument, however, showed either a misunderstanding or a wilful mis-
representation of the Norwegian measures and was therefore fallacious, 
as the latter were not intended to increase the share of women in business 
 management – unlike the Federal Council’s plan, which aimed at 20% of 
women on executive boards. It is true, though, that Norwegian quotas for 
corporate boards did not lead to more gender equality in senior manage-
ment positions (Teigen, 2018: 350–351). The denunciation of a ‘massive in-
terference’ and the comparison with Norway was thus undoubtedly abusive, 
since, again, no sanctions were envisaged in the Federal Council’s project. 
A useful tool? 147
Norway was therefore mobilized above all as a symbol of an undesirable 
state intrusion into the economy and contrasted with the approach of a 
more liberal Sweden. In order to avoid such an intrusion, the Swiss Employ-
ers Confederation tried to instil fear in its audience, claiming that several 
Norwegian firms had withdrawn from the stock exchange in order to escape 
from the quotas.
In June 2018, despite the strong opposition from the private sector, the 
National Council finally ratified the Federal Council’s proposal for a reform 
of the law on public limited companies by a narrow margin, with 95 votes in 
favour, 94 against, and 3 abstentions. A few days after the women’s strike of 
14 June 2019, which was itself a historical moment owing to its magnitude, 
the Council of States, in turn, ratified the project. The Federal Council’s 
proposal has certainly benefited from the changing international context, 
marked by the gradual adoption of quotas in many Western countries, the 
financial crisis that – temporarily – called the capitalist system into ques-
tion and the new rise of the women’s movement. It should be remembered, 
however, that the measures proposed by the Federal Council remained very 
moderate in comparison with those adopted by Norway or France since 
they did not include any sanctions in the event of non-compliance.
Conclusion
Since the Swiss debate on female business quotas began in the early 2000s, 
both supporters and opponents of the quota system have compared Swit-
zerland with other European countries. Both frequently drew on the rep-
resentation of the Nordic countries more than that of other countries, thus 
confirming the competing role of Norwegian and Swedish gender-quota 
policies in the Swiss debates on gender quotas. During the early phase of 
the debate, which began with the first discussions in parliament in 2003 and 
continued until the outbreak of the 2007–2008 financial crisis, the various 
parliamentarians – mainly women from the Green and the Socialist parties – 
who were arguing in favour of quotas made frequent references to Norway to 
plead their case. Interestingly, they depicted it as a progressive country and 
a forerunner, and thus as an example to be followed – but only to a certain 
extent, as they did not want to go as far as the Norwegian government in 
terms of sanctions or the quota level. Although this was probably essentially 
a strategy to persuade and reassure the right-wing majority, the early propo-
nents of a quota system implicitly gave the impression that Norway was too 
progressive – at least compared to Switzerland. The financial crisis of 2007–
2008 contributed to a shift in this perception, and the proponents of female 
quotas for board membership gradually aligned with the Norwegian system.
For ten years, the debates on the quota system remained essentially con-
fined to the Swiss parliament, and Norway was clearly the country most 
mentioned by the proponents of such a system, along with Sweden to a 
lesser extent. France, for example, was also cited but less often, even after 
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the introduction of the Copé-Zimmermann Law in January 2011. The Nor-
dic countries, and in particular Norway, thus served as the main reference 
points for policy innovation in the field of gender equality, in both the Swiss 
and French debates on quotas (for the French case, see Singh et al., 2015). 
All interventions in favour of some form of quota were blocked by the right-
wing majority, which was strongly opposed to any state interference in the 
economy.
The November 2013 decision of the Swiss Federal Council to increase the 
presence of women on the boards of directors of large firms with close ties 
to the Confederation made the threat of such an intervention concrete and 
contributed to a transformation of the debate. It led major employers’ or-
ganizations, such as Economiesuisse and the Swiss Employers Confedera-
tion, to take a stand against any non-voluntary measures, lining up with the 
right-wing parties. Switzerland’s business circles launched repeated attacks 
against the Norwegian model, pointing to its failures. They claimed that the 
introduction of quotas had benefited only a small female elite holding mul-
tiple board positions – the ‘golden skirts’– invoking the image of a country 
ultimately favouring an elitist rather than progressive system. In order to 
circumvent the threat of quotas, business organizations directed attention 
to Sweden’s voluntary system, although there are considerable differences 
between Switzerland and Sweden in terms of measurements of gender equal-
ity. In both countries, however, the principle of self-regulation and non- 
interference of the state in the business sector prevailed over gender-equality 
values. In the end, analysis of the Swiss debate on female quotas for cor-
porate boards shows that the Nordic countries have constantly remained a 
point of reference, whether presented as a model to be followed or one to be 
avoided. Whereas Norway at first was a model to imitate, right-wing poli-
ticians later mobilized it as a symbol of an undesirable state intrusion into 
the economy and contrasted it with the approach of a more liberal Sweden.
Notes
 1 See, for example, the website of Catalyst at www.catalyst.org.
 2 A question can be addressed by a member of parliament to the Federal Council 
in order to request information about important domestic or foreign affairs. The 
Federal Council must reply in writing by the next session. A postulate man-
dates the Federal Council to examine and report on whether to submit a bill to 
the Federal Assembly or to adopt a particular measure. It may be submitted by 
the majority of the members of a parliamentary committee, by a parliamentary 
group or by an individual member of parliament. The postulate is accepted as 
soon as it has been approved by one of the councils. A motion instructs the Fed-
eral Council to submit a bill to the Federal Assembly or to adopt a particular 
measure. As with the postulates, motions can be submitted by the majority of 
the members of a parliamentary committee, by a parliamentary group or by an 
individual member of parliament. Motions must be accepted by both councils. 
A council member, a parliamentary group or a parliamentary committee can 
use a parliamentary initiative to propose a draft version of new legislation or the 
terms of such legislation. A committee of the National Council or Council of 
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States is given responsibility for the legislative work (definitions according to the 
online lexicon of parliamentary terms; see Parliament of Switzerland, n.d.).
 3 Author’s translation from the original German.
 4 Author’s translation from the original French.
 5 The term was employed by Franziska Teuscher in her question (07.1072) 
 addressed to the Federal Council on 21 June 2007.
 6 Author’s translation from the original French.
 7 Author’s translation from the original German.
 8 Already in March 2004, Susanne Leutenegger Oberholzer had deposited a par-
liamentary initiative (04.412) entitled ‘Gender reporting pour les sociétés cotées 
en bourse’, arguing in favour of gender reporting in listed companies, which was 
rejected by the National Council.
 9 Author’s translation from the original French.
 10 Norwegian corporate boards do not set limits on the number of board seats an
individual person can hold, unlike France, for example, where there is a limit of
a maximum of five seats (Takagi and Gröschl, 2012: 4).
 
 
 11 Author’s translation from the original French.
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Creating a national brand might entail a polished version of realities and 
facts on the ground. Branding is, after all, image-building. How, then, are 
Norwegian gender-equality policies presented in national image-making? 
In this chapter, we investigate how the national branding of Norway takes 
form through the voicing and silencing of various features of Norwegian 
gender-equality policies. Gender-equality policy is a hybrid policy field 
that encompasses a range of different areas. The emphasis here will be on 
what we have identified as the four main areas of Norway’s gender-equality 
 policies: equality legislation, work–life balance, gender mainstreaming and 
gender balance in decision-making (Skjeie et al., 2019).1
We base our analysis on the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ most 
recent action plan on gender equality, together with selected speeches by 
the minister of foreign affairs and the minister of children and equality. We 
view these documents as core sites of communication to foreign audiences 
on Norwegian gender-equality policies and ask how their main messaging 
relates to existing knowledge about the features, merits and shortcomings 
of these policies. Our primary focus is the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs’ Action Plan for Women’s Rights and Gender Equality in Foreign 
and Development Policy 2016–2020, entitled Freedom, Empowerment and 
Opportunities (hereafter: ‘Action Plan’) (MFA, 2016a), the ministry’s most 
important communication document on gender equality. In addition, two 
other documents contribute to framing the main messaging articulated in 
this Action Plan: first, the speech by former minister of foreign affairs Børge 
Brende (2013–2017) at the launch of the Action Plan (MFA, 2016b); second, 
the statement by former minister of children and equality Linda Hofstad 
Helleland (2018–2019) at the 62nd session of the Commission on the Status 
of Women (CSW) (Norwegian Ministry of Children and Equality, 2018). 
These two statements are both thematically relevant and were made on 
prominent occasions. They therefore serve as central additional instances 
of branding, and the issues that are highlighted within them overlap overall 
with the focus and priorities of the Action Plan.
The question we ask is how Norway recommends gender-equality ap-
proaches and policy solutions abroad, and to what extent perspectives and 
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solutions promoted internationally take on board existing analyses of Nor-
way’s own experiences and policy challenges. A central finding in our anal-
ysis is that the branding abroad of Norwegian gender-equality policies in 
some important respects disregards our knowledge of the limitations and 
deficiencies of these policies. Further, and more surprisingly, some of the 
recognized strengths of Norwegian gender-equality policy are downplayed.
Nordic gender equality in nation-branding
A key insight from studies of nation-branding is that ‘branding matters’. 
The aim of different nation-branding strategies is to influence how countries 
are perceived by both state- and non-state actors in the international com-
munity. Such branding efforts aim to influence macro-economic variables 
(GDP, exports, etc.) or diplomatic relations (see, for example, Fan, 2005). 
However, they may also shape citizens’ perceptions of their own country 
and ideas of what, for instance, the ‘welfare state’ or ‘gender equality’ refer 
to and ought to imply at home (Danielsen et al., 2015; Marklund, 2017). 
A country’s economic, political and cultural position in the international 
system, as well as a government’s standing among its own citizens, is thus 
not straightforwardly given by some objective circumstances. A nation’s sta-
tus is also shaped by less tangible means, such as image-building, both at 
home and abroad.
Effective branding, however, needs to correspond with certain agreed-
upon realities to be credible. For example, when countries in the Nordic 
region find it useful to brand themselves as gender-equality forerunners (see, 
for example, Towns, 2017; Jezierska and Towns, 2018), this image-building is 
supported by the fact that these countries top international gender-equality 
indexes and the number of people living ‘gender equal’ lives within them 
tends to be greater than that in other regions. A successful branding strat-
egy is based on comparative advantages – for example, in relation to lev-
els of environmental pollution or a country’s record on human rights or 
gender equality (see, for example, Fetscherin, 2009, and Chapter 9 in this 
volume by Hellum) – and on toning down any possible shortcomings. But 
to what extent do we find this simple pattern of over-emphasizing achieve-
ments and covering up flaws when we examine the treatment of Norwegian 
 gender-equality policies in the country’s national branding?
There are several existing and ongoing studies of the role of gender equal-
ity and gender-equality policy in the national branding strategies of the 
countries of the Nordic region. These studies find, first, that internal con-
troversies spurred by mobilization and policies for gender equality in the 
Nordic countries are toned down or silenced. Such controversies include 
conflicts between Nordic gender-equality ideology and multiculturalism, or 
attacks on ‘feminism’ coming from the populist right – for example, Swe-
den’s Democrats (see Towns, 2017). Second, some studies have highlighted 
Silenced at the border 155
how the notion of gender equality brought to the fore in Nordic nation- 
branding as ‘Swedish’ or ‘Norwegian’ is not necessarily progressive, but 
diplomatic and ‘tamed’ (see Towns, 2002; Tryggestad, 2014; Moss, 2017; 
Jezierska and Towns, 2018; Skjelsbæk and Tryggestad, 2018, 2019), in the 
sense that more radical features of the feminist agenda are downplayed. For 
example, more fundamental questioning of gender and sexuality categories 
and societal power relations remains unmentioned. Third, historical lega-
cies and national self-conceptions developed over time about Nordic coun-
tries as champions of women’s rights (Danielsen et al., 2015), but also about 
Nordic gender, including ‘Nordic masculinity’ (Syse, 2017), play a central 
role in establishing the trajectories and legacies of gender-equality policies. 
In our analysis, we relate our findings to these existing contributions, but 
also pursue a reading inspired by postcolonial feminist theory.
Slippage between home and abroad
The Nordic countries have been portrayed as ‘nirvanas’ of gender equality 
(Lister, 2009) or – more soberly – as a group of countries more character-
ized by equality than others (Walby, 2004, 2009). However, gender- equality 
 policy and discourse in the Nordic countries has also been accused of tend-
ing to ignore plurality, diversity and individual autonomy (Holst, 2002; 
 Borchorst and Siim, 2016; Martinsson et al., 2016). Nonetheless, the four ar-
eas of g ender-equality policy outlined above have been recognized as pivotal 
policy innovations originating in the Nordic countries (Skjeie et al., 2019).
As for Norway, our focus in this chapter, the country has, first, well- 
developed equality legislation, which was primarily home-grown in the 
early period but in recent years has been widened and advanced as an ef-
fect of the integration of EU law and UN frameworks. Although there is 
variation between them, the Nordic countries share clear similarities, with 
Norway and Sweden being the most alike, as their equality legislation, en-
forcement and monitoring have developed in tandem, while Finland and 
then Iceland were latecomers who have subsequently levelled up with the 
other Nordic countries. Generally, Denmark deviates, having the least de-
veloped and most restrictive approach to equality legislation, enforcement 
and monitoring (Borchorst et al., 2012). Still, there are significant limita-
tions in the monitoring and enforcement system in Norway, as well as in 
the other Nordic countries. Second, welfare-state services and benefits that 
enable parents to combine work and family life have contributed to high 
levels of female employment in Norway. Nevertheless, the labour market 
remains relatively gender-segregated, and EU integration has brought to 
the fore new challenges, such as the risk of benefit export and discrepan-
cies between Nordic-style family policy and the EU’s equal-treatment and 
anti- discrimination regime. Third, gender mainstreaming is embraced in 
Norway in theory, but remains largely unenforced in practice. Fourth, 
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and finally, quota arrangements have contributed to high levels of gender 
 balance in political decision-making, while significant gender imbalances 
remain in other societal arenas, not least in the business sector.
Below, we will lay out in more detail these features of Norwegian Nordic- 
style gender-equality policy before providing an assessment of how each 
area is addressed in communications to the outside world.
Equality legislation
Norway was an ‘early achiever’ in terms of legislating against gender-based 
discrimination: As early as in 1978, a comprehensive law on gender equality 
that covered ‘all areas of society’ was passed by the Norwegian parliament. 
This legislative initiative also established the world’s first Gender Equal-
ity Ombud and Gender Equality Tribunal as a low-threshold mechanism.2 
From the outset, Norway’s gender-equality legislation combined bans on 
direct and indirect discrimination with regulations related to proactive ad-
vancement of gender equality. Proactive duties for state agencies and public 
and private employers form a central part of the country’s current equality 
legislation. In addition, over the past two decades, advances in EU law and 
a stronger commitment to complying with UN requirements in the wake of 
the 1995 Beijing Conference have resulted in a significant broadening of le-
gal protection against discrimination in Europe. This development has also 
contributed to significant changes in Norwegian equality legislation (Skjeie 
et al., 2017, 2019). The first Norwegian moves to legislate against discrimi-
nation on the grounds of race, ethnicity or religion were made in the late 
1990s through amendments to the Work Environment Act. Comprehensive 
equality laws aiming to cover not just gender but also racial or ethnic ori-
gin, religion or belief, disability, age and sexual orientation – the EU’s ‘six 
strands’ of anti-discrimination policy (Krizsan et al., 2012) – have had a pro-
found impact on Norwegian gender-equality legislation enacted from 2005 
onward. In relation to sexual orientation, gender identity and gender ex-
pression, comprehensive legislation was passed in 2013. The different legal 
provisions regarding protection against discrimination on various grounds 
were collected together in a new unified equality and anti-discrimination 
act, modelled on the initial gender-equality act, in 2017.
The low-threshold enforcement and monitoring system of the Ombud 
and the Tribunal entails significant limitations, however.3 For instance, 
very few discrimination cases have been taken to court (see Norges offen-
tlige utredninger, 2011; see also Hellum and Blaker Strand, 2017; Ketscher, 
2019). Despite recent amendments to strengthen low-threshold enforcement 
(see Holst, 2020), Norway’s ambitious equality and anti-discrimination leg-
islation has mainly functioned as a symbolic legal statement. Compared 
with broad welfare-state initiatives on public childcare and parental-leave 
schemes, individual and systemic discrimination have received scant atten-
tion in Norway (Skjeie et al., 2017).
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As one might expect, the importance of firm and well-developed gender- 
equality legislation is a key point in the Action Plan (MFA, 2016a). We see 
this clearly in formulations that repeatedly emphasize the rights of ‘girls’ 
and ‘women’s rights’ to ‘autonomy’, ‘freedom’, ‘self-determination’ and ‘em-
powerment’. Rights to gender equality and protection from discrimination 
are framed as basic rights tied directly to international agreements and obli-
gations, such as the UN human rights conventions and the UN Convention 
on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women, the 1995 
Platform for Action at the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing 
and the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals,4 as well as the EU’s Charter 
of Fundamental Rights, anti-discrimination legislation and gender-equality 
programmes (MFA, 2016a: 5–7).
Within the Action Plan, Norway – or a national ‘we’ – is positioned at 
the forefront of these developments. Not only is ‘our work on women’s 
rights… based on international human rights obligations’ (MFA, 2016a: 5), 
but Norway’s membership in international organizations in which women’s 
and human rights are promoted and developed means that these are also 
central arenas where ‘we… contribute to international gender equality ef-
forts’, channel ‘our gender equality and non-discrimination efforts’ (MFA, 
2016a: 7), and in different ways ‘mobilize’ for gender equality (MFA, 2016a: 
12). The foreign minister’s presentation of Norway’s international role in his 
speech at the launch of the Action Plan gives a parallel impression: ‘When it 
comes to gender equality,’ he states, ‘Norway is a superpower’ and a ‘global 
leader’.5 In her CSW statement, the minister of children and equality does 
the same by positioning Norway both as a country where ‘women are given 
the same opportunities as men’ and as a ‘prosperous and gender equal coun-
try’. Norway’s achievements are then contrasted with the situation in many 
other countries, where existing legislation does not respect gender equality 
and the need for protection against discrimination. The Action Plan, for 
example, takes up how ‘formal discrimination in national legislation is still 
widespread, particularly in the area of family law, but also in the areas of 
inheritance and property law’ (MFA, 2016a: 8). Similarly, when the foreign 
minister stresses anti-discriminatory equality legislation as a universal re-
quirement for Norway, he comments that ‘we cannot tolerate that religion, 
culture or traditions are used to discriminate against girls and women…. 
Human rights are universal. They apply to all. Everywhere.’6
It should be noted, however, that the references in the branding documents 
to rights and legislation are generic7 and do not identify specific features of 
Norway’s gender-equality legislation. This also means that no references are 
made to those features that have been central to Norwegian legislation, such 
as a concept of discrimination that includes both direct and indirect forms 
of discrimination, the role of proactive duties, and, more recently, the devel-
opment of a broader corpus of anti-discrimination legislation that connects 
gender and other dimensions, such as ethnicity and sexuality. This general 
avoidance of specificity also conceals the enduring problems that we are 
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familiar with in the Norwegian legislative context. These include limited 
implementation and enforcement, which tend to make equality legislation 
symbolic-legal declarations with limited real consequences.
Furthermore, whereas Norway’s role as an international norm entrepre-
neur and norm-pusher in the international arena is mentioned repeatedly, 
the branding documents make no mention of instances where the EU and 
other international judicial frameworks have ‘pushed’ for amendments to 
Norway’s equality legislation. Moreover, as conflicts between international 
gender-equality obligations and national legislation are framed as happen-
ing ‘elsewhere’, incidents in which Norway has been accused of not living 
up to international standards in its own legislation do not enter the picture.
Uncertainty around whether Norway’s family policy is in accordance 
with the EU’s anti-discrimination directive was tried legally in 2019 (Case 
E-1/18). This challenge to Norwegian policy occurred in the wake of the 
Maistrellis case, in which the European Court of Justice ruled that the 
Greek government could not deprive the father of the right to parental-leave 
benefit on the grounds that the child’s mother was not in employment (EUR-
Lex, 2015). Similarly, Norway’s parental-benefit scheme makes the father’s 
entitlement to paid parental leave dependent on the mother being in work or 
education. Such requirements do not apply for the paid parental leave of the 
mother. In the first round of legal assessment, the European Free Trade As-
sociation Surveillance Agency (ESA) found this regulation to be in violation 
of the EU’s equal-treatment directive. However, when Norway appealed the 
decision to the EFTA court, the court dismissed the case, arguing that the 
Norwegian parental-leave benefit scheme falls outside the scope of the di-
rective’s ban on unequal treatment in hiring and working conditions.8
Accordingly, the case of Norway vs. the EFTA court ended in favour of 
Norway’s policy of treating mothers and fathers differently in terms of the 
right to use the parental-leave scheme. However, the controversy brought 
into question the notion of Norway as a ‘global leader’ in gender equality 
and as favouring the ‘same opportunities’ for women and men. Arguably, 
this was rather a case of the EU pushing Norway towards a more progres-
sive stance, not the other way around, and, importantly, we find this even 
in the area of family policies, which have been a key pillar in the Nordic 
societal model (for overviews, see Skevik and Hatland, 2008; Leira, 2002, 
2012; Ellingsæter, 2014).
Work–life balance
Gender-equality-oriented family policies constitute a main sub-area of 
 Norway’s gender-equality policies. Over time, a range of family- and parent- 
friendly services and benefits have been institutionalized in Norway. The 
development of publicly subsidized kindergartens, daycare centres and out-
of-school care has been a priority at least since the 1990s, and Norway is 
currently regarded as having full kindergarten coverage. Paid parental leave 
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has been extended over time, and is now 49 weeks at 100% coverage (or 59 
weeks with 80% coverage), where some weeks are reserved for the mother, 
some for the father, and some are shared. In addition, there are rights for 
parents to unpaid long-term leave to care for newborns and small children, 
a right to paid leave of absence for nursing mothers, and a right to paid leave 
to care for sick children. A set of special benefits for single parents is also in 
place. There is also a universal child-benefit scheme for anyone supporting 
children under the age of 18. In addition, there are tax benefits for fami-
lies and a cash-for-care benefit for parents with children that do not attend 
state-sponsored nurseries (Vollset, 2011).
The outcomes of these policies are high levels of female employment and 
a strong integration of women in higher education and the labour market in 
Norway. Yet, in spite of these important markers of gender-equality success, 
the Norwegian labour market is characterized by high levels of horizontal 
gender segregation – men and women concentrate in different occupations 
and professions – and vertical gender segregation – prevalent male dom-
inance in top positions, which is especially evident in the business sector 
(Reisel, 2019).
Surprisingly, a work–life-balance perspective on the family is relatively 
absent in the Action Plan, with the exception of some background passages.9 
In the sections on family planning and topics such as gender-based violence, 
rape and female genital mutilation (Chapters 4 and 5), the family institution 
is presented primarily as something from which women need protection and 
that needs to be curtailed or avoided.
Strikingly, it is only at one point in the Action Plan that reconciliation 
between family and work is made an explicit topic. This occurs in a passage 
on women’s weaker position in business and industry, where the fact that 
women tend to have ‘a greater workload in the family than men’ is brought 
forward as one of several factors explaining gender inequality.10 The role of 
men as fathers, and their opportunities to balance work and family/father-
hood, is absent from the document. This is striking given the importance 
often assigned to the role of fathers in advancing gender equality for women 
in the family and in working life. It is also striking because so much weight, 
nationally, is put on the need for fathers to have an independent relation-
ship with their own children. However, Norway’s decision to appeal the 
case it lost in the ESA judgement, concerning the right of fathers to access 
the parental-benefit scheme irrespective of the mother’s activity, indicates 
that this concern in the end yields to other, presumably more important 
concerns – in this case, mothers’ employment vs. equal treatment of moth-
ers and fathers.
In line with this almost silencing of issues related to the work–life balance, 
the Action Plan neither reflects nor addresses solutions to the challenges 
faced by women – and men – in relation to combining full participation 
in economic and political life with family life and parenthood, or how to 
even out women’s ‘greater workload’ in unpaid caring and house work. 
160 Cathrine Holst and Mari Teigen
The avoidance of this issue is noteworthy given how the Action Plan gives 
women’s participation in the labour market, in politics and in society in 
general the highest priority, and how other means of increasing female 
 participation  – for example, by ensuring women’s equal economic rights 
and education and supporting women’s organizations in civil society – are 
given substantive treatment (MFA, 2016a: 15–21). Indeed, the complete 
absence from the Action Plan of a work–life-balance approach and a dis-
cussion of the role of family policy of some kind is rather remarkable, par-
ticularly given Norway’s own experiences in these areas and the fact that 
parental- leave schemes, family-friendly public services and publicly subsi-
dized kindergartens are highly regarded in terms of their role in facilitating 
high levels of female employment and women’s political participation in na-
tional policy-making and public debate. Family policies are not addressed 
in the foreign minister’s launch speech nor in the minister of children and 
equality’s CSW statement, which also emphasize the importance of wom-
en’s participation and equal opportunities between women and men, and 
repeatedly mention ‘education’, ‘female entrepreneurship’, ‘economic rights’ 
and ‘access to productive resources’ as instrumental for achieving this, 
while leaving out work–life issues and family policy. In this way, Norway 
promotes itself as a gender-equality leader and equal-opportunities regime, 
while making few references to the women- and family-friendly social poli-
cies that have arguably been key for these achievements.
Gender mainstreaming
Gender mainstreaming has been the official strategy of gender-equality pol-
icy in Norway for 40 years – that is to say, since the adoption of the Gender 
Equality Act in 1978. The mission statement of the Act was ‘to promote 
equality and in particular the position of women’ (§1a). To fulfil this aim, it 
was stated that ‘all public authorities shall facilitate for gender equality in all 
areas of responsibility’ (§1b). Since the late 1990s, the gender-mainstreaming 
strategy also corresponded with a stronger prioritizing of gender-equality 
policy within the EU, including equal-opportunity policies opening for pos-
itive action and institutionalization of gender-sensitive norms and practices 
in public policy more broadly (Hafner-Burton and Pollack, 2002, 2009).
Gender mainstreaming is a challenging approach because it requires that 
all central actors analyse the gender aspects of any policy process. Gender 
mainstreaming in Norway presupposes that equality efforts should be in-
tegrated into the daily work of all authorities, in all decision-making pro-
cesses and by all relevant actors. However, reviews of the implementation of 
mainstreaming activities in national, regional and local public administra-
tion have made clear that such activities are scarce (Norges offentlige utred-
ninger, 2011). Although gender mainstreaming is anchored in the activity 
duty of the Gender Equality Act and in government instructions for policy 
preparation, where an obligation to conduct gender-sensitive consequence 
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analysis has existed since the mid-2000s, there has been no monitoring of 
such written obligations. No comprehensive gender budgeting is in place; 
no systematic assessment of consequences for gender equality in legisla-
tion and policy formulation has been carried out; equality work has mainly 
been geared towards temporality in the form of various action plans on dif-
ferent areas; and there has been little equality expertise available to guide 
equality- eager authorities. In short, there seems to have been a one-eyed 
focus on gender-equality ‘integration’, in parallel with a limited understand-
ing of how effective integration needs separate institutions with sufficient 
resources, capacity and authority to push, plan, guide and monitor.
When we turn to Norway’s conceptualization and promotion of gender 
equality in the international arena, gender mainstreaming appears as a key 
strategy and connects to the emphasis on the UN’s role and UN conventions 
and structures. Concretely, gender mainstreaming is connected to the Bei-
jing Platform For Action and highlighted in the Action Plan as an approach 
that ‘commits governments to integrate a gender perspective into all policies 
and programmes’ (MFA, 2016a: 9).
The Action Plan is quite specific about how the gender-mainstreaming 
approach is to be implemented. It highlights, for example, how Norway will 
seek to ensure that multilateral development banks integrate gender equal-
ity as a systematic concern in their core activities and thus report on female 
job creation and women’s economic rights, especially in precarious areas 
(MFA, 2016a: 20). According to the plan, Norway will ‘promote effective 
implementation of the World Bank’s gender-equality strategy’, integrate 
gender equality in work ‘to advance private-sector development’ (‘for exam-
ple through Norfund’s11 agreements with the companies it has invested in’) 
and promote inclusion of gender-equality concerns in UN organizations, 
such as the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) 
and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) (MFA, 2016a: 20).
At the same time, it is also emphasized that gender mainstreaming is a 
demanding strategy. Gender mainstreaming entails diverse and complex 
questions, and coordination and comprehensive work, along with strategic 
priorities, are necessary to achieve mainstreaming goals.12 What is note-
worthy from the perspective of Norway’s own experiences, however, is, first, 
how gender mainstreaming as a strategy is not highlighted as something 
with longer and deeper roots in Nordic gender-equality policy and legis-
lation. Instead, gender mainstreaming is framed largely as a Beijing 1995 
innovation and as growing out of UN processes. Second, even if it is made 
explicit that gender mainstreaming is a ‘challenging’ strategy, the systematic 
failures of implementation in Norway, a gender-equality ‘superpower’, are 
not mentioned or drawn upon to assist the formulation of lessons learned. 
Illustratively, the lack of separate responsible resource organizations to 
oversee and enforce ‘integration’ – a likely key explanation of Norway’s own 
unimpressive record in this area – is not listed among the obstacles to effec-
tive gender mainstreaming.
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Gender balance in decision-making
Quota policies and preferential-treatment arrangements are a hallmark of 
Norwegian gender-equality policy. Quotas applying to the nomination pro-
cedures of political parties have been sequentially adopted since the late 
1970s; in relation to appointments to public boards and commissions since 
the 1980s and 1990s; and – most famously – for the membership of corporate 
boards since the early 2000s (for an overview, see Skjeie and Teigen, 2012; 
Teigen, 2018). Interestingly, the regulation on gender quotas for corporate 
boards was not included in the Gender Equality Act, but was made part of 
company law, to ensure stricter enforcement. The sanction system specifies 
that a company that does not have a board that is in compliance with the 
legislation will be given several warnings (followed by fines) to allow it to 
correct the matter. If, despite these measures, it fails to comply with the 
legislation, it will then be subject to forced dissolution. This case thus con-
stitutes a clear exception to the general trend of weak enforcement mecha-
nisms in Norwegian equality legislation.
Various forms of preferential-treatment policies have long been in place 
in relation to admissions to higher education and hiring within such institu-
tions, as well as within public administration in general. Yet, in 2003, a case 
before the EFTA court decided against the University of Oslo’s targeted ear-
marking of specific postdoctoral positions. The earmarking arrangement 
was found to violate the European Economic Area agreement as it reserved 
certain positions exclusively for women (Norges offentlige utredninger, 2012: 
498), and the further interpretation of this decision by the Norwegian au-
thorities put new limitations on a hitherto favoured preferential- treatment 
tool of Norwegian gender-equality policy.
Quota policies and preferential treatment have also had varying results 
in terms of ensuring more gender-balanced decision-making. In Norway, 
as in the other Nordic countries, a discrepancy exists between the relatively 
balanced representation of men and women in political decision-making, 
on the one hand, and high levels of vertical gender segregation in the labour 
market, especially in the business sector, on the other (Teigen and Wängn-
erud, 2009; Niskanen, 2011; Teigen et al., 2019).
Women’s participation in central societal arenas is also a key point in 
all the reviewed documents. In accordance with this, the strong under- 
representation of women in political decision-making and governing bodies 
worldwide is presented as a major challenge to gender equality, both in the 
two ministers’ speeches and in the Action Plan.13 In the Action Plan, ‘wom-
en’s political rights and empowerment’ is singled out as a key priority and 
thematic area, and as crucial to ensuring all ‘their democratic freedoms and 
rights’ (MFA, 2016a: 15). Norway will thus ‘engage in normative efforts’ in 
the international arena to foster gender balance in politics, to support actors 
who engage in the process of increasing the presence of women in political 
processes, and to ensure a stronger participation among women in peace 
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processes and negotiations (MFA, 2016a: 15–17). In line with this, the min-
ister of children and equality stresses the importance of ‘gender-balanced 
government’ in the opening passage of her speech at the CSW, while the for-
eign minister emphasizes how ‘power’ is crucial for gender equality ‘because 
we cannot accept that women only constitute 22% of the parliamentarians 
of the world because we cannot accept the glass ceiling that continues to 
exist in many places for women in the private sector’.14
In other words, there is no question that the Norwegian government 
speaks very clearly about the need to achieve gender balance in political 
decision-making. Moreover, in this area, Norway is repeatedly depicted as 
a pioneer country: ‘Just think about how our own society has developed 
because of women’s participation in politics,’ states the foreign minister in 
his Action Plan launch speech,15 before going on to emphasize how Norway 
consistently works for women’s political participation in the international 
arena, during times of war and peace, through the UN and through support 
for human rights activism and social justice.16 On this point, however, there 
is more ambivalence in the CSW statement: ‘Still, even in our prosperous 
and gender-equal country,’ the minister of children and equality notes, ‘men 
dominate positions of power. We see it in finance, law firms, academia, and 
in our main rural industries – fisheries and agriculture. Where power and 
money dominate – men prevail.’ Although this is just one instance, this is a 
reminder of the persistent challenges Norway faces regarding both vertical 
and horizontal gender segregation in the labour market.
Still, what remain consistently silenced both in the speeches and in the 
Action Plan are the policies that have been instrumental in Norway’s ‘pros-
perity’ in this area, and how gender-quota policies specifically have been 
adopted to promote gender balance in decision-making assemblies, from 
parliaments to corporate boards.17
Silencing and voicing patterns revisited
From our outline above, the gender-equality policy promoted internation-
ally by Norway deviates quite substantially from the priorities of the coun-
try’s domestic gender-equality policies. Norway has an advanced equality 
legislation, subscribes to a gender-mainstreaming strategy, and has high 
rates of female employment and relatively high levels of women’s representa-
tion in decision-making bodies. Clearly, some of the aims and instruments 
promoted in the branding documents overlap paths and approaches in 
 gender-equality policy at home. It also makes sense that the Norwegian 
government in these documents highlights Norway’s efforts abroad to sup-
port gender-equality initiatives and the judicial and policy frameworks of 
the UN and other international organizations. Norwegian nation- branding 
also directs attention to the fact that Norway is a high achiever in the 
gender- equality area when compared to many other countries, and it is only 
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to be expected that the government would highlight these credentials for 
international audiences.
It is harder to understand why some of the features of Norwegian gender- 
equality policy that are widely recognized as fundamental, and that in 
research and national policy discussions are considered central to the coun-
try’s high achievements in the gender-equality area (see Skjeie et al., 2019), 
are left out. As we have learned from the branding literature, successful 
nation-branding typically promotes recognized successes and compara-
tive advantages. On this basis, we should expect Norway to boast about 
its policy innovations and well-functioning approaches and instruments 
in gender-equality policy. Why are advantages such as an equality and 
anti- discrimination legislation that emphasizes proactive duties, work–
life balance policies set up to enable the combination of equal parenthood 
and equal labour-market participation, and the contribution made by the 
introduction of electoral quota policies to women’s presence in political 
 decision-making not put forth as major achievements that other countries 
could learn from? It would appear that some of the characteristics of Nor-
wegian gender equality that would seem the most brandable have been left 
conspicuously unbranded.
Existing scholarship on gender equality in Nordic-style national brand-
ing suggests that branding patterns may reflect a toning down of radical 
feminist questioning of gender and sexuality norms that are unpopular and 
controversial among some home audiences. On this point, there may be 
some non-trivial inter-Nordic differences. To our knowledge, all the Nordic 
countries brand themselves as gender-equality promoters to the interna-
tional community. However, whereas Sweden, for example, explicitly brands 
its foreign policy as ‘feminist’, Norway has been reluctant to use that term 
(Skjelsbæk and Tryggestad, 2019). The difference between Norway and Swe-
den accords with a general finding of differences between the Norwegian 
and Swedish gender-equality discourses. The differences between the two 
are harder to detect, however, when it comes to actual policies and gender 
relations (Teigen and Wängnerud, 2009; Teigen and Skjeie, 2017; Goul An-
dersen and Shamshiri-Petersen, 2020). Further, gender-equality policies in 
the Nordic region – family and quota policies and equality legislation – are 
well-known among national audiences, have the characteristics of ‘social 
democracy’ (Holst, 2018) and are not particularly controversial at home. 
National policies to promote improvements in gender equality receive rel-
atively high support across voter segments (Hellevik and Hellevik, 2012; 
Midtbøen and Teigen, 2019). Thus, it is hard to see why there would be a 
need to downplay them and some of their well-known merits to placate do-
mestic audiences and avoid controversy.
Existing studies of gender equality in Norwegian nation-branding also 
point at relationships between branding patterns and distinctive histori-
cal legacies – for example, how Norway over the centuries has been high-
lighted as a forerunner when it comes to women’s participation in political 
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and economic life (Larsen, 2017). Still, it is not clear why this legacy would 
rule out straightforward talk about the policy and legislative prerequisites 
of participatory credentials.
For attempts to understand this omission, we believe postcolonial inter-
ventions in feminist theorizing (Zuckerwise, 2014; see also Martinsson et al., 
2016) can be helpful. One prominent strand of postcolonial feminist cri-
tique has argued that Western feminism and gender-equality ideology has 
 prioritized Western problems above gender and other injustices and devel-
opmental challenges in other regions and cultural contexts. However, also 
an almost opposite pitfall has been highlighted in the claim that Western 
gender-equality proponents have failed or hesitate to recognize that prob-
lem definitions and struggles for gender equality in both non-Western and 
Western contexts may have shared features. In these instances, the underly-
ing conception of the world seems to be that the ‘non-Western’ situation is, 
for one thing, somehow and overall shared, and, second, fundamentally dif-
ferent from the more advanced situation in the West. This worldview is then 
combined with a linear narrative in which ‘they’ are positioned at a ‘less 
developed’ stage, not yet ready to be introduced to ‘our’ more developed 
problems and policy exchanges. These assumptions are all obviously prob-
lematic given the great variation in cultural, social and policy contexts in 
both Western and non-Western parts of the world that result in similarities 
and differences across countries and regions that do not fit easily into any 
simple linear, dichotomous scheme. However, it is a perspective that may 
assist us in illuminating the more puzzling aspects of the branding patterns 
we have identified. Seemingly, it could make sense to leave out even the most 
recognized of policy successes, such as the merits of Nordic-style family 
policy. This may even be the case on occasions where a central rationale is 
to make ‘our nation’ shine, if the fundamental contentions are that these 
successes are not remotely relevant to ‘them’, since their situation and policy 
challenges are of an essentially different and ‘early-stage’ kind.
Conclusion
In this chapter, we have investigated how the branding abroad of four main 
areas of Norwegian gender-equality policy corresponds with – or deviates 
from – our knowledge of policy qualities and effects recognized in research 
and national policy discourse. With some exceptions, we found that Nor-
wegian national experiences regarding policy failures, as well as instances 
where Norway has been at the receiving end of international policy diffu-
sion, are largely put aside. This is not surprising in the light of scholarship 
on national branding that sees ‘good’ branding as emphasizing successes 
while downplaying negative effects. The almost systematic downplaying of 
Norwegian policy achievements in the gender-equality area – from family 
policies to quota arrangements – is harder to make sense of. Inspired by 
postcolonial feminist theory, we suggest that a certain linear narrative that 
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distinguishes between ‘our’ advanced policies and policy problems, on the 
one hand, and ‘their’ less-advanced challenges, on the other, can help us 
illuminate this key aspect of the identified branding patterns.
There are some limits to our study and analysis. For one thing, our ap-
proach would benefit from an analysis of more branding documents and 
an expansion of the range of methods used – to include, for example, inter-
views with relevant governmental staff – which would enable us to check 
the extent and strength of the patterns identified here. Comparative studies 
between the Nordic countries would also be useful.
Still, despite these limitations, we believe the descriptive conclusions that 
we have presented from our research so far deserve attention and follow-up 
studies. They also raise new research questions. There may, for example, be 
feedback loops between how policies are presented and branded to the out-
side world and national policy conceptions (Marklund, 2017).
Competing accounts of the patterns identified in the present study must 
also be considered more closely. First, it could be argued that in this chap-
ter we have placed too high demands on political speeches and generally 
framed action plans of the kind we have been analysing. We find that the 
documents we have studied address the policy and regulatory levels of 
gender- equality politics only in very limited ways, and maybe this is no less 
than we should expect in the type of discourse we have scrutinized. Yet, 
even if the documents we have reviewed have a sketchy approach to policy, 
they touch upon a range of substantive policy references and priorities. It is 
difficult to see how also including references to Norwegian family policy or 
some of the more detailed characteristics of the national equality legislation 
would somehow be discursively ‘impossible’.
Second, differences between policy areas and between the focus of spe-
cific ministries – for example, between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
the Ministry of Children and Equality – may play a role. Yet, our broader 
reading so far suggests that the inter-ministerial differences on this point are 
limited.18 It is also possible that the political colour of the government mat-
ters. Conservative governments, for example, may tend to emphasize female 
entrepreneurship and girls’ equal access to education more than quota and 
family policies. Still, foreign affairs is among the policy fields least charac-
terized by party-political cleavages.
Importantly, it could be argued that some of the branding patterns that 
have puzzled us reflect how criticism from postcolonial feminism and simi-
lar corners has actually been taken on board by Norwegian policy-makers 
and is reflected in their branding strategies. We should not ethnocentrically 
assume that policies that work in the Nordic region – be these parental-leave 
schemes or gender quotas in corporate boards – are realistic, workable op-
tions in other parts of the world. Hence, maybe the omissions we find, for 
example, in the Action Plan are quite sensible given the social and cultural 
situations and policy contexts that are addressed therein.
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Yet it is not obvious that the policies that are listed in plans and empha-
sized in speeches are easier to implement and would work better outside 
the Nordic region (the strategy of gender mainstreaming, mentioned repeat-
edly in the Action Plan, is known to have failed in most contexts so far). 
Considering the recent wide spread of electoral quotas all over the globe 
(Dahlerup, 2006; Krook, 2008) and the international diffusion of work–life 
balance norms, also in UN contexts, we should also be careful to think of 
measures such as quotas and parental-leave schemes as ‘utopic’ proposals 
once we leave the Nordic context.
Notes
 1 This choice of themes obviously leaves out other core areas, such as violence 
against women, gender perspectives on health and equal-pay policies. Still, we 
argue that the four areas on which we focus have been particularly central to 
official gender-equality policy and allegedly Nordic innovations (Skjeie et al., 
2019).
 2 A low threshold implies that it is easy and free to make a complaint about 
discrimination.
 3 The system of enforcement of the equality low threshold means that it is easy 
to make a complaint; however, the system is only able to decide upon whether 
discrimination has occurred and lacks sanction mechanisms.
 4 UN Sustainable Development Goal 5 is to ‘achieve gender equality and empower 
all women and girls’.
 5 ‘Når det kommer til likestilling, er Norge en supermakt.’ ‘Norge er en global 
leder. Vi er i front for jenters rett til utdanning.’
 6 ‘Frihet fordi alle mennesker skal bestemme over eget liv. Likestilling gir frihet 
til både kvinner og menn…. Muligheter fordi alle jenter og kvinner skal kunne 
bruke sine evner. Alle jenter og kvinner skal kunne gi sine fullverdige bidrag til 
samfunnet. Vi kan ikke tolerere at religion, kultur eller tradisjon brukes for å 
diskriminere jenter og kvinner. Dette er kjernen av problemet. Dette må mot-
arbeides uansett hvor det skjer. Menneskerettighetene er universelle. De gjelder 
for alle. Overalt. I FNs bærekraftsmål nummer 5 forplikter vi oss til å oppnå 
likestilling for jenter og kvinner.’
 7 For example, when it is stated that ‘Norway will promote the development of 
non-discriminatory legislation through the UN’s normative processes and sup-
port at country level, [and] compliance with, and implementation of, legislation 
relating to women’s rights’ (MFA, 2016a: 17).
 8 The argument was that the Norwegian parental-leave benefit is not an em-
ployment or working condition in the context of the equal-treatment directive. 
Hence, the activity requirement for the mother is not in violation of the directive. 
For the EFTA decision, see EFTA Court (2019).
 9 For example, in the general introduction to the Action Plan:
The fundamental aim of Norway’s gender equality-efforts is to increase 
the opportunities available to women and girls, promote their right to self- 
determination and further their empowerment…. Norway will help to ensure 
that women gain a stronger position in the family, in the community and in 
the international arena.
(MFA, 2016a: 5)
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 10 ‘Women encounter various obstacles that prevent them from participating in 
business activities and in the labour market in general, and are overrepresented 
among those working under unacceptable conditions. There are political, eco-
nomic, legal, cultural and other structural obstacles to women’s participation 
in the labour market. Women in fragile situations are at particular risk of dis-
crimination and exclusion. Women have less control over the world’s resources 
than men. They also have a greater work load in the family than men, both in 
developed and in developing countries. This means that they compete in the la-
bour market on less advantageous terms than men. In many countries, disparities 
in economic, political and legal rights, and social and cultural obstacles, are the 
greatest barriers to women starting up, running and further developing their own 
businesses. Examples include women’s lack of property rights and restrictions on 
women’s access to bank accounts. This means that the transition from the infor-
mal to the formal sector is often time-consuming’ (MFA, 2016a: 18).
 11 Norfund is an investment company owned by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
 12 ‘Experience shows that mainstreaming the gender perspective is challenging. 
The approach to this work has not been strategic enough. In addition to the pri-
ority areas set out in the Action Plan, the Ministry will identify specific areas for 
active mainstreaming of gender equality and women’s empowerment. In other 
areas, we will carry out risk assessments of projects to ensure that they do not 
have any negative consequences for gender equality and women’s empowerment. 
These steps are necessary in order to concentrate our efforts and ensure that 
they produce results’ (MFA, 2016a: 31).
 13 However, ‘a slight increase in the number of women members of parliament’ is 
recognized: ‘The figure today is 23% compared with 12% in 1995.’
 14 ‘Makt fordi vi ikke kan akseptere at kvinner kun utgjør 22 prosent av verdens 
parlamentarikere, fordi vi ikke kan akseptere at glasstaket fortsatt er intakt 
mange steder for kvinner i privat sektor.’
 15 ‘Det andre området i planen er kvinners politiske deltakelse. Det å ha en stemme 
til å påvirke beslutninger er essensielt. Tenk bare på hvordan vårt eget norske 
samfunn har utviklet seg på grunn av kvinners deltakelse i politikken.’
 16 ‘Norge arbeider for kvinners politiske deltakelse, i situasjoner med krig og konf-
likt, så vel som i fred og utvikling…. Vi vil fortsette å ta dette opp i FN. Vi vil 
fortsette å støtte menneskerettighetsforsvarere som står i fremste linje i kampen 
mot urett.’
 17 Gender quotas have also gained a prominent position internationally as a way 
of regulating gender balance in political decision-making and corporate boards 
(Hughes et al., 2017; Piscopo and Clark Muntean, 2018; see also International 
IDEA, n.d.), and are an important factor in the increase in women’s presence in 
politics in many countries. Interestingly, the latter is highlighted in the Action 
Plan, but not connected to the significance of quota measures.
 18 Consider, for example, Minister of Children and Equality Solveig Horne’s speech 
at the She Decides conference in Brussels, 2017, where the persistent challenges 
of gender segregation in Norway were left unmentioned.
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In the 1970s, the Nordic countries were among the first in the world to pass 
general laws that prohibited gender discrimination and sought to promote 
gender equality. They also played an active role in the drafting of UN gender 
policies and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimina-
tion Against Women (CEDAW), which was enacted by the UN General As-
sembly in 1979. These legal achievements feature in the Nordic success story 
regarding gender equality in fields like politics, work, education and family 
life, both at home and abroad (see more about this development in Chapter 8 
of this volume by Holst and Teigen). They are also central elements in the 
image of a Nordic gender-equality model, which is associated with strong 
state feminism1 accompanied by laws and policies that promote substantive 
equality in all areas. Gender-equality and anti-discrimination legal frame-
works could thus have been part of a strong women-friendly regional brand.
It is therefore puzzling that, in many respects, the Nordic countries’ 
equality and anti-discrimination laws and policies are lagging behind the 
dynamic developments that are taking place in international equality and 
anti-discrimination law, particularly CEDAW and European Union law 
(Nielsen, 2012; Hellum, 2013; Nousiainen and Pentikäinen, 2013; Svensson 
and Gunnarsson, 2018). The Nordic states’ argument that legislation that 
would have the effect of making CEDAW and other conventions apply di-
rectly in national law would skew the balance between the judiciary and 
the parliament and as such undermine representative democracy has been 
termed the Nordic human rights paradox (Føllesdal and Wind, 2009; Skjeie, 
2009; Langford and Schaffer, 2013; Bailliet, 2016). This argument can be 
seen as a breach with being international heavyweights on gender equality.
Since the 1980s, and through the increased internationalization and Euro-
peanization of equality and anti-discrimination laws and policies, the image 
of Nordic gender-equality exceptionalism has been increasingly challenged. 
In a context where 189 states have ratified CEDAW, gender equality has be-
come a legal principle to which most states ascribe. Yet, whereas they were 
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among the first to initiate and ratify CEDAW, the Nordic countries have in 
later years resisted the CEDAW Committee’s call for legislation that ensures 
that the Convention applies directly in national law and takes precedence 
when coming into conflict with national law. This chapter will describe this 
development by outlining how different images and legal representations of 
gender equality have travelled back and forth between the Nordic countries 
and the UN from the 1970s to the present, and what this might entail for 
branding the countries and region as champions of gender equality.
The empirical starting point is an examination of the CEDAW Commit-
tee’s responses to the periodic state reports of Nordic countries. The overall 
focus is on contestations regarding the relationship between CEDAW and 
these Nordic countries’ gender-equality and anti-discrimination laws. An 
in-depth study of how Norway has responded to critical comments from 
the CEDAW Committee is supplemented with an analysis of responses from 
Sweden, Denmark and Finland. The chapter shows how the homecom-
ing of international equality and anti-discrimination standards that these 
countries support at the international level is often met with resistance at 
the national level. There is a mismatch between the image as gender-equal 
champions at home and the international critique of national law. A com-
parison between these Nordic countries’ responses to the CEDAW Com-
mittee’s critique shows that, unlike the other countries, Norway has to some 
extent changed its equality and anti-discrimination laws to bring them into 
line with the Committee’s recommendations. An examination of public de-
bates in Norway regarding the status of CEDAW in Norwegian law suggests 
that Norway’s reputation as an international champion of women’s rights 
and human rights is a factor that influences law and policy-making. Bring-
ing the country’s actions in line with the brand as a superpower on gender 
equality is seen as a factor that may have influenced this motivation.
The trajectory of anti-discrimination law in the 
Nordic countries
The Nordic countries’ enactment of general gender-equality and anti- 
discrimination laws in the 1970s and 1980s signalled the start of a strate-
gic shift from specific and programme-based to general and rights-based 
gender- equality strategies.2 Until that time, gender equality had been pro-
moted through a combination of piecemeal abolition of laws and policies 
that constituted formal discrimination against women and political meas-
ures. A characteristic feature of the Nordic countries’ approach to equality 
was the use of corporative agreements and programmes that involved the 
state, labour unions and women’s organizations.
While all of the Nordic countries have had gender-equality and anti- 
discrimination laws in place since the 1980s, the histories, legal and political 
origins, designs and enforcement systems of their various legal frameworks 
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vary. Combining both gender-neutralized and gender-specific elements, the 
1978 Norwegian Gender Equality Act set out to promote gender equality 
and improve the position of women. In 2017, it was replaced by a single 
law, the Equality and Anti-Discrimination Act, that covered discrimina-
tion on grounds that included gender, sexual orientation, gender identity, 
pregnancy, care, ethnicity, disability and combinations of these factors – 
so-called intersectional discrimination. The new act, which also combines 
both gender-neutralized and gender-specific elements, sets out to improve 
the position of women, minorities and people with disabilities. The Swedish 
Sex Equality Act of 1980 was replaced in 2009 by a single law, the Discrimi-
nation Act, that covered seven grounds of discrimination, but not combina-
tions of these grounds.
Unlike Norway and Sweden, Finland and Denmark have maintained 
separate gender-equality acts. Finland’s 1986 Act on Equality between 
Women and Men was a direct result of the country’s ratification of CEDAW. 
A gender- neutralized act, however, was seen as the most appropriate means 
of promoting gender equality. In Denmark, the 1975 Act on Equal Pay and 
the 1978 Act on Equal Treatment in the Labour Market were the first acts 
that prohibited gender discrimination. In 2006, these two acts were merged 
into a single Act on Equal Treatment in the Labour Market. This was in 
2009 replaced by the Equal Rights Act, which also applies in areas outside 
the labour market. Neither the Finnish nor the Danish acts provide protec-
tion against intersectional discrimination.
Through their inputs to the preamble to the Convention on the Elimina-
tion of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, the Nordic countries 
promoted the ideal of a family model where men and women worked outside 
the home and shared responsibilities for care and housework at home. In-
deed, Sweden prompted the inclusion of the 14th paragraph of the preamble, 
according to which the states parties to the Convention declare that they 
are ‘aware that a change in the traditional role of men as well as the role of 
women in society and in the family is needed to achieve full equality be-
tween men and women’ (Rehof, 1993: 40). This formulation was influenced 
by Swedish sociologist, politician and diplomat Alva Myrdahl and her ef-
forts to work for both Swedish and international reforms where individual 
liberty (especially for women) went hand in hand with shared responsibility 
for children both between the parents as well as between the family and the 
community. Denmark, Finland and Norway followed Sweden and shared 
the aim of emphasizing the importance of ‘the role of both parents in the 
family and the upbringing of children’ embedded in the 14th paragraph of 
the preamble. Sweden stated that ‘true equality between men and women 
could not be introduced by means of measures dealing exclusively with 
women: some measures aiming to bring about changes in the traditional 
role of men would be required’ (Rehof, 1993: 56). The Nordic countries 
thus supplemented the gender-specific prohibition against discrimination 
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‘against women’ in Article 1 of CEDAW with a gender-neutralized and sym-
metric conception of equality.
Critiquing the champions
Since ratifying CEDAW, the Nordic countries have regularly submitted pe-
riodic state reports to the CEDAW Committee that monitors states’ compli-
ance with the Convention (Byrnes, 2012; Hellum and Ikdahl, 2019). These 
reports describe the progress of their efforts to respect, promote and ful-
fil the rights of women to substantive equality and protection against all 
forms of discrimination. The CEDAW Committee reviews these reports 
and issues concluding observations, which form an assessment of the states’ 
performance.
In its concluding observations on the reports from the four Nordic coun-
tries, the CEDAW Committee has expressed similar types of critiques re-
garding the shortcomings of the gender equality and anti-discrimination 
laws of each country. Below, we will take a closer look at three sets of crit-
icisms that have set off controversies about the role of CEDAW in Nordic 
law. These controversies provide a window into changing external and inter-
nal gender images and the representation of gender equality as a hallmark 
of the Nordic states in general, and of Norway in particular.
The first set of contestations derive from the CEDAW Committee’s re-
quirement that states parties to the Convention facilitate the independent 
participation of women’s rights organizations in the state reporting pro-
cedure. While the Nordic countries, through the provision of development 
aid, have provided economic support to enable women’s rights organiza-
tions in the global South to participate in the state reporting procedure, 
such support was not given to Nordic women’s organizations. This prac-
tice shows how CEDAW was initially viewed by the Nordic states as a 
tool to promote women’s rights in the global South and not in the Nordic 
countries.
The second controversy derives from the CEDAW Committee’s call for 
constitutional and statutory measures to ensure that the Convention takes 
precedence over national laws that come into conflict with the principle of 
gender equality expressed in the Convention. National resistance to this re-
quirement epitomizes tensions between the Nordic image of gender equal-
ity as an overall national value and political and legal traditions based on 
strong state prerogatives and popular majoritarian democracy.
The third controversy illustrates the tense relationship between, on the 
one hand, the CEDAW Committee’s call for gender-specific and intersec-
tional equality and anti-discrimination laws and, on the other, the Nordic 
countries’ strong emphasis on gender-neutralized and one-dimensional 
equality and anti-discrimination laws, as well as policies that are premised 
on the sociocultural notion of sameness.
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The first controversy: why does civil society’s ability to hold 
states accountable matter more in the South than in the North?
The CEDAW Committee, like other human rights treaty bodies, requires 
that the states parties to the Convention facilitate the independent partic-
ipation of national human rights institutions and civil society in the state 
reporting procedure. The CEDAW Committee has paid particular atten-
tion to the states parties’ duty to include women’s rights organizations. 
The aim of this requirement is to promote state accountability through a 
balanced procedure whereby civil society – particularly women’s organi-
zations from all parts of the world – has access to international law. In-
itially, as a part of their international gender policies, the Nordic states 
provided economic support to women’s rights organizations in what were 
termed third world countries so that they could participate in the CEDAW 
Committee’s scrutiny of their states’ reports. In the Nordic countries, with 
their imagined gender equality, such support was not provided. This was 
due partly to the fact that CEDAW was viewed by Nordic policy-makers 
as a tool for women’s development in the third world and partly to the 
state-feminist approach to equality, with its blurred boundaries between 
state and civil society.
Since the 1980s, CEDAW has constituted the backbone of the Nordic 
countries’ rights-based international gender policies. While Denmark has 
been criticized by the CEDAW Committee for its lack of attention to CE-
DAW’s role in development policies. Norway, Finland and Sweden have 
been commended for their promotion of women’s human rights in their de-
velopment cooperation activities.3 Initially, the Nordic countries saw lack 
of state transparency and accountability as a phenomenon that stood in the 
way of gender equality in third world countries. Supporting the competence 
of women in the third world to write independent shadow reports and par-
ticipate in the state reporting process was thus a central part of Finland, 
Sweden and Norway’s international gender-equality policies. An example 
is the 2007 Action Plan for Women’s Rights and Gender Equality in De-
velopment Cooperation (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norway, 2007). Like 
the earlier Strategy for Women and Gender and Equality in Development 
Cooperation (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norway, 1997), it was anchored 
in CEDAW. In the Foreword to the Action Plan, Minister of Development 
Erik Solheim stated that
The Government wants Norway to be a fearless champion of women’s 
rights and gender equality. Accordingly, the rights, participation and 
influence of women will be at the core of Norway’s development cooper-
ation efforts. Our aim is to ensure the realization of the rights of women 
that are set out in international human rights conventions.
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norway, 2007: 7)
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The Action Plan saw human rights and democracy as mutually constitutive
It stated that Norway would use the CEDAW Committee’s concluding ob
servations on Norway’s partner countries in development cooperation a
the point of departure for dialogue and priority-setting. Civil society, par
ticularly women’s organizations, was identified as a key actor in develop
ment and democracy-building. By providing economic support to enhanc
the competence and capacity of women’s organizations to write independ
ent shadow reports and participate in CEDAW’s state reporting procedure
the Action Plan set out to promote democracy in terms of accountabilit
vis-à-vis national authorities.
The state reporting procedures in the Nordic countries were for a long 
time a different ball game. Initially, women’s organizations were not given 
an opportunity to present independent reports but were consulted as part of 
the preparation of the state report. This state-feminist approach, character-
ized by a blurring of the boundaries between state and civil society, did not 
sit well with the CEDAW Committee’s call for independent NGO participa-
tion. It also differed from the approach favoured within the international 
gender policy of the Nordic countries where independent NGO reporting 
was actively promoted.
The Norwegian case study shows how democratic flaws in the state
feminist policy were challenged by the CEDAW Committee, which insiste
that Norwegian women’s rights organizations be given economic suppor
to write independent shadow reports and participate in the proceeding
(Hellum, 2013: 604).4 An in-depth study of the participation of Norwegia
women’s organizations in the CEDAW reporting process between 198
and 2008 reveals that that the participation of nongovernmental women’
organizations in these processes was severely limited (Halsaa and Thun
2010). The study also shows that, for the most part, comments from th
women’s organizations were not included as separate attachments to th
state’s CEDAW report but were incorporated within the report withou
any specific reference being made to the statements made by the actua
organizations.5 In 2007, Norwegian women’s organizations wrote their firs
shadow report to the CEDAW committee without state funding.6 Owin
to this lack of funding, however, the women’s organizations were unabl
to present their shadow report in the Committee’s preparatory meetin
in New York. The Norwegian shadow report was thus presented to th
Committee by the Malaysian representative of the international networ
International Women’s Rights Action Watch (IWRAW). In its concludin
comments on Norway’s seventh periodic report, the CEDAW Committe
took notice of ‘the absence of Norwegian NGOs at the session, apparentl
for lack of funding’.7 In 2011, for the first time, 32 women’s organization
coordinated by the NGO FOKUS received funding from the Ministry o
Family and Equality to produce and present an NGO shadow report to th
CEDAW Committee. In its concluding comments on Norway’s eighth pe
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support of women’s organizations (NGOs) for the finalization of a shadow 
report and for travelling expenses to both the pre-session working group 
and the session’.8
The Norwegian case reveals the disjuncture between the country’s na-
tional and international gender policies. It suggests that the Norwegian 
state’s self-image as a pioneer of gender equality stood in the way of critical 
scrutiny of democratic flaws in the existing state-feminist policy according 
to which women’s organizations were regarded as an integrated part of a 
corporate political culture. Rather than seeing Norway as exceptional in 
the light of its high score on global gender indexes, the CEDAW Committee 
insisted that Norway follow the same standards for Norwegian women’s or-
ganizations as it did for third world women in relation to the right to inde-
pendent access to international law. The fact that the CEDAW Committee 
saw the state-feminist approach as depriving Norwegian women’s organ-
izations of the right to independent democratic participation drew the at-
tention of international women’s rights organizations such as the IWRAW. 
Such negative international attention was a factor that motivated Norway to 
change its practice in order to reassert its reputation as a promoter of gender 
equality at home and abroad.
The second controversy: why do the Nordic states resist 
incorporation of CEDAW into national law?
Through their ratification of CEDAW and other human rights instruments, 
all of the Nordic states have agreed to implement international standards 
of gender equality and non-discrimination in national law. Human rights 
principles such as the rights to equality, self-determination, integrity and 
dignity are values that are shared by different political parties, different 
civil society organizations, different branches of government and different 
schools of jurisprudence in the Nordic region. It is therefore a puzzle that 
most of the Nordic countries have resisted the CEDAW Committee’s call to 
incorporate CEDAW into their domestic legal systems to make it directly 
applicable in national law. The reluctance of Sweden, Denmark and Nor-
way to make CEDAW directly applicable in national law speaks to the am-
biguous and contested relationship between gender equality and national 
identity in those countries. The Norwegian controversy over incorporation, 
however, shows how women’s rights organizations and independent human 
rights institutions can use CEDAW’s state reporting procedure as a means 
of accountability in ways that may result in change.
Article 2 of CEDAW requires all state parties to incorporate the Con-
vention into their domestic legal systems to secure the enforceability of its 
provisions at the national level. In General Recommendation 28, the Com-
mittee urges ‘those States parties in which the Convention does not form 
part of the domestic legal order to consider incorporation of the Conven-
tion to render it part of domestic law, for example through a general law on 
180 Anne Hellum
equality, in order to facilitate the full realization of Convention rights as 
required by article 2’.
In its reviews of state reports from Sweden, Denmark and Norway, the 
Committee has repeatedly concluded that these countries have failed to en-
sure that the Convention prevails over national law. Finland’s Constitution, 
which, unlike the constitutions of the other Nordic countries, states that 
binding human rights conventions apply directly in national law, is unprob-
lematic.9 In its concluding comments on Sweden’s seventh periodic report, 
which was followed up by a combined eighth and ninth report, the CEDAW 
Committee expressed concern that
the provisions of the Convention, even though largely respected, have 
not yet been fully incorporated into the domestic legal system of the 
State party and, as a result, are not directly applicable in the national 
courts.10
In its concluding comments on Denmark’s reports, the CEDAW Committee 
has repeatedly called for legal measures that ensure the full incorporation of 
CEDAW within national law.11 In its concluding comments on the country’s 
eighth periodic report, the Committee expressed regret that
notwithstanding its previous recommendation (CEDAW/C/DEN/CO/7, 
para. 15), the State party decided in October 2014 not to incorporate 
the Convention into its national legal order. In that regard, the Com-
mittee is concerned that the State party’s Supreme Court has ruled that 
nonincorporated treaties do not have the same status in national law as 
incorporated treaties.12
In its consideration of Norway’s fifth and sixth periodic reports in 2003,13 
the CEDAW Committee expressed concern that CEDAW had not been in-
corporated into Norway’s Human Rights Act and recommended that the 
act be revised to incorporate CEDAW. This recommendation, which was 
not followed up by the Norwegian state, was reiterated by the Committee in 
its concluding comments on Norway’s eighth periodic report.14
The Nordic countries have responded in different ways to the CEDAW 
Committee’s call for incorporation. Denmark’s wholesale rejection is nota-
ble, while Sweden has expressed a political will during dialogue to address 
the remaining gaps in its incorporation of CEDAW’s provisions within na-
tional law.15 Unlike these countries, after ten years of resistance, Norway de-
cided to follow the CEDAW Committee’s call for incorporation of CEDAW 
into national law. On 19 June 2009, almost 30 years after Norway’s ratifica-
tion of CEDAW, the Women’s Convention and the Optional Protocol to the 
Convention were incorporated into Norway’s Human Rights Act. Accord-
ing to Article 2 of that act, in cases of conflict between the Human Rights 
Act and other provisions of Norwegian law, the former takes precedence.
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In order to understand the process whereby incorporation of CEDAW was 
promoted, resisted and finally adopted by the Norwegian state, I will take a 
closer look at the different legal narratives that were invoked by various state 
and non-state actors at different stages of the debate over the issue, which 
lasted for ten years. These legal narratives highlight the different imaginaries 
about the relationships between gender, national law and international law 
that underlie national legal cultures and subcultures. The concept of a na-
tional legal culture refers to ideals that are shared by different state and non-
state actors. A broadly agreed notion is that human rights principles such 
as equality, freedom, dignity and integrity are cornerstones of national law. 
The concept of national legal subcultures refers to different understandings 
among legal scholars or branches of state administration of how interna-
tional law should be interpreted and applied at the national level.
The first integration controversy was about national hierarches of laws. 
It began with the enactment of the Human Rights Act in 1999, according 
to which three international conventions would take precedence in the 
event of conflict between those conventions and other provisions of Nor-
wegian law. These were the European Convention on Human Rights, the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.16 The decision of the 
social- democratic Stoltenberg I government to exclude CEDAW, the Con-
vention on the Rights of the Child and the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination from the Human Rights 
Act gave rise to a fierce debate. This debate was centred around two strands 
of arguments that constituted different legal subcultures within the national 
legal culture. State institutions like the Ministry of Justice and the state legal 
counsel argued that only the ‘main’ conventions were suitable for incorpo-
ration. CEDAW and other ‘specialist’ conventions were deemed unsuitable. 
They referred to the Human Rights Law Commission, which had introduced 
a distinction between ‘main conventions’ and ‘special conventions’ in 1993 
(Norges offentlige utredninger, 1993). In this way, they invented a national 
human rights hierarchy within which, owing to their ‘specialist’ character, 
CEDAW, the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination were 
ranked lower than the ‘main conventions’.
This position was criticized by state and non-state actors who argued 
that all human rights were equal and that, by excluding CEDAW, the Hu-
man Rights Act established a gendered human rights hierarchy that was in 
conflict with Norway’s international reputation as a promoter of women’s 
rights at home and abroad. When the Human Rights Act was passed in 
1999, a majority in the Norwegian parliament requested that the Stoltenberg 
I government incorporate CEDAW and the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child into Norwegian law ‘within reasonable time’.17 Most state institutions 
and independent national human rights institutions such as the Ministry of 
Education, the Ministry of Children and Family, the Ministry of Foreign 
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Affairs and the Gender Equality Ombud shared the view that, since wom-
en’s rights and gender equality were core principles both in international 
and in Norwegian law, CEDAW should be incorporated. In spite of this, 
the Christian Democratic coalition government (Bondevik I) that replaced 
the Stoltenberg I government lent its ear to the Ministry of Justice and the 
state legal counsel. These actors were of the view that incorporation of CE-
DAW and other conventions in the Human Rights Act would undermine 
Norway’s existing legal culture, which was founded on values such as clar-
ity and predictability. The use of metaphors that associated CEDAW with 
specificity, inferiority, chaos and indecisiveness, as opposed to the clear and 
general character of the main conventions, speaks to the gendered char-
acter of the dominant national legal culture that on the surface appeared 
gender-neutral.
The second aspect of the integration controversy turned on notions of de-
mocracy. In 2003, in its review of Norway’s fifth and sixth periodic reports, 
the CEDAW Committee noted that CEDAW had not been incorporated 
into the Human Rights Act and recommended that
the State party amend section 2 of the Human Rights Act (1999) to in-
clude the Convention and its Optional Protocol, which will ensure that 
the provisions of the Convention prevail over any conflicting statutes 
and that its provisions can be invoked in domestic courts.18
The same year, a new argument in the controversy was introduced in the 
report of the Power and Democracy Commission (Norges offentlige utred-
ninger, 2003). The overall concern of the majority in the Commission was 
that the growing number of international treaties ratified by the Norwegian 
state curtailed parliamentary democracy. The minority in the Commission, 
however, argued that international human rights instruments like CEDAW 
constituted a tool for a fairer distribution of power and resources between 
women and men and, as such, a means of achieving greater democracy 
(Skjeie, 2003).
The arguments and concerns articulated by the majority in the Commis-
sion became a powerful tool in the hands of the Ministry of Justice and the 
state legal counsel. They argued that incorporation of CEDAW into the Hu-
man Rights Act would skew the balance between the judiciary and the par-
liament and accordingly undermine representative democracy. On the basis 
of advice from these state actors, the Christian Democratic coalition gov-
ernment (Bondevik II) concluded that the rule of precedence, embedded in 
the Human Rights Act, should in future be restricted to very special cases in 
relation to incorporation of international conventions:
In the light of certain international bodies’ dynamic interpretation of 
international law – going in directions beyond the scope of what the leg-
islative branch of government at the time of incorporation reasonably 
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could foresee – there is ample reason to emphasize the need to be as 
consistent as possible in relation to the incorporation of international 
treaties that have a binding effect. The government is of the view that 
rules giving international law precedence in the event of conflict with 
other Norwegian law should be used restrictively.19
The law and democracy argument breathed new life into the national hierar-
chy argument that had been rejected by the Norwegian parliament in 1999. 
Faced with a threat to national popular democracy, the Bondevik II gov-
ernment concluded that it was of the utmost importance to uphold the legal 
boundary between international and national law. The Ministry of Children 
and Equality therefore proposed that CEDAW should be incorporated into 
the Gender Equality Act and not be given precedence in the event of conflict 
with other provisions of Norwegian law.20 This proposal was met with criti-
cism from actors like the Gender Equality Ombud, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, the Norwegian Centre for Human Rights, the Institute of Women’s 
Law and women’s organizations. These actors were of the view that incor-
poration of CEDAW into the Human Rights Act would strengthen the po-
sition of women in law and society, and accordingly strengthen democracy. 
The Bondevik II government’s proposal was approved by a Conservative 
majority in the Norwegian parliament in 2005, but was opposed by Labour, 
the Socialist Left Party and the Centre Party.
The third integration controversy was about national status. Could the re-
sistance of the Norwegian state to putting CEDAW on an equal footing with 
other conventions affect its legitimacy as an internationally acclaimed wom-
en’s rights champion? This question was invoked by non-state actors that 
included women’s rights organizations and experts in the fields of women’s, 
gender and equal rights studies who were in favour of incorporation.
A key concern in this debate was how the state’s resistance to incorpora-
tion of CEDAW undermined Norway’s efforts to be ‘a fearless champion of 
women’s rights and gender equality’, as the 2007 Action Plan for Women’s 
Rights and Gender Equality in Development Cooperation put it (Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, Norway, 2007: 7). The legitimacy argument was directed 
at the announcement by the centre-left coalition government (Stoltenberg 
II) that, to protect national democracy, it needed to reconsider its political 
promise to incorporate CEDAW into the Human Rights Act.21 The gov-
ernment was publicly asked how its changed position would affect its legit-
imacy as a ‘champion of human rights’. The disjuncture between CEDAW’s 
low status in national law and the way in which Norway ‘branded’ itself as 
a champion of women’s human rights on the international scene was thus 
brought to the public’s attention, in part through a debate between the au-
thor and the Minister of Justice.22 In spring 2009, the Ministry of Justice 
and the government legal counsel were publicly criticized for their political 
resistance and lack of loyalty to the policy of the Stoltenberg II government 
regarding the incorporation of CEDAW in national law (see Andenæs, 2008; 
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Hellum, 2008; Hellum et al., 2009). As a result, the government changed its 
position, and the Ministry of Justice sent out a White Paper recommending 
incorporation of CEDAW into the Human Rights Act, which was approved 
by the parliament.23 In his address to the Norwegian parliament, while af-
firming the centrality of the principle of gender equality as a national value, 
the minister of justice emphasized that this was the very last convention that 
would ever be incorporated into the Human Rights Act.24
These three aspects of the controversy over CEDAW’s incorporation into 
national law speak to the tense relationship between the Norwegian state’s 
identity as an international champion of women’s human rights and the 
perception of international law as a threat to an ‘imagined community’ of 
original Nordic ethnicity. They show how a strong protection of women’s 
human rights can coexist with a weaker protection of other groups, such 
as people with disabilities or ethnic minorities. A puzzle in this regard is 
how the internationalization of women’s rights and gender equality, on the 
one hand, blurs the boundaries between Nordic and international law and, 
on the other, evokes nationalist feelings according to which CEDAW and 
other human rights conventions are perceived as an external threat to the 
imagined community of ethnic Nordic gender equality (Kantola and Nousi-
ainen, 2009). This tension between changing laws and sociocultural percep-
tions suggests that the notion of gender equality in the Nordic countries in 
practice is premised on the notion that sameness between women and men 
and between majority and minority groups is necessary if different groups 
are to get along (Gullestad, 2001; Hellum, 2011).
The third controversy: why are the Nordic countries resisting 
the CEDAW Committee’s call for gender-specific anti-
discrimination laws?
Another contested issue is whether equality and anti-discrimination laws 
in the Nordic countries should be moulded on a gender-neutralized or a 
gender-specific legal design. A related issue is whether gender as a ground 
for discrimination should be constructed on the basis of a single identity 
or include protection against discrimination that is a result of interplay 
between gender and other grounds, such as ethnicity, sexual orientation, 
disability or age – so-called intersectional discrimination. CEDAW is a 
gender- specific convention that, according to Article 1, prohibits ‘all forms 
of discrimination against women’. The CEDAW Committee, in its review 
of state reports, emphasizes that a gender-specific legal guarantee is neces-
sary for combating the asymmetrical character of gender relations (Byrnes, 
2012; Hellum and Ikdahl, 2019). Recognizing that discrimination of women 
on the basis of sex and gender is inextricably linked with other factors that 
affect women, such as race, ethnicity, religion or belief, health, status, age, 
class, caste, sexual orientation and gender identity, the CEDAW Committee 
also calls for legal protection against intersectional discrimination. In the 
following, I will explore tensions and conflicts between the Committee’s call 
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for gender-specific legislation that provides protection against intersectional 
discrimination and existing images and legal representation of gender in the 
Nordic countries.
The gender-neutralized design of most Nordic gender-equality and anti- 
discrimination legislation is premised on the view that gender equality is 
a matter of changing the roles of both women and men. To showcase this 
position, the Nordic states have over the last 15 years systematically selected 
male candidates to serve on the CEDAW Committee, the majority of whose 
members are female gender experts. As a result, the candidature of more 
competent female candidates has not been considered (Bailliet, 2016).
There are, however, tensions between this seemingly gender-neutralized 
and symmetric position and the CEDAW Committee’s emphasis on the need 
to strengthen the position of women in order to achieve substantive equality.
In its review of the Nordic state reports, the Committee has emphasized 
the need for legislation that recognizes the skewed distribution of power and 
resources between women and men. Such concerns were expressed in the 
Committee’s concluding comments on Denmark’s eighth25and Finland’s 
fifth and sixth periodic reports.26 In its comments on Sweden’s combined 
eighth and ninth periodic reports, the Committee clearly stated that it did 
not agree with Sweden’s view that a gender-neutralized and single discrimi-
nation act was the best way of addressing gender discrimination. The Com-
mittee recommended that
the State party should also evaluate and, if necessary, revise the scope 
of protection of its Discrimination Act in order to ensure that it con-
tains a definition of discrimination against women in accordance with 
article 1 of the Convention, covering inter alia, intersecting forms of 
discrimination.27
Another recurrent critique from the CEDAW Committee is that the one- 
dimensional conception of gender discrimination that is prevalent in the 
Nordic gender-equality and anti-discrimination legislation is unsuited to 
addressing the discrimination challenges posed by increasing sociocultural 
diversity and transnationalism.28 In its consideration of Finland’s sixth pe-
riodic report, the Committee stated that
the Gender Equality Act and the Non-Discrimination Act do not cur-
rently provide adequate protection to women against multiple or inter-
secting forms of discrimination.29
In line with this, the Committee urged the Finnish state to
ensure that reforms explicitly affording protection to women against 
multiple or intersecting forms of discrimination in all national gender 
equality and anti-discrimination laws are adopted in a harmonised 
manner.30
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Unlike Sweden, Finland and Denmark, Norway has to some extent taken 
into consideration the CEDAW Committee’s recommendations regarding 
the need for a gender-specific act that provides protection against intersec-
tional discrimination. Norway’s 2017 Equality and Anti-Discrimination 
Act replaces the Gender Equality Act of 2013. It is a single act that merges 
four specific anti-discrimination laws into one general equality and anti- 
discrimination act. The reform process, which was subject to several inter-
ventions by the CEDAW Committee, sparked off a series of controversies 
regarding the construction of gender equality and gender discrimination. 
The outcome of the process was an act whose aim was in line with CEDAW’s 
call for a gender-specific legal guarantee. According to Article 1 of the 2017 
Equality and Anti-Discrimination Act: ‘This Act has the particular objective 
of improving the position of women and minorities.’ Furthermore, Article 6 
of the act provides protection against intersectional discrimination. The pro-
hibition against discrimination in Article 6 includes discrimination on the 
basis of ‘gender, pregnancy, leave in connection with childbirth or adoption, 
care responsibilities, ethnicity, religion, belief, disability, sexual orientation, 
gender identity, gender expression, age or combinations of these factors’.
CEDAW’s state reporting procedure clearly fed into longstanding in-
ternal contestations regarding gender-specific, gender-neutralized and in-
tersectional legal representations of gender in Norwegian equality and 
anti-discrimination law. The women’s rights movement and the Equality 
Ombud have made systematic use of CEDAW’s state reporting procedure as 
an arena in which to make different governments accountable for the pro-
posed weakening of women’s right to equality and non-discrimination. In 
the NGO shadow report commenting on Norway’s eighth periodic report to 
the CEDAW Committee, women’s organizations argued that the abolition 
of the Gender Equality Act would be
contrary to the obligation under the CEDAW, which requires dynamic 
action. Another consequence would be that differential treatment aimed 
at improving the status of women would be put on par with differential 
treatment aimed at improving the status of men.31
In her Supplementary Report to the Committee, the Equality Ombud 
commented:
If protection against discrimination on grounds of gender is incorpo-
rated in a new comprehensive Act without retaining the ‘statement of 
purpose’, the Ombud sees a danger that the work against discrimina-
tion of women can be weakened. A neutral statement of purpose in a 
comprehensive Act will obscure the fact that, as a society, Norway has 
not achieved full gender equality, and that discrimination has a gender 
perspective that still requires targeted efforts and measures aimed at 
improving the position of women in particular.32
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In its concluding comments on Norway’s eighth periodic report, the Com-
mittee noted the proposed abolition of the Gender Equality Act that set out 
to promote the position of women and expressed concern about
the use of gender-neutral legislation, policies and programs, which 
might lead to inadequate protection of women against direct and indi-
rect discrimination and hinder the achievement of substantive equality 
of women and men.33
Against this background, and after a long public debate, the Conservative 
coalition government (Solberg II) decided to propose a single equality and 
anti-discrimination act with the specific purpose of improving the position 
of women, minorities and people with disabilities. It also decided to formal-
ize existing practices in which the Equality Ombud, the Equality Tribunal 
and the lower courts provided protection against discrimination on a com-
bination of grounds.
All in all, this picture of how the Nordic countries have resisted or adopted 
the CEDAW Committee’s recommendations shows the contested terrain in 
which different gender images and legal definitions of gender equality travel 
back and forth between local, national and international legal arenas, and 
may be influenced by the imaging the countries in question wish to engage in 
of their own position on gender equality. Norway’s adoption of a combined 
gender-neutralized and gender-specific act that provides protection against 
intersectional discrimination shows how national legal struggles may be 
influenced by the desire to maintain an international reputation as a pro-
moter of women’s human rights and gender equality. It should be borne in 
mind that, when the single equality act was passed in 2017, Norway’s Prime 
Minister Erna Solberg was co-chairing with President Nana Addo Dankwa 
Akufo-Addo of Ghana the UN Secretary General’s advocacy group for 
global goals – the Millennium Development Goals, followed by the Sustain-
able Development Goals.
A Nordic equality model with five exceptions?
An examination of the CEDAW Committee’s reviews of Nordic state re-
ports has shown that Nordic gender-equality legislation and practices in 
many instances fall short of international standards. Accordingly, the CE-
DAW Committee’s concluding comments on the periodic reports of the Nor-
dic states constitute a counter-narrative to the global gender indexes that 
through statistical ranking reproduce the external idea of the Nordic coun-
tries as havens of gender equality. An examination of the CEDAW Com-
mittee’s concluding observations also reveals the disjuncture between the 
way in which the Nordic countries ‘brand’ themselves on the international 
scene and the different ways and degrees to which they resist full integration 
of international standards in their national laws. Accordingly, the CEDAW 
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Committee’s critical observations call the picture of the exceptional nature 
of the Nordic gender-equality model into question.
The diversity of approaches to national equality and anti- discrimination 
laws within the Nordic countries and their different responses to criti-
cism from the CEDAW Committee also begs the question whether Nordic 
gender- equality laws, like the Nordic welfare model, should be seen as ‘a 
model with five exceptions’ (Christiansen et al., 2006). One puzzle in this 
context is why the CEDAW Committee, in spite of the strong resistance put 
up by powerful Norwegian state actors, has had greater impact on Norwe-
gian legislation than in Sweden, Denmark and Finland. The outcome of the 
Norwegian CEDAW controversies, described in this article, suggests that 
international reputation and status are factors that under certain circum-
stances may influence national laws and policies concerning women’s rights 
and gender equality.
Notes
 1 The term ‘state feminism’ refers to cooperation between the women’s movement 
and state authorities. The idea of the women-friendly Scandinavian welfare 
states was introduced by Norwegian political scientist Helga Hernes (1987).
 2 For an overview of these developments in the Nordic countries, see Nordic In-
formation on Gender (n.d.).
 3 See CEDAW Concluding Comments on Denmark’s fourth and fifth periodic 
reports, A/57/38, para. 321; CEDAW/C/FIN/CO/6, para. 165; CEDAW/C/SWE/
CO/8-9, para. 4.
 4 In Sweden, the first independent NGO report was written in 2001 by two Swed-
ish UN organizations on behalf of the country’s women’s organizations. The 
first state-supported NGO report was written by the Swedish Women’s Lobby. 
In Finland, the first NGO report was written in 2004 and the second in 2008 
(Nousiainen and Pentikäinen, 2013). 
 5 Norway’s fifth periodic report, where comments from the Gender Equality Om-
bud, the Centre for Gender Equality, the MiRA Resource Centre for Black, 
Immigrant and Refugee Women, and the Women’s Front were attached as an 
appendix, made an exception.
 6 The report was a cooperation between FOKUS, Kompetanse- og ressurssenter i 
internasjonale kvinnespørsmål (Competence and Resource Centre for Interna-
tional Women’s Issues), Kvinnesaksforeningen (the Norwegian Association for 
Women’s Rights), Kvinnefronten (the Women’s Front) and Internasjonal kvin-
neliga for fred og frihet (Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom).
 7 CEDAW/C/NOR/CO/7, para. 5.
 8 CEDAW/C/NOR/CO/8, para. 3.
 9 Under Finland’s Constitution, binding human rights conventions take direct ef-
fect in national law (Nousiainen and Pentikäinen, 2013).
 10 CEDAW/C/SWE/CO/8-9, para. 14.
 11 CEDAW/C/DEN/CO/7, para. 15
 12 CEDAW/C/DNK/CO/8, para. 11.
 13 CEDAW/C/NOR/5 and CEDAW/C/NOR/6, para. 21.
 14 CEDAW/C/NOR/CO/7, para. 14.
 15 CEDAW/C/SWE/CO/8-9, para. 4.
 16 Proposition to the Odelsting No. 3 (1998–1999).
 17 Recommendation No. 51 (1998–1999) to the Odelsting, para 1.
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 18 CEDAW/C/NOR/5 and CEDAW/C/NOR/6, para. 21.
 19 Report No. 17 (2004–2005) to the Storting, 74–75.
20 Proposition to the Odelsting, No. 35 (2004–2005) 80.  
 21 This political promise was embedded in the socialist coalition government’s 
political statement for the governing period of 2005–2009, the so-called Soria 
Moria Declaration of 2005.
22 See the debate between in the Norwegian daily newspaper Dagbladet between 
Anne Hellum (2007) and Minister of Justice Knut Storberget (2007).
 23 Høyring – inkorporering av kvinnediskrimineringskonvensjonen i mennesker-
ettsloven, Ministry of Justice, 7 November 2008.
  
 24 Innst. O. nr. (Recommendation to the Odelsting) 115 (2008–2009).
 25 CEDAW/C/DNK/8, para. 11.
26 CEDAW/C/FIN/CO/6, para. 167.
 
  
 27 CEDAW/C/SWE/CO/8-9, para. 15.
28 CEDAW/C/SWE/CO/8, para. 15; CEDAW/C/DNK/8, para. 12.
 29 CEDAW/C/FIN/CO/7, para. 10.
  
 30 CEDAW/C/FIN/CO/7, para. 11.
 31 NGO Shadow Report to CEDAW 2011, Supplementing and Commenting on 
Norway’s Eighth Periodic Report on the Implementation of CEDAW at 10.
 32 The Equality and Anti-Discrimination Ombud’s Report to the Pre-session of the 
CEDAW. A Supplementary Report on Norway’s Eighth Official Report to the 
CEDAW Committee, p. 7.
 
 33 CEDAW/C/NOR/C08, para. 8.
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The prevailing discourse of Nordic exceptionalism is saturated by references 
to the region headlining various global indexes and indicators (Kirkebø 
et al., 2019). In 2015, Norway topped the Human Development Index and 
the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index, was second in two rule 
of law and human rights indexes, and was third in the World Economic 
Forum’s Global Gender Gap Index (Langford and Schaffer, 2015: 26). This 
index-infused narrative is not surprising. It fits neatly with the rebranding of 
the Nordic region that occurred from the 1990s onwards. During the Cold 
War, the Nordics actively constructed an image for themselves as represent-
ing a peaceful middle way between the West and the East – ‘market[ing] 
a brand of rational/modern society and international order’ (Browning, 
2007: 36). Yet, following the fall of the Soviet Union and the decline of a 
bipolar world order, this imaginary lost traction – and the region was con-
fronted with a new competition-based multilateral order fuelled by eco-
nomic globalization, multipolar geopolitics, and rising nationalism (Angell 
and Mordhorst, 2015). In this competitive environment, indexes provided a 
ready-to-hand measure of policy achievement across multiple fields, with a 
high ranking communicating ‘excellence’ and ‘exceptionalism’.
The field of gender equality was soon engulfed by this index-based excep-
tionalism discourse. Gender equality figures prominently in the global nar-
rative on Nordic exceptionalism. It is ‘one of the most prominent hallmarks 
of the Nordic model’ (Melby et al., 2009: 4, quoted in Lister, 2009: 248) and 
‘integral to Scandinavian citizenship’ (Ellingsæter and Leira, 2006: 7; and the 
Nordics ‘have distinguished themselves through their active work to promote 
gender equality’ (Nordic Council of Ministers, 2006: 7). The Nordic gender 
brand is so powerful that any apparent deviation from gender equality in 
 practice – such as Denmark’s poor performance in many indices of gender 
equality (Kirk, 2019) – is framed as an outlier rather than a challenge to the 
idea of a Nordic model, or simply not mentioned. Likewise, global indexes are 
mobilized as central evidence and artefacts in the many descriptions of Nordic 
gender equality success. Gender equality figured prominently in the early wave 
of global indexes, and the Nordics performed strongly in the first two, which 
were launched by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in 
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1995: the Gender Development Index and the Gender Inequality Index. The 
impact of these indexes on the way media reported about gender issues can be 
witnessed in their distillation into simple slogans or brands (Aspeli, 2018; Bre-
deveien, 2018). A media analysis in Norwegian newspapers of the phrase ‘the 
world’s most gender-equal country’ (‘verdens mest likestilte’) showed a rapid 
increase in the use of the phrase from 2006 (see Figure 10.1).
In this chapter, we examine critically the rise of global indexes and ask 
how they helped build and shape the idea of Nordic gender exceptional-
ism, as the region’s members moved from being Cold War–era ‘middle way 
countries’ to the ‘top of the world’ in the age of globalization. In the wake 
of the index revolution, we find a critical scholarship that raises questions 
about the material construction of such indices (Apaza, 2009) and a broader 
social scientific scholarship highlighting their symbolic power in shaping 
perceptions and policies (Mennicken and Espeland, 2019; Mau, 2020; Davis 
et al., 2012). As indexes constitute a new form of power, they have naturally 
attracted sceptical inquiry. Indexes help secure attention and influence, el-
evate status and moral authority, and, in the process, create new social and 
symbolic hierarchies, global winners and losers.
We begin the chapter by tracing the rise of global indexes and the lit-
erature on their limitations and constructive power, thereafter present-
ing critically the Nordic rankings across 78 global and 8 gender-specific 
indexes. This enables us to better understand which features of gender 
equality are captured by the indicators and what the rankings communi-
cate symbolically. We conclude by analysing the presence of indicators in 
gender- equality discourse, with a focus on the role of media diffusion. In 
so doing, we make two principal arguments: (1) that indexes powerfully and 
peculiarly shape the discourse on Nordic gender exceptionalism and (2) that 
their constructive limitations and constituent power are often underplayed 
in policy discussions.
Figure 10.1  Norwegian articles on ‘the world’s most gender-equal country’ over 
time.
Creating gender exceptionalism 193
Ranking the world
Terms like ‘indicator’ and ‘index’ refer to a ‘statistic that aims at combining 
scientific authority with normative authority’ (Davies, 2015: 285), a system-
atic presentation of information that allows for comparison among units 
over time. Indicators are ‘globally circulating knowledge technologies that 
can be used to quantify, compare and rank virtually any complex field of 
human affairs’ through the creation and defining of social phenomena by 
naming them and attaching them to data (Davis et al., 2012: 5). Today, they 
are ubiquitous, ranging from the Sustainable Development Goals to the Hu-
man Development Index (HDI) and the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Busi-
ness Index. Kelley and Simmons (2015) chart a 2,000% increase in ‘global 
performance indexes’ in the period 1994–2014, accompanied by an expan-
sion in themes that move beyond core socio-economic issues.
To be sure, indicators established themselves early in national and inter-
national governance (Gates, 1975). However, the creation of global indexes – 
combining a set of indicators in a summary and ranked form – was often the 
result of one-off experiments by experts in their respective fields without or-
ganizational support. This stands in contrast with how index production is 
integrated today as part of regular and long-term activities of an assemblage 
of organizations, classified formally as Ranking and Rating Organizations 
(RROs) (Cooley and Snyder, 2015). These RROs extend beyond interna-
tional organizations to encompass corporations, civil society organizations 
and activists, with 75% of the leading global indexes being produced in the 
USA (Kelley and Simmons, 2015). Some of these RROs, such as Freedom 
House, assemble large teams of analysts and expert advisors (up to 125 ana-
lysts and 40 advisors in the case of the Freedom in the World Index) (Ringel 
et al., 2020: 41).
The reasons for this turn to quantification are diverse. Mau (2020) re-
fers to the engines of economization and digitalization as important forces. 
Economization is represented by the turn towards markets and market 
mechanisms and the ascendance of evaluation criteria related to efficiency 
and performance. Digitalization makes the collection, storage and analysis 
of data substantially more accessible, quicke, and easier. Furthermore, in-
dicators provide a mutually acceptable means of assessment where there is 
distrust (Rosga and Satterthwaithe, 2009: 280), providing a low-cost means 
of accountability and control. Advocates and activists can make problems 
visible; and businesses and governments can monitor and control behav-
iour. Indexes are also an ideal communications tool. Offering clear, compre-
hensible and simple snapshots of complex situations, indicators constitute 
a ‘technology of distance’ that is ‘well suited for communication that goes 
beyond the boundaries of locality and communication’ (Porter, 1995: viii, 
ix). For news media, indexes helpfully simplify complex issues, provide 
ready-made narratives (some nations go up, others down), and satiate public 
interest in issues such as national security and identity.
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Despite playing an important instrumental role, indicators and indexes 
have two primary limitations, related to their statistical quality (construc-
tion) and sociological impact (unintended and intended effects). 
First, in relation to statistical quality, it is worth briefly rehearsing the 
common critiques. Indexes may suffer from a lack of construct validity be-
cause they provide a poor or over-simplistic representation of a phenomenon 
being represented. For example, the global Gender Empowerment Measure 
measures only the formal (not substantive) participation of women in pol-
itics and workplaces. Moreover, indexes may suffer from a lack of reliable 
and valid data. Recorded observations may not be an accurate reflection of 
the reality being measured, data may be missing, human bias and error or 
state interference may have affected data creation, different contexts may 
affect respondent answers, and the selection of weightings for respondent 
groups or indicators in an index may be incorrect. Finally, global indexes 
suffer often from the challenge of excessive aggregation. Seeking to amass 
many and widely varying countries and issues in a single scale often results 
in excessive simplification and a lack of differentiation. One common result 
is data truncation (Barsh, 1993: 102–103; Landman, 2004: 923). High-income 
countries are bunched at the top of the index, and it is rare to find analy-
sis on whether there are statistically significant differences in the different 
countries’ rankings.
A second set of challenges concern the interpretation and effects of in-
dexes and indicators. What indicators ‘actually communicate, and to whom, 
may not be what their producers and promulgators sought to communicate’ 
(Davis et al., 2012: 11). A common effect is the focus on the measurable. 
As Davis et al. (2012: 9) remind us, indicators embody a ‘theoretical claim 
about the appropriate standards for evaluating actors’ conduct’. If an indi-
cator is loosely matched with a standard or simply achieves prominence, it 
can quickly take on a normative life of its own. Indicators inevitably become 
substitutes for the phenomena that they are measuring – ‘what gets meas-
ured gets managed’ – rendering the indicator itself, not what it is measuring, 
the focus of social action. This includes setting the policy agenda or defining, 
maintaining and developing a problem field. For example, a consequence of 
new indexes related to ‘good governance’ is the introduction of the notion 
of ‘failed’ or ‘failing’ states (Andrews, 2008). Concepts and measurements 
introduced by RROs gain high salience and will influence how we identify, 
frame, construct, and respond to global problems.
Another effect of indexes is their mobilization of competitive modes of ac-
tion and broader use in political economy (Mau, 2020). Global performance 
indexes are a form of economic and political capital that can be used by var-
ious actors for a wide variety of purposes, which may extend beyond the 
policy problem that initially motivated the creation of a particular index. 
This secondary use is especially potent in the branding of nations. Rankings 
help construct a politics of global competition by creating a single political 
imaginary (Erkkilä and Piironen, 2018) – often through methods such as 
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national reputation management and nation-branding. Angell and Mord-
horst (2014: 186) explain that national reputation management constitutes 
a globalization of nationalism in two senses. First, ‘it changes the focus of 
national identity … to a more external orientation in which the state uses the 
country’s national reputation to promote its interests in the global market-
place’. Second, ‘national reputation management moves nationalism out of 
its traditional political, cultural and ideological field and into the domain of 
global competition for prosperity – that is, into a commercial field’.
Contemporary indexes facilitate this competition by providing ready-
made tools for comparison. Indeed, the core of the nation-branding move-
ment is the Nation Brand Index. However, the competition is not confined 
to pure commercial interests, as indexes have become a new way for states to 
build political capital and secure political influence (Kelley and Simmons, 
2015; Beaumont and Towns, 2018). Indicators create a ‘social pressure’ by 
focusing international attention on low-performing nations and organiza-
tions, and they provide valuable political capital for states or other actors 
jostling for political influence (Moss and Langford, 2020).
A final effect is the divergent causal explanations that may be mobilized 
by the same index or a diversity of indexes. On the one hand, indexes can 
strengthen or facilitate the circulation of concepts that incorporate the 
‘core value’ in a country’s success. A recent and somewhat amusing ex-
ample is the explosion of interest in and emergence of a global market for 
the Danish concept of ‘hygge’ – a common Danish and Norwegian word 
for a form of comfort. After Denmark was named the happiest country in 
the world in the 2012, 2013 and 2016 World Happiness Reports, the con-
cept of ‘hygge’ started to circulate.1 Today, there are bestselling books,2 
webpages3 and seminar series4 set up in the spirit of – or to sell – ‘hygge’. 
On the other hand, rankings and shifts in them generate, almost instan-
taneously, a demand for a readily available theory of change. To take the 
example of the World Happiness Report again, newspaper discussions of 
why Switzerland was the happiest country in the world in 2015 included 
the feature of low taxation levels; but, for Denmark in 2016, discussions 
pointed to the inverse – namely high levels of taxation (Kirkebø et al., 
2019). While more serious analyses of the causes of happiness engage with 
these competing explanations, the conflicting narratives can live on in 
parallel fashion in the public sphere.
An example of diverse or contradictory explanations can be seen in the 
field of gender equality. Within the Nordic region, different rankings are 
mobilized to portray Denmark as either a champion of gender equality or a 
low performer in comparison with the other Nordic countries. Whereas it is 
ranked as number 14 in the World Economic Forum’s Global Gender Gap 
Index, which has led to discussions as to why Denmark scores so poorly 
(Kirk, 2019), other rankings, such as the recent Equal Measures 2030 in 
which Denmark achieved the top score, made it possible for a campaign to 
brand Copenhagen as ‘the world leader in gender equality’.5
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Constructing global gender indexes
To understand the role of rankings in helping shape ideas of Nordic ex-
ceptionalism, Byrkjeflot et al. (2018) looked at 78 relevant global indexes.6 
These were identified in targeted searches and the list assembled by Cooley 
and Snyder (2015). The indexes were categorized across seven different issue 
areas: social, economic, infrastructure, governance, global contributions, 
global perspectives and gender.7 The organizations producing the indicators 
are diverse and were classified as civil society, corporation/interest group, 
research institute, or international organization.8
The average ranking in each category for each Nordic state is shown in 
Figure 10.2. From a general perspective, there are two notable trends. First, 
the Nordics perform extremely strong on all indexes, although slightly less 
so on economic and infrastructure indexes. Second, the performances of 
Iceland and Finland do not always match those of the other Scandinavian 
states – which suggests that we might need to think in terms of Scandina-
vian rather than Nordic exceptionalism.
For present purposes, what is of interest is that Figure 10.2 shows that 
the highest-ranked category for the Nordics after global contributions (e.g. 
aid) is gender. This category is composed of eight gender indexes, which 
are listed in Table 10.1 along with the last-known ranking for each Nordic 
country. These indexes are: (1) the Gender Empowerment Measure; (2) the 
Gender Development Index; (3) the Gender Inequality Index; (4) the Gender 
Equality Index; (5) the Global Gender Gap Index; (6) the Where To Be Born 
Index; (7) the Mothers Index and (8) the Social Institutions and Gender In-
dex. Not all of these indexes are focused solely on equality (nos 5–6), or are 
global (nos 7–8) or numerical (no. 8). Nonetheless, the overall pattern is gen-
erally clear. In the seven numerical indexes, the Nordics possess an average 
ranking of 3.6, with the Scandinavian bloc performing most strongly.
When we examine the construction of these eight gender indexes and the 




































Figure 10.2 Nordic countries’ average rank on global indexes.
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selection and construction of indicators is the subject of critical statistical 
literature. For example, the UNDP’s Gender Development Index (GDI) was 
first launched in 1995 to adjust the yearly Human Development Index (HDI) 
scores for the extent to which achievements on income, life expectancy, 
health and education were shared among men and women.
The GDI faced early criticism though, especially from Bardhan and 
Klasen (1999), and was subsequently revised. Nonetheless, the same authors 
later argued that caution should be exercised still in interpreting and apply-
ing the revised index in relation to high-performing countries. This is be-
cause of concerns with construct validity (choice of constituent indicators) 
and truncation (small differences between high-income countries in the in-
dicators). ‘All this tells us’, Bardhan and Klasen continue, ‘is that gender 
bias in the very crude indicators used in the HDI – life expectancy, literacy, 
gross enrolments, and ‘adjusted’ income – [is] indeed very small in most rich 
countries’. Yet, they conclude by noting:
At the same time, this does not mean that more subtle gender inequali-
ties do not exist in rich countries […] that may have a substantial impact 
on human development. It is just that the HDI and GDI are too crude 
to pick up these more subtle inequalities.
(Bardhan and Klasen, 2000: 194)
The implications of these concerns become clear when one compares the Nor-
dics on a neglected indicator such as parental leave. Norway and Sweden have 
adopted policies that push fathers to take parental leave, while Denmark has 
taken a very different approach, with a weaker institutionalization of leave 
conditions and greater focus on individual freedom for each family. In Den-
mark, the focus is less on gender equality and more on children’s rights (Bor-
chorst and Siim, 2008). However, the highly aggregated scores above do not 
provide this level of understanding or nuance: Denmark significantly outper-
forms Sweden in the GDI but not on this dimension of gender development.
Likewise, the Gender Empowerment Measure has been criticized on meas-
urement grounds. The index includes formal measures of women’s empow-
erment: share of parliamentary seats; share of administrative, professional, 
technical and managerial positions; and share of earned income. Yet, even 
though the index ‘captures some aspects of female agency, it is questionable 
how well the GEM measure at present fully captures economic and political 
power held by women and their role in the development process’ (Bardhan and 
Klasen, 1999: 1000). This concern, however, is more relevant to those countries 
with strong use of quotas in formal representative bodies with little power, 
such as China and Cuba. A more relevant critique for the Nordics is that there 
are reliability challenges in comparing industries across countries and that in-
dexes do not take into account strong internal regional disparities within coun-
tries (Pillarisetti and McGillivray, 1998: 202; Kirkebø and Langford, 2019).
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Second, the choice of data has been subject to critique. A common element 
in global indexes is expert panels or survey data (Kirkebø and Langford, 
2019). The Global Gender Gap Index from the World Economic Forum is 
a case in point, as it includes surveys of executives alongside statistics from 
international organizations. The risk is that images of certain countries 
become reinforcing. In the Global Gender Gap Index, the Nordics score 
very highly, and their performance is particularly strong on two of the five 
areas measured: politics and economic participation. Such an index allows 
Denmark to rank quite highly, yet other long-standing indexes show Den-
mark lagging significantly behind on pay gap and participation. In relation 
to equal pay, Denmark is ranked at 52, whereas it is ranked 102 in relation 
to female participation in business (Kolberg, 2020). Indeed, less than 10% 
of businesses have a female leader, with a greater number being led by men 
called Lars (Knudsen, 2018).
Third, indexes can be interpreted in problematic ways, especially through 
the conflation of relative and absolute performance. Rankings do exactly 
what the term suggests – they rank; they do not provide any information 
about whether the level of performance is satisfactory. In practice, however, 
they are often interpreted in absolute terms. This unintended consequence 
was noted early with the Gender Development Index: ‘As expected, no coun-
try has a GDI as high as its HDI, suggesting that all countries have some 
gender gaps in at least one of their components’ (Bardhan and Klasen, 1999: 
989).
The role and power of global gender indexes
Moving beyond statistical questions, the potential power of indexes on Nor-
dic gender exceptionalism discourse is arguably palpable. To study this, we 
performed a quantitative media content analysis of the role of indexes in 
strengthening gender exceptionalism. Using the global m360 media retrieval 
service, we identified 6,809 articles in English-speaking online media con-
taining the words ‘Nordic’ and ‘index’ in the period between January 2012 
and 30 June 2018. The most commonly mentioned thematic words – which 
are the subject of indexes or objects of substantive comparison – are listed 
in Figure 10.3. Two of the most common themes are the performance of the 
business and pharmaceutical sectors, but a range of socio-economic themes 
also feature strongly, such as happiness, work, technology and war. What is 
most striking, though, is the prominence of gender. ‘Women and girls’ are 
the fourth most-mentioned, and ‘gender’ the sixth most-mentioned.
How are we to interpret these results? A decision tree analysis of linked 
phrases and words shows not only that gender is prominent, but also how 
global indexes in general power the discourse of Nordic gender excep-
tionalism. On the one hand, many media articles refer to specific gender- 
specific indexes. One newspaper article discussing this index, on female 
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participation in the technology industry, contains the following discussion 
of a low performer:
[India’s Global Gender Gap Index ranking has declined with] a widen-
ing of its gender gaps in Political Empowerment… healthy life expec-
tancy and basic literacy.
And then a high performer:
[Iceland] has closed more than 87% of its overall gender gap… the first 
in the world to [make] ‘paying men more than women’ illegal.
On the other hand, many of the decision trees concern other non-gender in-
dexes, yet still address gender. When this occurs, the high performers (often 
some Nordic countries) are mentioned together with low or other perform-
ers. For example, looking at a specific article, which discusses a global index 
on competitiveness, we see one way in which gender enters:
The 2018 Global Talent Competitiveness Index benchmarks how coun-
tries and cities expand, attract and retain talent…. The Nordic countries 































Figure 10.3  Ranking of thematic words in Nordic and index media content analysis 
(by counts).
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score remarkably well on most variables related to collaboration, inter-
nal openness, social mobility and gender equality but they struggle in 
external openness….. Norway again tops the index.
(NBR, 2018, emphasis added)
This broader focus on gender across many different indexes reveals a sim-
ple but powerful phenomenon: There is a gender dimension to almost all 
datasets. Indicators are often disaggregated by gender – as it is the easiest 
background characteristic to measure (a binary in most cases) and has been 
measured for a long time. Alternatively, as in the example of the Global 
Talent Competitiveness Index above, a gender dimension is included in the 
index. The result is that, in the discussion of virtually any index, there is a 
good chance that countries that perform well or poorly on its gender dimen-
sion are mentioned. Thus, what is powerful for the purposes of discourse is 
not just the specific gender indexes but gender performance in all indexes.
Moving beyond the role of indexes in diffusing and strengthening Nordic 
gender exceptionalism, some comments on the broader power of indexes 
on shaping our understanding of Nordic gender equality are warranted. As 
foreshadowed, the power of gender indexes to mobilize contrasting images 
of the Nordics is also apparent. Like Kirk (2019), Teigen and Skjeie (2017) 
place Denmark consistently below the other Nordic countries on most in-
dicators, and identify Sweden as the frontrunner. Yet, other indexes show 
Denmark performing at a level that is just as high as that of the other Nor-
dic countries. This illustrates how the Nordic model may be sustained even 
when there is a controversy related to the performance of some of the coun-
tries associated with the model.
Equally, there is the power of indicators in driving causal explanations. 
For example, examining national statistics from the Nordic countries in the 
1990s, Skevik (2006: 260) points out that Nordic mothers raising their child 
alone are less likely to live in poverty than other mothers in a similar situ-
ation.9 Skevik attributes this to the Nordic approach to parental leave and 
the high degree of employment for women, although the analysis does not 
indicate a causal relationship between the two. Frazer and Marlier (2007) 
come to a similar conclusion as Skevik, pointing to inclusive family policies, 
including parental leave, as an explanation for comparatively less family 
poverty in the Nordic countries. Reflecting on statistics measuring division 
of labour in the home, Lister (2009: 261) argues, however, that the belief in 
the effectiveness of policies among the Nordics weighs heavier than the ac-
tual effect of the policies.
However, the effect is not only global – it may also be national. The 
branding of nations may be intentionally or unintentionally directed at a 
domestic audience (Moss and Langford, 2020). Towns (2002) argues that the 
gender-equality identity created and branded in Sweden has divisive effects. 
She argues that ‘this equality discourse has also become implicated in a 
new inequality, namely the hierarchical categorization of the population of 
Sweden into “Swedes” and “immigrants”’ (Towns, 2002: 157). The gendered 
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effects of national self-understanding can also be evident in discussions of 
LGBT rights. Populist critiques of migrants have politicized the conserva-
tism of certain migrant communities on the question of sexual minorities – 
culminating in the emergence of a homonationalist discourse (Puar, 2007). 
Interestingly, Freude and Bosch (2020) find that Sweden has the fourth- 
largest homonational grouping in its population – with a high correlation 
between LGBT tolerance and racism.
This ‘dark side’ of index success deserves greater attention. Do positive 
rankings have a negative effect on willingness to impose new regulation or 
policy to tackle gender issues, given the comparative achievement of the 
Nordics, or provide easy ammunition for populist critiques? Moreover, in 
a global perspective, does the possibility of influencing policy development 
lead to an overplaying of regional success, as we see, for example, when 
Norwegian officials cooperate with EU officials to develop European poli-
cies on prostitution and gender equality, branding and conceptualizing the 
Nordic model of criminalisation of sex purchase in the process (Langford 
and Skilbrei, 2021)?
Conclusion
This chapter has argued that contemporary understandings of Nordic gen-
der exceptionalism cannot be divorced from the role of global indexes. These 
indexes are regularly called upon and mobilized to justify images and im-
aginaries of gender exceptionalism in the Nordic region, as others have also 
noted in this book. This chapter has argued that global indexes may con-
tribute to the shaping of Nordic gender exceptionalism in two discrete ways.
The first is that the prominence of gender in the reporting of indexes (both 
general and gender-specific) creates and maintains a ‘background’ discourse10 
on Nordic exceptionalism. This is driven by the inherent forces within sta-
tistical constructions: Gender is easily operationalizable and thus easily 
included as an element in an index or a background attribute for disaggrega-
tion. It is also shaped by the structure of indicator discourse. Index narratives 
commonly include high and low performers, or those improving or worsen-
ing their position. Thus, the index discourse is arguably constantly skewed 
towards the production of a narrative on Nordic gender exceptionalism.
The second is that global indexes have created a new discourse for gender 
exceptionalism: policy characteristics and achievements are often expressed 
quantitatively in competitive and ranked form. Parsing these developments, 
this chapter has sought to shed light on the statistical underpinnings and 
limitations of the indexes and their latent authority in policy discussions – in 
other words, their constructive and constituent power. It is argued that some 
caution should be exercised in their naïve reception and use. The simplifi-
cation and resilience of gender indexes occlude a range of gender-equality 
paradoxes in the Nordic region and the politics behind their mobilization.
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Notes
 1 See Green (2016, 2017). 
 2 See, for example, Wiking (2016); see Higgins (2016) for a list of books on hygge.
 3 See https://www.hyggelife.com/.
 4 See https://www.hygge.nyc/.
 5 For the branding of Copenhagen, see Lubanski (2019); for the ranking, see Equal 
Measures 2030 (2019).
 6 A full overview of indexes and their classification is found online at https://
www.uio.no/english/research/strategic-research-areas/nordic/research/ 
research-groups/nordic-branding/research-projects/dataset-of-indexes.html. 
As this chapter focuses on the Nordic countries, indexes that do not include a 
majority of the Nordic countries have been excluded from the analysis. Most of 
the Nordic countries are included in all indexes, but Iceland appears in fewer 
than the rest.
 7 Social indexes include those that focus on social issues – that is, social justice, re-
ligion, child survival, happiness and hunger. Economic indexes measure degree 
of globalization, innovation, tax and finance. Infrastructure includes access to 
internet, connectedness and access to data. Governance indicators deal with 
issues of democracy, freedom, rule of law and peace. There are comparatively 
fewer global contributions and global perspectives indexes. For the former, we 
have included commitment to philanthropy and development; for the latter, 
passport power and good country/nation brands. The last category on gender 
includes indexes that have a gender perspective, measuring development, em-
powerment and gender gaps.
 8 No states were directly responsible for their production even though they were 
included as possible actors in the initial coding manual.
 9 In another study, Skevik (2006b: 225) compares poverty in the Nordic countries 
to that in the UK and Netherlands. In the Nordics, the poverty rate is between 
5% and 17%, while the rate for the UK and the Netherlands is 40%.
 10 See Schmidt (2008: 304) on discursive institutionalism and the power of chang-
ing ideas in shaping ‘background ideational abilities’.
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What is the role of gender and gender equality in branding the Nordic 
states? This is a question of obvious political significance and academic in-
terest. In setting out to answer it, the editors of this collection have had high 
ambitions – ambitions that have been met over the preceding pages, in part 
by rephrasing the question. As demonstrated in the different chapters of 
this book, we should probably rather ask, ‘What roles do gender and gender 
equality play in the relations between the Nordic states and the world?’ The 
answers provided are far from straightforward, and, as with all good intel-
lectual answers, they bring out additional puzzles. Over the next few pages, 
I will highlight some of these puzzles. I would nevertheless like to preface 
my concluding comments by emphasizing that these puzzles arise from a set 
of tightly argued, conceptually informed and empirically strong chapters. 
This collection demonstrates in full the benefits of bringing together a di-
verse team of scholars to study one fairly specified topic from a number of 
different angles.
To better be able to evaluate the practices discussed in this volume, we 
need to engage with the basic conceptual frameworks, starting with the no-
tion of place branding, which is a fairly new concept in the social sciences. 
Its attraction lies in its capacity for increasing our understanding of how 
cities, regions and states seek to create affective connections between places 
and people. In its most basic sense, place branding is about creating a bond 
between a place and consumers willing to pay to experience and/or share in 
the perceived qualities of said place. It is also a concept based on a market 
understanding of competition: one place’s gain is most likely some other 
place’s loss. Typically associated with efforts to attract tourists, entrepre-
neurs and investments, it has recently also been associated with states’ ef-
forts to increase influence or improve reputation (Dinnie, 2015). At that 
stage, the concept comes in touch with other ways of conceptualizing state 
behaviour or capacity directed at other countries and populations, such as 
public diplomacy and soft power. The boundary between place branding 
and public diplomacy in particular is blurry (but see Szondi, 2008; Cull, 
2019). To be very crude, one could argue that public diplomacy is about win-






What is often lost in conceptual discussions like this, however, is the simple 
question of why? Why, beyond profit or affection, do states want to be seen 
and recognized?
One potentially productive way of framing the debates about nation- 
branding and public diplomacy is to consider them both subsumed under 
the broader motivations of status, prestige and reputation. Going back to 
Hobbes, it has been assumed that states seek not only power and wealth, 
but also status. Recent theoretical discussions have led to an appreciation 
of status as an autotelic goal: it does not have to be explained as subservient 
to any other goal, it is its own goal.1 While status has often been associated 
with great-power aspirations and conflicts, there are many reasons why one 
would assume status to be even more important to small powers and middle 
powers (Wohlforth et al., 2018). For those states, moral authority, rather 
than brute force, is the sought-after source of status. And, to return to the 
case at hand, gender equality has become one of the many dimensions along 
which moral authority at the state level is conferred (Towns, 2010).
Reframing the questions about gender and gender equality in the external 
activities of the Nordic countries in terms of status has at least three imme-
diate advantages. The first advantage is that status expands the scope and 
reduces the reliance on agency. Analysing processes in the light of public 
diplomacy and nation-branding requires a strategic outlook, active agency 
and an underlying premise that states are pursuing specific actions (like 
promoting gender equality) to achieve something else (like increasing prof-
its). The analytical lenses of status and status-seeking, on the other hand, 
allow us to make sense of less explicitly goal-oriented activities and mixed 
motivations.2 The second advantage is that status, as currently perceived, 
is social and relational, where nation-branding and, to some extent, public 
diplomacy are unidirectional. A status lens highlights complexity at home 
and abroad. On the one hand, it emphasizes how domestic politics can shape 
status-seeking and how the domestic resonance of status-seeking matters to 
its likelihood of success (Beaumont, 2020). On the other hand, it leads our 
attention to the external recognition of status, how it can be associated with 
circles of recognition, club membership and relative ranking (Røren, 2020), 
and also how there is a marked difference between formally equal-status 
relationships and relationships more in the teacher–pupil mould. The third 
advantage is reducing anachronism. Public diplomacy and nation-branding 
are relatively new concepts of both practice and analysis. Applying them to 
activities from before the middle of the twentieth century can create inter-
esting juxtapositions but can also lead us to misguided analyses. Status and 
reputation, on the other hand, have been acknowledged motivations of state 
behaviour for centuries. As was noted in the Norwegian parliament in 1864, 
for smaller states, ‘honour and prestige are even more important than for the 
greater powers’ (cited in Leira, 2015: 22).
Turning to the preceding chapters, status does unlock a number of what 
might seem puzzling insights if the latter are viewed solely through the 
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lens of nation-branding. To start with a combination of all of the points 
above, reforms pushing gender equality and other gendered topics were not 
originally conceptualized for external strategic aims. On the contrary, as 
Larsen demonstrates in her chapter, it took American activists to make the 
case for the Nordics as pioneers. Gender equality was not originally con-
ceived as a branding strategy. It was something that these states engaged 
in, which gradually became part of national identity/self-images and much 
later seemed to possibly be usable in public diplomacy/nation-branding 
to increase status/prestige. And it is not as if these states were not status- 
conscious at the time when gender equality was first put on the agenda. 
When one of the Norwegian foreign policy intellectuals discussed a future 
foreign policy in the run-up to Norwegian independence in 1905, he wanted 
to emphasize international law, not necessarily to stake a claim as a ‘pio-
neering people’, but to emphasize, ‘it will be our honour to have partaken 
in creating a new age and an era of peace among men’ (cited in Leira, 2013: 
344). As small states, the Nordics wanted to be recognized; gender equality 
was just not one of the fields that they considered to offer such recognition. 
In recent years, however, policies such as the Swedish rape legislation have 
been crafted with at least some consideration for the example to be set, as 
demonstrated by Skilbrei. But even while the Nordics are eager to promote 
their high ranking on different gender performance indexes, as discussed by 
Kirkebø, Langford and Byrkjeflot, it is not obvious that this self-perceived 
and index-reinforced exceptionalism has any instrumental consequences 
beyond status affirmation.
Many of the chapters touch upon the domestic side of status-seeking. To 
be effective, status-seeking must be built around something that the domes-
tic audience acknowledges as salient to the self-image. While gender equal-
ity is certainly part of the self-image of the Nordic states, it is expressed in 
different ways and also ‘usable’ for diplomats in different ways. As Jezierska 
and Towns demonstrate, the place of gender in the different national narra-
tives is, so to speak, ‘on brand’ (with Norway focusing on nature, Sweden on 
progress, Finland on function, and so on). Domestic politics also spill over 
into how the state projects outwards. While it is, for instance, relatively un-
controversial for a centre-left Swedish government to engage in a ‘feminist’ 
foreign policy, for a similar Norwegian government such a label would not 
fly domestically. There, ‘gender equality’ is the commonly accepted frame. 
As explored in different ways in the chapters by Moss and by Skjelsbæk 
and Tryggestad, similar hesitations influence how diplomats are able to uti-
lize gender issues. To use the Norwegian case as an example, it seems that, 
in diplomatic practice, the self-identity as a ‘peace nation’ trumps the self- 
identity as gender-progressive.
Turning to the outside, it becomes even more obvious how gender and 
gender equality have seldom been about branding at all. As Ginalski 
demonstrates, the Nordic policies on gender quotas (which have never been 
pushed hard as examples by the Nordic states) have been used actively in 
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Swiss debates. This illustrates on one hand the lack of Nordic control over 
foreign uptake of their policies, on the other the importance of how the Nor-
dics have pursued different policies. The lack of control over uptake is also 
obvious in how sexual liberation at home has been perceived as promis-
cuity abroad. In general, the Nordics have been gender-progressive, but in 
different ways, leading them to be ‘usable’ in debates and as examples in 
different ways. The lack of control is also obvious in what we could call the 
‘boomerang effect’, or the feedback loop of claiming status as a pioneer, as 
demonstrated by Hellum. Promoting a norm like gender equality globally 
might come back to challenge you at home when global norms move beyond 
your position. At that stage, as Erlingsdóttir discusses, internal actors might 
use outside perceptions to change domestic policy. The perceived foreign 
association of Iceland with gender equality could be utilized domestically 
to push for even further equality.
In more indirect ways, the different chapters also demonstrate the im-
portance of a differentiated approach to the analysis of status-seeking. The 
Nordic countries generally form each other’s most important circle of rec-
ognition. This implies that relative ranking within the group, albeit friendly, 
is paramount (Røren, 2020). With Sweden leading the way with a feminist 
foreign policy, the other states might just decide to focus elsewhere. The re-
gional dynamics also imply that gender issues might not be seen as ‘usable’ 
for status purposes by the individual states. Moving beyond the region and 
approaching the rest of the world, as discussed by Holst and Teigen, there is 
a distinct teacher–pupil dynamic in play in how the Nordics push the gen-
der agenda. Even though diplomats might want to tone down the notion of 
‘moral superiority’, the states have been reluctant to accept that other states 
have advanced the agenda of gender equality beyond the Nordic example.
Overall, this volume demonstrates in detailed and varied ways how gender 
issues and gender equality have been interweaved with how the Nordic states 
present themselves to the world. Being gender-equal is obviously part of the 
self-image of the Nordic states, and it also matters for how they interact with 
the world. Self-consciousness of being pioneers matters to regional identity- 
building and branding, but is on the other hand not necessarily something 
the individual states can mobilize to increase status. Paradoxically, the Nor-
dic brand has been thoroughly gendered, but, for status- seeking purposes, 
gender has proved surprisingly unhelpful. Perhaps if everyone knows that 
you are the most gender-equal countries in the world, there is little to gain by 
demonstrating that you have become even more equal?
Notes
 1 Structuring the discussion, we could then start from the assumption that states 
care about status (or prestige/image/reputation). One of the ways in which states 
have tried to increase or retain their status over the last decades is through pub-
lic diplomacy. One specific form of public diplomacy (or possibly an activity that 
overlaps to some degree with public diplomacy) is place branding.
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 2 Status could, for instance, help to make sense of the promotion of gender equal-
ity as a case of a combination of utilitarian norm-diffusion and self-interested 
status-seeking.
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